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Abstract 
This thesis engages with the following three questions. First, how should the 
presence of risk and ambiguity affect how we distribute a benefit to which 
individuals have competing claims? (In line with common use in decision 
theory, a case involves risk when we can assign at least subjective 
probabilities to outcomes and it involves ambiguity when we cannot assign 
such probabilities.) Second, what is it about the imposition of a risk of harm 
itself (that is, independently of the resulting harm), such as the playing of 
Russian roulette on strangers, which calls for justification? Third, in the 
pursuit of the greater (expected) good, when is it permissible to foreseeably 
generate harms for others through enabling the agency of evildoers? 
 
Chapters 1 through 3 of the thesis provide an answer the first question. 
Chapter 1 defends the importance of a unique complaint of unfairness that 
arises in risky distributive cases: that sometimes individuals are better off at 
the expense of others. Chapter 2 defends a view called Fairness as Proper 
Recognition of Claims which guides how a decision-maker ought to act in 
cases where individuals have unequal claims to a good. Chapter 3 considers 
how the presence of ambiguity affects distributive fairness, and defends an 
egalitarian account of the evaluation of ambiguous prospects.  
 
Chapter 4 provides an answer to the second question through a defence of 
the Insecurity Account, which is a unique way in which impositions of risks 
of harm can be said to harm individuals, namely by rendering the victim’s 
interests less secure.  
 
Chapter 5 provides an answer to the third question by defending what I call 
the Moral Purity Account, to explain when it is permissible to provide aid in 
cases where individuals are harmed as a foreseeable consequence of the 
provision of such aid.  
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Introduction 
Core Questions 
This thesis engages with the following three questions. First, how should the 
presence of risk and ambiguity affect how we distribute a benefit to which 
individuals have competing claims? (In line with common use in decision 
theory, I shall say that a case involves risk when we can assign at least 
subjective probabilities to outcomes and that it involves ambiguity when we 
cannot assign such probabilities.) Second, what is it about the imposition of 
a risk of harm itself (that is, independently of the resulting harm), such as the 
playing of Russian roulette on strangers, which calls for justification? Third, 
in the pursuit of the greater (expected) good, when is it permissible to 
foreseeably generate harms for others through enabling the agency of 
evildoers? 
Chapters 1 through 3 of the thesis provide an answer the first question. 
Chapter 1 defends the importance of a unique complaint of unfairness that 
arises in risky distributive cases: that sometimes individuals are better off at 
the expense of others. Chapter 2 defends a view called Fairness as Proper 
Recognition of Claims which guides how a decision-maker ought to act in 
cases where individuals have unequal claims to a good. Chapter 3, which is 
joint work with Alex Voorhoeve, considers how the presence of ambiguity 
affects distributive fairness, and defends an egalitarian account of the 
evaluation of ambiguous prospects.  
Chapter 4 provides an answer to the second question through a defence of 
the Insecurity Account, which is a unique way in which impositions of risks 
of harm can be said to harm individuals, namely by rendering the victim’s 
interests less secure.  
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Chapter 5 provides an answer to the third question by defending what I call 
the Moral Purity Account, to explain when it is permissible to provide aid in 
cases where individuals are harmed as a foreseeable consequence of the 
provision of such aid.  
Competing Claims 
The theme of “competing claims” is the thread that runs through the thesis. 
The first three chapters go some way towards providing an account of how 
one ought to act in distributive cases with competing claims, taking into 
account variables such as the type of risks – whether they are, for instance, 
correlated or independent – (Chapter 1), the number of individuals with 
claims of varying strength (Chapter 2) and various levels of probabilistic 
information (Chapter 3).  
Before proceeding, I shall briefly comment on the nature of competing 
claims.1 Suppose I have a medicine, which I myself have no use for, and an 
individual needs this medicine in order to survive. This individual has a 
claim on me that they receive the medicine. The strength of this claim can be 
measured by how much this individual’s well-being would be increased by 
receiving the good and by how badly off they are compared to others 
(Voorhoeve, 2014: 66). Individuals do not have claims to a good if their 
interests are not at stake. Now suppose that there are two individuals who 
both require the medicine in order to survive. If and only if the claims of 
these individuals cannot be jointly satisfied, then these claims are in 
competition with one another. The chapters in this thesis revolve around such 
cases. It is worth noting that claims may be influenced by other factors as 
                                                          
1 The competing claims approach has its roots in the work of Thomas Nagel (1979: 106-27; 
1991). The most popular exposition of a competing claims approach can be found in the 
development of contractualist moral theory (Scanlon, 1998).  
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well, such as the nature of the agency involved in producing a benefit or 
harm. Indeed, Chapter 5 considers how one ought to act when one set of 
individuals has a claim to medical assistance, and another group has a claim 
against being killed by a villainous aggressor.   
One particular virtue of the competing claims approach is that it respects 
both the unity of individuals and what is often called the “separateness of 
persons”. 2 The former establishes that one has reason to balance benefits 
and burdens for an individual with an eye towards their prospective good. 
(This is true both across times in an individual’s life – e.g. a burden today 
may be outweighed by a somewhat larger benefit later in their life – and 
across an individual’s potential futures – e.g. a chance of a burden for them 
may be outweighed by an equal chance of a greater benefit to them). The 
latter establishes that, because individuals lead separate lives, it is 
inappropriate to balance benefits and burdens across individuals as if they 
were a super-individual. A present or possible burden for an individual can 
be compensated by a future or possible benefit, whereas a burden to one 
individual cannot straightforwardly be compensated by giving a benefit to 
another person. The views defended in the first three chapters are 
appropriately sensitive to the unity of the individual and the separateness of 
persons. 
Risk and Ambiguity 
Sven Ove Hansson has claimed that throughout history “moral theorizing 
has referred predominantly to a deterministic world in which the morally 
                                                          
2 Utilitarianism famously fails to respect the separateness of persons because it treats a 
collection of individuals as if they were a super-individual (Rawls, 1999: 26-7). Otsuka 
(2012) presses separateness of persons objections to prioritarianism. Voorhoeve and 
Fleurbaey (2012) offer a competing claims account which respects the separateness of 
persons.  
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relevant properties of human actions are both well-determined and 
knowable. … Ethics still lives in a Newtonian world.” (2003: 291). The 
project of determining how one ought to act under conditions of risk and 
ambiguity is of great importance, since we do not live in such a world. There 
has been a recent blossoming in the ethics of risk literature, particularly in 
distributive ethics (see, e.g. Broome, 1984; Otsuka and Voorhoeve, 2009; 
Parfit, 2012; Hyams, 2015), and the ethics of imposing risks of harm (see, e.g. 
McCarthy, 1997; Finkelstein, 2003; Lenman, 2008; Oberdiek, 2009 & 2012). 
This thesis makes contributions to these two important areas.3  
Furthermore, the thesis enters a new area in the ethics of risk, namely 
distributive ethics under conditions of ambiguity. An individual is in an 
ambiguous situation when they are not able to assign precise subjective 
probabilities to states of the world and the associated possible outcomes of 
their actions. The vast majority of the ethics of risk literature considers cases 
where it is at least possible in principle to assign precise probabilities. This 
altogether bypasses the common scenario in which it is often not possible to 
establish precise probabilities of states of the world. Distributive ethics 
under conditions of ambiguity is therefore of great practical importance.  
Outline of the Thesis  
The thesis can be categorised roughly into two parts. The first part (Chapters 
1-3) examines questions of distributive fairness under conditions of risk and 
                                                          
3 Another recent off-shoot of the ethics of risk literature concerns the ability of 
contractualism to accommodate risk. Since contractualism, in the form outlined by Scanlon, 
focuses on undiscounted complaints of individuals to a particular policy, it seems to be “too 
confining”, since activities that impose a small risk of death on everyone whilst also giving 
each a small benefit (e.g. the benefits everyone receives from permitting air travel, vs. the 
small risk that there will be one death from falling plane debris) will be outlawed because 
the complaint of the one who will die will outweigh the small inconvenience of those who 
forgo a small benefit (Scanlon, 1998; Reibetanz, 1998; Ashford, 2003; James, 2012; Frick, 2015; 
Kumar, 2015). I will bracket an explicit discussion of this off-shoot of the literature.    
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ambiguity. In such cases, individuals have competing claims to a good and a 
morally-motivated decision-maker has to decide how to distribute the good. 
The second part (Chapters 4-5) considers the relationship between imposing 
risk, harming, and benefitting. The outlines of the five chapters are as 
follows.   
Chapter 1 asks how a morally-motivated decision-maker ought to act under 
conditions of risk when (i) only the interests of one person are at stake; and 
(ii) the interests of multiple other people are at stake. The chapter defends a 
competing claims account to guide how a decision-maker ought to act in 
such cases. Against recent writings of Michael Otsuka, Alex Voorhoeve, and 
Marc Fleurbaey, it argues that one ought to maximise each person’s 
expected utility not merely in single-person cases without inequality, but 
also in many-person cases with guaranteed (or likely) outcome inequality, 
when such inequality is the result of independent risks. At the centre of this 
account is a distinct complaint of unfairness: that some will (or might be) 
made better off at the expense of others. This occurs when the fates of 
individuals are tied in such a way that inequality that is to the detriment of 
the person who is worse off is guaranteed (or likely) to obtain. The chapter 
therefore considers how different types of risk (e.g. independent and 
inversely correlated risks) can make a moral difference to how one should 
act.  
Chapter 2 continues on the theme of distributive ethics under conditions of 
risk, and asks what fairness requires when individuals have unequal claims 
to a good. Some have argued that what fairness requires depends on the 
strength of claims of those who have their interests at stake (Broome, 1990; 
Piller, forthcoming). On this view, when claims are very unequal, fairness 
13 
 
requires giving the good directly to the person with the strongest claim, and 
when claims are slightly unequal, fairness requires the use of a weighted 
lottery. Others have questioned the contribution to fairness made by 
weighted lotteries and have argued that fairness requires that the person 
with the strongest claim ought to receive the good directly (Hooker, 2005: 
348-9; Lazenby 2014). The chapter argues that fairness requires a weighted 
lottery in such cases, and in demonstrating this, outlines and defends an 
account of distributive fairness called Fairness as Proper Recognition of Claims. 
This account provides a justification for lotteries in cases with unequal 
claims and is, it will be argued, appropriately sensitive to changes to the 
number and strength of claims. The chapter makes a contribution to the 
recent fair distribution literature by providing a novel account for the 
justification of weighted lotteries in cases with indivisible goods.4   
Chapter 3 considers the ethics of distribution under conditions of ambiguity. 
It argues against the use of a version of the ex ante Pareto principle applied 
to ambiguous prospects, or “Pareto under Ambiguity”, for short. It rejects 
this principle on two grounds. One is familiar from discussions of the ex ante 
Pareto principle under risk, namely that it conflicts with egalitarian concerns 
(see, e.g. Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve 2013). The other is novel: we show that 
prospects that are ambiguous at the individual level may be far less so at the 
social level. An ambiguity-averse distributor, who rightly considers the 
                                                          
4 This is an underrepresented position within the contemporary debate on the ethics of fair 
distribution. Broome (1990) and Piller (forthcoming) consider the fairness of weighted 
lotteries for some cases of unequal claims, but my account argues that fairness requires the 
use of weighted lotteries in such cases. To my knowledge, this is not a position that has been 
extensively defended. However, weighted lotteries have often been defended in the 
literature of “saving the greater number”, where it is either possible to save one individual, 
or a group of individuals (Kamm, 1993; Otsuka, 2006; Saunders, 2009). The cases I discuss 
do not involve options where it is possible to save a whole group, but rather involve 
separate individuals. 
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latter level, may therefore correctly favour a set of ambiguous individual 
prospects that eliminates social ambiguity, even when one would not prefer 
this set of individual prospects on any individual’s behalf.   
Chapters 1 and 3 outline new reasons to depart from what would maximise 
each individual’s expected utility in distributive cases under conditions of 
risk and ambiguity. Chapter 1 argues that one should sometimes depart 
from what is best for each individual taken separately when there is a 
complaint that one is better off at the expense of others. Chapter 3 argues 
that one should sometimes depart from what is best for each individual 
because of social ambiguity-aversion.  
Chapter 4 moves onto the question of when it is permissible to impose a risk 
of harm on others. The chapter asks what it is that gives impositions of risk 
themselves (that is, even when they do not result in material harm) moral 
significance, and thereby be the sort of thing that can be impermissible. The 
chapter examines, and rejects, four candidate views of the moral significance 
of risking. The first states that risks of harm are not themselves harms, and 
therefore, that if imposing a risk of harm were to possess moral significance 
it is not because of its harmfulness (Perry, 1995, 2003). A second view states 
that the potential impermissibility of imposing a risk arises from the fact that 
a risky act may itself wrong the victim. A third view is that an imposition of 
a risk of harm’s impermissibility stems from the fact that it curtails the 
victim’s autonomy (Oberdiek, 2009, 2012). A fourth view uses a preference-
based account to argue that because these risks are dispreferred by the 
person exposed to them, an imposition of risk of harm is itself a harm, and 
thereby possesses moral significance (Finkelstein, 2003). In contrast to all 
these accounts, the chapter outlines and defends a novel account of the 
15 
 
moral significance of imposing a risk of harm, called the Insecurity of Interests 
Account. It is argued that what gives an imposition of a risk its moral 
significance is that it renders the victim’s interests less secure. As well as 
providing a unique account of what it is that is morally significant about 
impositions of risk, the account complements the value of chances view that 
is defended in Chapter 1 by outlining why it is that risks of harm can have 
disvalue for an individual. 
Chapter 5 considers a case of competing claims between those who wish to 
be saved from harm by rescuers and those who wish to avoid being harmed 
by evildoers. The chapter asks the following question: In the pursuit of the 
greater (expected) good, when is it permissible to foreseeably contribute to 
harm on innocent others through enabling the agency of evildoers? The 
chapter outlines and defends what is called the Moral Purity Account to both 
explain when it is permissible to provide aid in such cases and determine 
when aiders bear moral responsibility for the harms imposed by another. 
This is contrasted with a recent account by Jennifer Rubenstein (2015) which 
she calls the Spattered Hands view. According to this view, aiders sometimes 
have a responsibility to grudgingly accept contributing to injustices 
perpetrated by others. When they do so, they bear a degree of moral 
responsibility for those harmful actions. It is argued that the Moral Purity 
Account is superior to Rubenstein’s account, and it is claimed that when 
suitably motivated, aiders are not blameworthy for the actions of evildoers. 
This chapter stakes out terrain in an area that is relatively under-theorised, 
and has great practical importance.  
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Chapter 1 
Risk and the Unfairness of Some Being Better Off 
at the Expense of Others5 
1.1 Introduction 
How should a morally-motivated decision-maker act under conditions of 
risk when (i) only the interests of one person are at stake; and (ii) the 
interests of multiple other people are at stake? 6 This chapter defends a 
competing claims account to guide how a decision-maker ought to act in 
such cases. At the centre of this account is a distinct complaint of unfairness: 
that sometimes some are better off at the expense of others.  
The chapter has three subsidiary aims. The first is to demonstrate how the 
type of risk that one is exposed to can make a moral difference to how one 
should act. There has been little systematic discussion of this question. The 
second is to outline and defend a unique complaint of unfairness: that 
sometimes some are better off at the expense of others. I argue that 
competing claims obtain if and only if some might be better off at the 
expense of another. The third is to contrast my account of competing claims 
with that of the recent view of Michael Otsuka, Alex Voorhoeve and Marc 
Fleurbaey. My view differs from theirs in the respect that it limits the variety 
of cases in which competing claims complaints obtain.  
                                                          
5 Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the Brave New World conference in 
Manchester, and at the Warwick Graduate Conference in Legal and Political Theory. I am 
grateful to the audiences for helpful comments. 
6 By morally-motivated stranger I am referring to a private individual who can at very little 
cost to herself come to the assistance of other strangers. 
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Sections 1.2 and 1.3 I argue that 
when risks are independent, i.e. when the prospects for one person in a 
gamble do not depend on the prospects of another, it is permissible for a 
morally-motivated decision-maker to provide an expected well-being 
maximising alternative, regardless of the number of people involved, and 
that the potential for outcome inequality does not itself give rise to 
complaints of unfairness. In Section 1.4 I argue that, in cases where risks are 
inversely correlated, i.e. when the prospects for one person have an inverse 
relation to the prospects of another, a source of individuals complaints 
against a situation in which they are disadvantaged is that some are better 
off at their expense. This complaint, I argue, should lead us to be averse to 
inequality in inversely correlated cases. I contrast my account to Otsuka, 
Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s recent view. In Section 1.5 I demonstrate how 
the account guides action in cases involving certainty, as well as how it 
respects the distinction between the unity of the individual and the 
separateness of persons. Section 1.6 concludes.  
1.2 Single-Person Case and Two-Person Intrapersonal Case  
Consider the following case: 
Single-Person Case: Ann, a young child, who is currently in 
full health, will soon go completely blind through natural 
causes (utility = 0.65) unless Tessa, a morally-motivated 
stranger, provides one of two available treatments. 
Treatment A will either, with 50 percent probability, leave 
Ann blind (0.65) or instead, with 50 percent probability, 
fully cure her (utility =1); treatment B will restore Ann to 
partial sight for sure (0.8). (See Table 1.1) 
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Table 1.1: Final utilities for Single-Person Case. 
 S1 (0.5) S2 (0.5) 
 Ann Ann 
Treatment A 0.65 1 
Treatment B 0.8 0.8 
 
Before judging this case, I need to clarify the measure of well-being 
employed. I shall assume a measure of utility derived from idealized 
preferences satisfying the Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. According to 
this measure, a prospect has higher expected utility for a person “just in case 
it would be preferred for that person’s sake after rational and calm 
deliberation with all pertinent information while attending to her self-
interest only. (A person’s expected utility is just the probability-weighted 
sum of her utility in each state of the world.) One prospect has the same 
expected utility as another for a person just in case such deliberation would 
yield indifference between the two prospects” (Otsuka and Voorhoeve, 
forthcoming: 8-9).  
Now, supposing only Ann’s interests are at stake, which treatment should 
Tessa select? Treatment B gives Ann a set outcome for sure, but it offers a 
lower expected well-being than treatment A. In this case, it is possible to 
offer the following prudential justification for providing A: “I did the best I 
could for you given the information I had at the time” (Voorhoeve and 
Fleurbaey, 2016: 935). This provides, I believe, a strong reason to provide A. 
Moreover, insofar as the individual’s interests are considered in isolation 
19 
 
from others, there is no countervailing reason to favour B. As Michael 
Otsuka puts it, there are “no interpersonally comparative or otherwise 
distributive considerations … that tell in favour of paying heed to anything 
other than what is in this [person’s] rational self-interest” (Otsuka, 2015: 5). 
Why, when one is considering this individual’s interests alone, ought one to 
depart from what, given the information available, anyone concerned 
exclusively with the individual’s interests (including the individual herself) 
would rationally regard as the best one can do for her?  
For these reasons, in this chapter, I shall assume the following answer is 
correct: in Single-Person Case, Tessa should maximize Ann’s expected well-
being and hence choose A.7 The correctness of this answer has recently been 
much debated.8 I shall not revisit this debate here. Instead, I shall pursue the 
following, less thoroughly discussed question: How should a view that 
accepts the premise that one should maximize an individual’s expected well-
being when one considers her fate in isolation deal with multi-person risky 
cases, in which the risky alternative that is in the expected interests of each 
person, taken separately, will generate outcomes in which some end up 
better off and others worse off than they would under a less risky 
alternative? 9 This question is important because some who accept my 
                                                          
7 The measure does not presuppose anything about what the nature of well-being is in itself. 
For instance, one may think that well-being consists in the satisfaction of preferences or the 
presence of happiness and absence of suffering. The measure is consistent with a decision-
maker maximizing whatever it is they take well-being to be. I will use the terms “utility” 
and “well-being” as synonymous in this article.   
8 Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009) and Otsuka (2015) defend the permissibility of maximizing 
well-being in the Single-Person Case. McCarthy (2008; forthcoming), Greaves (2015), and 
Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey (forthcoming) defend the view that one ought to maximize this 
person’s expected well-being. For the contrary view that one is permitted to be risk averse 
in a person’s well-being, see, e.g. Parfit (2012: 432) and Bovens (2015: 404). 
9 Many views accept this premise. Most noteworthy are the views defended by Otsuka and 
Voorhoeve (2009; 2011; forthcoming), Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey (2012; 2013; 2016) and 
Johann Frick (2013: 130-133; 2015: 186-191). 
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premise hold that in such multi-person risk cases, each individual has a 
claim only to what would maximize their expected well-being, and those 
who end up worse off as a result of the distributor’s choice of such an 
alternative have no complaint (Frick, 2013: 144-5; 2015: 181-8). Against such 
a view, I shall argue that within a claims-based framework there can 
sometimes be reason to select an alternative that does not maximize each 
person’s expected well-being, namely when choosing what would maximize 
each person’s expected well-being would ensure that some end up better off 
at the expense of others. 
Now consider the following case, inspired by Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey 
(2012: 386): 
Two-Person Intrapersonal Case: This case is identical to the preceding 
case with the addition of an extra person, Bill, who has partial sight 
for sure (0.8), no matter what treatment Tessa selects for Ann. Bill’s 
well-being is completely unaffected by Tessa’s action. If Tessa selects 
treatment A, then Ann will with 50 percent probability either remain 
blind (0.65) or instead, with 50 percent probability, be fully cured (1); 
treatment B will restore Ann to partial sight for sure (0.8). (See Table 
1.2.) 
Table 1.2: Final utilities for Two-Person Intrapersonal Case: 
 S1 (0.5) S2 (0.5) 
 Ann       Bill Ann      Bill 
Treatment A 0.65       0.8 1            0.8 
Treatment B 0.8         0.8 0.8         0.8 
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In this case, Tessa ought to, in my view, select A. Only Ann’s interests are at 
stake in this case, just like in Single-Person Case. Just as it was reasonable to 
select a treatment in Single-Person Case to maximize Ann’s expected well-
being, it should also be the case here. The only difference to the structure of 
the example is that now there is an extra individual, Bill, who is completely 
unaffected by Tessa’s decision. If we believe that only people who have their 
well-being at stake in a gamble have a complaint, or potential complaint, 
against the actions that a decision-maker will take, then Tessa ought to select 
A, as in Single-Person Case. To lend support to this idea, an interpretation of 
contractualism, the Complaint Model, states that: “a person’s complaint 
against a principle must have to do with its effects on him or her, and 
someone can reasonably reject a principle if there is some alternative to 
which no other person has a complaint that is as strong” (Scanlon, 1998: 
229).10 The absence of any effects on Bill from Tessa’s action means that Bill 
does not have a complaint against the provision of A. This captures an 
important feature of the separateness of persons.  
One way to argue against the selection of A in this case is to claim that the 
morally-motivated decision-maker ought to care about the fact that there 
will be inequality if A is selected. For instance, there may be a brute luck 
egalitarian reason to favour the selection of B for this ensures that both Ann 
and Bill will have a well-being level of 0.8. Brute luck egalitarians believe 
that “it is bad, or objectionable, to some extent—because unfair—for some to 
be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own” (Temkin, 
1993: 13). Even if Ann and Bill were on separate continents and have 
                                                          
10 However, Scanlon also argues that there may be other considerations other than well-
being which may lead to grounds for complaints, such as complaints of unfairness (1998: 
219). 
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absolutely no relationship with one another, inequality between them would 
be bad to the extent that it did not follow from a choice of theirs. 
One could object to this reason for favouring B on the grounds that it is an 
alternative that is not in the expected best interests of Ann, and only her 
interests are at stake. The fact that some are worse off than others through 
no fault or choice of their own can sometimes generate a reason for selecting 
a more egalitarian alternative over an alternative that does not necessarily 
guarantee outcome equality. But in Two-Person Intrapersonal Case only the 
interests of Ann are at stake. It would be difficult to justify her choice if 
Tessa selected an option that guaranteed equality, but failed to give Ann 
what was in her best expected interests. Following this, Two-Person 
Intrapersonal Case lends strong support to the claim that the mere pattern of 
inequality resulting from a gamble is no basis for individual complaints. 
This is because bill can’t reasonably complain about the ensuing outcome 
inequality since nothing that is selected for Ann would affect his well-being. 
Although inequality obtains if A is selected, the only effective claim that can 
be lodged to Tessa is that she do what is in the best expected interests of 
Ann.  
Some brute luck egalitarians may argue that we should not always be 
guided by individual complaints, but should sometimes be guided by 
impersonal value. Perhaps brute luck equality is impersonally valuable. My 
response is that although it may be granted that brute luck inequality can 
sometimes provide reasons for action, there is no good reason for such 
impersonal considerations to outweigh the individual reasons that Ann 
possesses in favour of the selection of A. Given that only Ann’s interests are 
at stake in this case, there is no good reason to allow anything other than the 
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rational self-interest of Ann to determine what treatment ought to be 
selected.11 If A is selected then there will be outcome inequality for sure, but 
there will be no reasonable complaints against this. Bill could complain and 
say that the fact that there is this impersonal complaint against outcome 
inequality should mean that B is selected. It may be the case that the fact of 
inequality means that in some respect the state of affairs is bad for luck 
egalitarian reasons, but the presence of a prudential justification lends 
support to selecting A in this case, as in Single-Person Case.  
A relevant distinction can be drawn here between consequentialist complaints 
and personal complaints. Consequentialist complaints track the alleged 
badness of patterns of consequences. It is implausible that such complaints 
should determine what Tessa ought to do in Two-Person Intrapersonal Case 
because only the interests of Ann are at stake, so only considerations 
relevant to Ann’s fate should determine how Tessa ought to act. Further, 
considerations of the pattern of inequality do not bear on the well-being 
level of individuals. Bill will remain at the same level of well-being if 
treatment A or B is selected, since his interests are not at stake. Personal 
complaints track individuals’ reasons for complaint. The only claim in Two-
Person Intrapersonal Case is on behalf of Ann for Tessa to select the 
alternative that is in her expected best interests. If Ann ends up badly off, a 
prudential justification can be given to her. If Ann ends up better off than 
Bill, Bill has no reasonable personal complaint that he can raise, because he 
could not have been made better off. 
                                                          
11 As such, it may be the case that brute luck inequality can provide reason for action, but 
such a consideration fails to outweigh the considerations in favour of selecting what is best 
for Ann, since only Ann’s well-being is at stake in Tessa’s choice. 
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I do not think that the inequality present in Two-Person Intrapersonal case is 
a sufficient reason to favour treatment B. This is because only Ann’s interests 
are at stake, and as such only her interests should guide how Tessa ought to 
act. The claims of individuals are what should guide action in cases such as 
Two-Person Interpersonal Case because claims are responsive to the level of 
well-being that an individual has at stake (i.e. the prospective increase in or 
decrease in that individual’s well-being), unlike impersonal considerations such 
as the pattern of inequality, which is not sensitive to such considerations. 
Ittay Nissan-Rozen (2017) has argued that a distributor has a pro tanto reason to 
discard impersonal reasons when deciding what reasons to take into account 
when distrusting a resource to individuals that individuals have a claim to. In 
support of this claim, Nissan-Rozen appeals to the Kantian demand to treat 
individuals as ends in themselves and not as mere means. The impersonal 
reason of equality has nothing to do with Ann’s well-being. By selecting an 
alternative in line with this impersonal reason when only Ann’s interests are at 
stake, “the distributor treats the [impersonal reason] itself ... as the end of the 
act of weighing it; and so, by weighing [the impersonal reason], the distributor 
treats [Ann] as a means to an end: she treats her as a means for the end of 
satisfying [the impersonal reason]” (Nissan-Rozen, 2017: 5). As such, there is 
further reason to be sceptical of the claim that in cases where individuals have 
claims grounded in their (expected) well-being, one ought to sometimes act in 
accordance with impersonal reasons. My view is that inequality is necessary 
but not sufficient for a complaint of unfairness. The presence of inequality 
does not guarantee a complaint of unfairness in distributive cases under 
conditions of risk. Other conditions are required for a complaint of 
unfairness to arise.  
 
25 
 
1.3 Independent Risks and Inequality 
I shall now consider a case involving two individuals with the difference 
that now both individuals’ well-being is at stake in Tessa’s decision.  
Fully Independent Risk Case: There are two children, Ann and Bill, 
who will soon go completely blind through natural causes (utility = 
0.65) unless Tessa, a morally-motivated stranger, provides one of 
four possible treatment alternatives. She can give treatment A to Ann 
and treatment B to Bill or vice versa, or she can give both individuals 
treatment A or both treatment B. Ann and Bill’s outcomes under the 
treatments are statistically independent of each other. (See Table 1.3.) 
Table 1.3: Final utilities for Fully Independent Risk Case: 
 
 
Treatments  
S1 (0.25) S2 (0.25) S3 (0.25) S4 (0.25) 
Ann       Bill Ann       Bill Ann       Bill Ann       Bill 
Ann: A 
Bill: A 
0.65        1 1        0.65 0.65    0.65 1            1 
Ann: B  
Bill: B  
0.8        0.8 0.8        0.8 0.8        0.8 0.8       0.8 
Ann: A 
Bill: B 
0.65     0.8 1           0.8 0.65      0.8 1         0.8 
Ann: B 
Bill: A 
0.8         1 0.8       0.65 0.8       0.65 0.8         1 
 
Tessa ought to select A for both individuals in this case. The same reasoning 
that supported the selection of A in the preceding cases supports the same 
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selection in Fully Independent Case. Ann and Bill’s futures are in every 
sense independent from one another, since (i) it is possible to offer either 
treatment to each individual independently of which treatment is offered to 
the other, and (ii) under each alternative any risks they face are independent. 
This implies that the well-being of Ann and Bill is separate in the same way 
that it is in Two-Person Intrapersonal Case. By this I mean their potential 
futures are not linked together: the well-being value of each individual is not 
causally dependent on the well-being values of other individuals. For 
example, if Tessa chooses A and Ann ends up with a particular level of well-
being, then this has no bearing on what level of well-being Bill ends up with.  
It is important to distinguish my use of “separateness” here from what is 
known in welfare economics as “additive separability”. If one tries to order 
distinct distributions of individual’s well-being, one may believe that such 
orderings are “additively separable”, which contains the thought that the 
moral value of “each person’s well-being should be evaluated 
independently of other people’s wellbeing” (Broome, 2015: 220-1). I shall not 
endorse this idea of additive separability. As I shall argue below, in 
determining the moral value of individuals’ well-being, comparisons 
between their well-being matter just in case their fates are “tied together” in 
a particular manner. Rather than additive separability, I am instead 
endorsing an account of separability that is consistent with the separateness 
of persons, in that it tracks cases in which these futures are thoroughly 
independent, or unlinked. 
In Fully Independent Case (Table 1.3) there is the possibility of inequality 
between Ann and Bill if Tessa chooses A for one or both of them. In Two-
Person Intrapersonal Case (Table 1.2), inequality was certain to occur if A 
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was selected, but this did not form the basis of individual complaints. How 
should Tessa accommodate the possibility of outcome inequality given that 
the interests of both individuals are now at stake? I think that, again, the 
potential inequality if A is selected for one or both of them is no basis for 
individual claims against selecting A. What is of importance in this case, as 
in the preceding two cases, is the separateness of Ann and Bill’s prospects. 
The potential futures of Ann are distinct from Bill’s potential futures; 
moreover, nothing that is decided by Tessa about Ann’s future affects Bill’s 
fate; nor does anything that happens by chance to Ann affect how Bill ends 
up, and vice versa. In this regard, the expectably best treatment for Ann 
leaves Bill’s well-being unaffected, and the expectably best treatment for Bill 
leaves Ann’s well-being unaffected. Furthermore, there is a decisive reason 
to select treatment A for both Ann and Bill given the strength of the 
prudential justification that can be offered to both, based on the fact that the 
prudential justification appeals to these unified potential futures of each 
person.  
One could object to the selection of A for both individuals by arguing that, 
while there is no complaint against inequality per se, this is a case in which, 
if we choose A for both, some may end up better off and others worse off 
than they might as a consequence of our choices, so that there may be 
competing claims ex post between the better and the worse off. And when 
there are such competing claims, whoever will end up worse off has a claim 
to an alternative in which they would have ended up better off (so to be 
given B in this case). Such reasoning is suggested by Voorhoeve and 
Fleurbaey (forthcoming, 10-11) and a definition of this approach is provided 
by Matthew Rendall, who states: “whenever we distribute benefits and 
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burdens among more than one person, the parties have competing claims on 
our solicitude” (2013: 942). I think that this is too inclusive a conception of 
the conditions under which there are competing claims. For one, it is not the 
case that when I am deciding who to give a gift to, that each individual has a 
claim on my solicitude. I can choose who I give the gift to, but no individual 
has a claim on my gift. Second, and more pertinently to our case, the mere 
fact that, ex post, some may end up better off and others worse off than they 
might have been is insufficient for the existence of competing claims.  
An individual has a claim only if their interests are stake. For example, in 
Two-Person Intrapersonal Case (Table 1.2) there is only a claim on Ann’s 
behalf since Bill’s interests are not at stake. In Fully Independent Case 
(Table 1.3) the interests of both Ann and Bill are at stake, but they are not 
in competition because they do not conflict ex ante; nor, despite the 
possibility of inequality, can they conflict ex post, as I shall now explain. 
If S1 obtains, then it is best for Ann that B is selected. Selecting the best 
for Ann (B) does not preclude selecting the best for Bill (A), since it is 
possible to give B to Ann and A to Bill. This is because of the 
separateness of Ann’s and Bill’s prospects. Nothing that is decided about 
Ann’s fate affects the fate of Bill. Similarly, the treatments affect each 
individual independently. There is therefore no ex post conflict of interest 
if S1 obtains. Analogous reasoning establishes the same for every other 
state of the world. There is therefore no conflict of interest ex post in any 
state of the world. 
Since there is no conflict of interest, I conclude that Tessa should simply 
select what is expectably best for each, which is A. Though this may 
leave one or both of them badly off and one of them worse off than 
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another, there is a prudential justification that can be given to the 
person(s) who end up in such a position, and ending up badly off (or 
worse off) was never the result of doing something to that person that 
was contrary to the badly off person’s interests but in the interests of 
another. 
Now consider the following modification to the preceding case: 
Modified Independent Risk Case: The set-up of this case is the same as 
before. However, due to technical limitations, Tessa can either 
provide both with treatment A or both with B, but cannot offer one of 
them A and the other B. (The case is described in Table 1.4.)  
Table 1.4: Final utilities for Modified Independent Risk Case: 
 S1 (0.25) S2 (0.25) S3 (0.25) S4 (0.25) 
 Ann       Bill Ann       Bill Ann       Bill Ann       Bill 
Both get 
A 
0.65        1 1        0.65 0.65    0.65 1            1 
Both get 
B 
0.8        0.8 0.8        0.8 0.8        0.8 0.8        0.8 
 
Does this change anything regarding what Tessa ought to do? One may 
observe that, as visible in the table above, there is a fifty percent chance that 
there will be a conflict of interest in final utilities, and that there are therefore 
competing interests ex post. Treatment A is rationally preferred by both 
individuals, but this choice is, in states of the world S1 and S2, better than B 
for one person but worse than B for another. Suppose, for instance, that S2 
obtains. Giving B to both is best for Ann, but giving A to both is best for Bill. 
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Their ex post interests therefore conflict, because both must receive the same 
treatment.  
Does this potential ex post conflict of interest in Modified Independent Risk 
Case make a difference to what Tessa ought to do? It does not. Although it is 
not possible to provide a different treatment to each individual, the 
treatments affect each individual separately, in the sense that, if one chooses 
the risky treatment for both, the fact that one is well off doesn’t imply (or 
increase the chance that) the other is badly off.  
Moreover, A would have been selected individually if it was possible to do 
so, as in Fully Independent Case (Table 1.3). The mere fact that options are 
removed that one would not select anyway should not make a difference to 
what one ought to do. Suppose that an individual is faced with a number of 
options, and that one alternative is permissibly chosen from these options. 
Suppose that we now shrink this set of options by removing one of the 
unchosen alternatives. The permissible alternative ought to remain 
permissible in this subset. This is the property of “basic contraction 
consistency” (Sen, 1993: 500). For example, if giving A to both is permissible 
in Fully Independent Risk Case (Table 1.3), then it should also be 
permissible in Modified Independent Risk Case (Table 1.4), which contains a 
subset of the alternatives in the former case.  
I shall now outline a view to explain the judgments from all cases considered 
so far. I call this view the “value of chances” view. The view that chances 
have value is by no means original (Broome, 1990: 98; Wasserman, 1996: 43). 
The view is not focused only on the distribution of chances between people, 
but also on the value that a chance has for an individual. This view claims 
that an individual’s possession of a chance to be advantaged has positive 
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expected value for that individual. Of course, a chance that does not come 
good does not (I shall assume) contribute to a person’s realized well-being. 
But, following Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, I hold that while “the well-being 
value of a chance evaporates once it is clear that this chance is unrealized 
(…), a chance’s contribution to fairness does not evaporate” (2012: 396). For 
example, having a chance of winning the lottery or of receiving a much-
needed kidney is of expected value to a person. If two individuals both need 
a kidney and each is given an equal chance at receiving the kidney, then the 
chance’s contribution to fairness does not disappear, even though one 
person will be without a kidney. The chance’s contribution to fairness does 
not disappear because it remains true that an individual was given a chance 
after an outcome obtains.12 A chance has value for a person in virtue of 
tracking a possibility of being advantaged. I shall bracket the consideration 
of whether a chance actually gives the individual something of value 
                                                          
12 This can be further illustrated by considering the fact that a chances contribution to 
fairness can remain even if the chance of a benefit disappears: 
Alternative A Alternative B 
 
People 
States (equiprobable)  
People 
States (equiprobable) 
Heads Tails Heads Tails 
Ann Dies and 
treated 
unfairly 
Dies and 
treated 
unfairly 
Ann Dies Lives 
Bill Lives Lives Bill Lives Dies 
In a scenario where it is possible to select between two different coin flips (Alternative A 
and B above), a chances contribution to fairness can persist in how we evaluate the 
goodness or badness of outcomes (Broome, 1991: 113). A chances contribution to fairness 
remains even when the chance of a benefit disappears, since Ann dying and not having a 
chance of survival (Alternative A) is worse than Ann dying and having a chance of survival 
(Alternative B). This allows us to have a principled reason for not being indifferent between 
the two Alternatives: because in Alternative B equal chances of survival are given to both, 
which is not the case in Alternative A. If a chances contribution to fairness disappeared once 
outcomes eventuate, then it would not be possible to establish the greater fairness of 
Alternative B over Alternative A.  
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(Wasserman, 1996: 30; Otsuka, ms: 9-10) until Chapter 2, and I shall also 
remain agnostic on the question of what makes a chance genuine.13  
To illustrate: the prudential justification that is offered to an individual in a 
single-person case when a gamble is taken for their sake appeals to the 
possibility of that individual being advantaged even if it turns out that ex post 
they are disadvantaged. If they turn out disadvantaged, the morally-
motivated stranger can say that because they had a sufficiently advantageous 
chance, the option was chosen for their sake – it was the best way to promote 
this person’s interests at the time, given the knowledge possessed. As well as 
chances having prospective value for an individual, the distribution of 
chances between people also possesses value: (Broome, 1990; Voorhoeve and 
Fleurbaey, 2012: 396). If two individuals are equally in need, and equally 
deserving of a kidney, a fair way of distributing the kidney would be to give 
each individual an equal chance at receiving the good, rather than an 
unequal chance. The distribution of chances can therefore facilitate fairness. 
Some have questioned whether the distribution of chances can help facilitate 
fairness (Hyams, 2017; Wasserman, 1996). Hyams has critiqued the view that 
the distribution of chances can make outcome inequality less unfair than it 
would have otherwise been. Hyams does so by arguing that what he calls 
the “egalitarian mixed view” (the view that outcome inequalities are less 
unfair when they arise from a less unequal ex ante distribution of chances 
than a more unequal ex ante distribution) cannot accommodate for an 
intuition regarding what we ought to do in the following pair of cases . 
Suppose that Tessa is charged with allocating a medicine to either Ann or 
                                                          
13 For instance, I am not committed to the claim that genuine chances can be merely 
subjective (epistemic) chances of an advantage, or instead must be objective.  
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Bill in the first case, which we can call Initial Ex ante Choice. Tessa can either 
hold a lottery in which either Ann or Bill will receive the medicine, and 
receive a utility level of 10, or a utility level of 0 if they do not receive the 
medicine, or Tess can crush the pill and divide it between them, giving each 
a utility of 4 as the crushing reduces the medicine’s effectiveness. Suppose 
now that in Initial Ex ante Choice the lottery device is broken, and has been 
all along, such that Ann will certainly receive the medicine. Hyams claims 
that intuitively we would want to switch to giving both 4 for sure rather 
than holding the lottery once we realise that it is broken. Hyams argues that 
the egalitarian mixed view struggles to account for why we ought to swap to 
crushed pill in the modified ex ante choice lottery, but not swap to crushed 
pill in the first version of the case.  
To illustrate this, Hyams considers a further case where instead of the lottery 
device being broken all along, there is a “magical transformation” such that 
the previously equal objective probabilities of Ann and Bill winning are 
modified so that Ann receives a probability of 1 of receiving the good, as in 
the broken lottery case. Hyams argues that we ought to switch from the 
lottery to crushed pill, which will give 4 to each. Hyams claims that the fact 
“that [Ann] had an objective 0.5 chance of winning [before the 
transformation] now seems irrelevant” (Ibid.). This is a challenge to the idea 
that a prior distribution of chances makes a contribution to fairness, since 
the fact that there were prior chances is irrelevant to determining whether 
we should switch to crushed pill once the transformation has occurred. In 
response, there is reason to think that we ought not to switch to crushed pill 
in the magical transformation case once we know that Ann is certain to win 
the lottery. The reason is that the “magical transformation” can be viewed 
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simply as the result of the lottery that had equal chances. There were 
objectively equal chances, and then one individual was declared the winner. 
As such, the magical transformation in the modified case does no more work 
than the declared outcome of the equal chance lottery. There are therefore 
clear grounds for thinking that it is consistent to switch to the crushed pill in 
the broken lottery case and not in the magical transformation case. This is 
because the prior equal chances in the magical transformation case are no 
different to the prior equal chances in the Initial Ex ante Choice case.       
Wasserman (1996) argues that equal chances do not make a further 
contribution to fairness over and above the contribution to impartiality. For 
my view, I appeal to the fact that it is possible for the distribution of chances 
to facilitate fairness, not the stronger claim that this is the only way to 
facilitate fairness, or the denial of impartiality based reasons for giving equal 
chances. Further, it is of value for individuals with equally strong claims to a 
good to receive equal chances of receiving the good, rather than unequal 
chances, for the reason that the former is fairer than the latter. It is fair that 
identically situated people should be treated identically (Broome, 1990: 95). 
In Chapter Two, I consider in more detail why the distribution of chances 
can help facilitate fairness.   
To summarise, there are at least two related ways in which a chance at an 
advantage can have value: 
1. A chance can have positive expected prudential value for an 
individual; 
2. Equality in the distribution of chances contributes to fairness. 
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When providing a prudential justification to Ann for treatment A in Single-
Person Case (Table 1.1) and Two-Person Intrapersonal Case (Table 1.2), there 
is an appeal to (1). When providing a prudential justification to Ann and Bill 
in Fully Independent Risk Case (Table 1.3) and Modified Independent Risk 
Case (Table 1.4) for giving both A, there is an appeal to (1) and (2): each 
individual had a chance to be advantaged, and each individual has this 
chance equally.  
I have argued that there are no complaints which give us reason to go 
against the recommendation to provide treatment A in these cases. The 
pattern of inequality arising in Two-Person Intrapersonal Case (Table 1.2) 
was not sufficient grounds for a complaint on behalf of Bill as he did not 
have a claim against Tessa because his interests were not affected by her 
action. Against the idea that the potential inequality in Fully Independent 
Risk Case (Table 1.3), if A were given to both should be of concern, I argued 
that this inequality need not concern us because this is not a case of 
competing interests (neither ex ante nor ex post) between a better-off and the 
worse-off person. I then appealed to both the independence of Ann and 
Bill’s fates to argue that in Modified Independent Risk Case (Table 1.4) Tessa 
ought to still give A to both. 
1.4 Inversely Correlated Risks and the Complaint that Some are Better Off 
at the Expense of Others 
In this section, I consider how the view I am defending handles conflict of 
interest cases and arrive at a characterisation of when people have 
competing claims. I argue that there is an important moral difference 
between risks that are independent and risks that are inversely correlated. In 
the case of inversely correlated risks, the complaint of unfairness is not 
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solely the outcome inequality itself, but rather the fact that one is better off at 
the expense of another. I argue that this complaint ought to be included in the 
account of claims I am providing. I argue that in cases of independent risks 
this particular complaint does not arise, and that this is so even if the same 
pattern of inequality arises as it does in an inversely correlated case.  
Consider the following: 
Inversely Correlated Case: Ann and Bill will both soon, through natural 
causes, go completely blind unless Tessa administers one of two 
treatments. Treatment A, will either, with fifty percent probability, 
cause Ann to go blind (0.65) and Bill to retain full vision (1), or 
instead, with fifty percent probability, cause Bill to go blind and Ann 
to retain full vision. Treatment B will restore both Ann and Bill to 
partial sight for sure (0.8). (See Table 1.5.)  
Table 1.5: Final utilities for Inversely Correlated Case: 
 S1 (0.5) S2 (0.5) 
 Ann      Bill Ann      Bill 
Treatment A 0.65       1          1          0.65 
Treatment B 0.8        0.8 0.8        0.8 
 
Which treatment should Tessa choose? There are reasons that pull in 
different directions. Firstly, there are considerations in favour of A due to the 
presence of a prudential justification to Ann and Bill, since A maximizes 
both Ann’s and Bill’s expected well-being. Secondly, there are considerations 
against the selection of A, due to the fact that (I shall argue) one will be 
37 
 
better off at the expense of another. On balance, I shall argue that Tessa 
ought to select B in this case.  
 
In this case, there will always be a conflict of interest ex post, whereas in 
Two-Person Intrapersonal Case (Table 1.2), although there was inequality 
for certain there was no competing claims complaint. There will be a 
competing claims complaint in Inversely Correlated Case (Table 1.5) on 
behalf of whoever turns out to be worse off. This speaks in favour of 
selecting B. In structurally analogous cases, others agree with the selection of 
B (Otsuka, 2012: 373-4; Otsuka and Voorhoeve, 2009: 173-4; Voorhoeve and 
Fleurbaey, 2013: 118-9). One important consideration is that the identity of 
the individual who would be better off if A were selected, and that of who is 
worse off is not known in this case – all that is known is that one individual 
will be in each position. This is important because there is a moral 
distinction between placeholders and persons. As Johann Frick argues, it 
makes a difference to the type of justification that can be given to each 
person in this case: “contractualist justification is owed to persons, with 
determinate identities and interests, not placeholders in a pattern of 
outcomes” (Frick, 2013: 141). We might think that because we do not know 
who will be better off and who will be worse off, Tessa could justify the 
selection of A to both because she does not know the identity of who will be 
better off. To see how this might work, consider Frick’s argument in this 
case: 
“[Ann] and Bill, if they are self-interested [and competent choosers], 
would not want [Tessa] to choose [B]. It is in both persons’ ex ante 
interest that we take a gamble on their behalf by choosing [A]. The 
question is: to what extent could either [Ann] or Bill complain of 
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“outcome unfairness” when any outcome inequality under [A] 
results from having forgone an option, in line with their own self-
interest, that would have satisfied both of their claims to a significant 
extent and produced no inequality? We might think that, by 
receiving [A], [Ann] and Bill “exchanged” their claim to the 
significant benefit that they could have gotten from [B] in return for 
the chance of getting an even greater good—a gamble that was in 
both persons’ self-interest. It is not clear that, having made this 
exchange, either [Ann] or Bill is left with any valid complaint of 
unfairness if [A] does not turn out in [their] favour” (Frick, 2013: 144-
5). 
Contra Frick, I think that the individuals do possess a valid complaint of 
unfairness. For the complaint of unfairness in this case does not arise merely 
from the pattern of inequality that results, but rather from the fact that, 
inevitably, someone is benefitted by the other’s misfortune. In this case, the 
fact that it is not possible for both individuals to be simultaneously better off 
(or worse off) means that it is possible for a compliant to arise on behalf of 
the worse off: “someone else is better off at my expense”. I believe that this is 
a distinct complaint of unfairness that an individual can raise irrespective of 
any judgments about the pattern of inequality. This distinct complaint of 
unfairness arises when one is worse off as a causal flipside of someone else 
benefitting. This view also captures the following two ways in which one 
can be worse off than another: when one is made worse off in order to benefit 
another, and when one is made worse off as a side-effect of benefiting 
another. In both of these cases one is made worse off as a causal flipside of 
another being benefitted. One would not be benefitted were it not for 
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another being burdened. To illustrate the potential objectionableness of 
having one’s fate tied to another, suppose that at the flip of a coin, I receive 
£1000 if the coin lands heads and you receive nothing, or if the coin lands 
tails, you receive £1000 and I receive nothing. We might think that there is 
something intrinsically bad about the fact of inequality between two 
individuals, whatever the result of the coin flip. But we might also think that 
there is something bad about one individual being better off at the expense 
of another, when one person being better off is – literally, in this instance – 
the flipside of another’s being worse off.14  
Part of the grounding for this distinct claim of unfairness comes from the 
separateness of persons. When an individual’s potential futures involve 
another’s interests, a claim of unfairness may arise if the individuals’ 
interests are linked in such a way that inequality may arise. The potential 
complaint of unfairness can be further illustrated by the following example. 
Following the structure of Single-Person Case (Table 1.1), suppose Ann ends 
up badly off after Tessa selects treatment A on her behalf. If Ann then learnt 
that the gamble was one in which the potential to gain was hers but that it in 
fact failed to materialize, then Ann may see her position as justified as she 
had a large enough chance of being better off to make the gamble in her 
                                                          
14 An interesting feature of inversely-correlated risks is the role that consent might play in 
legitimatising exposure to such risks. We might think that having one’s fate tied to another’s 
arbitrarily is unjust, whereas if one chooses to tie one’s fate to another’s then this is 
permissible. For example, Ann and Bill may choose to go to a casino where all of their pay-
offs are dependent (if Ann wins, then Bill loses and vice versa) or to a casino where all their 
pay-offs are independent of one another. This would be due to the preferences that Ann and 
Bill have for risk. Whereas if one entered a casino with the intention of gambling alone (with 
payoffs independent of others’) then one may object if one’s gamble turned out to be tied up 
with another. If Ann loses a gamble then it might appear that Ann lost at the expense of Bill. 
But whether we think it is permissible that one’s fate is inversely correlated with the fate of 
another may come down to whether the inverse correlation is voluntary. Here, I consider 
only risks that are non-voluntary, because neither Ann nor Bill can make a choice for which 
they are responsible – only Tessa can. 
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interest. But if Ann were to then learn that the flip-side of her loss was in fact 
a gain to another person, she may well think that the other person is better 
off at her expense, since if she were not worse off, he would not be better off. 
Suppose that in Single-Person Case, Ann ends up badly off. In this case the 
potential alternative future of Ann’s, where she could have been better off 
evanesces when it fails to materialize for her. Suppose, now, that Ann ends 
up badly off in Inversely Correlated Case. Instead of Ann’s potential future 
evanescing where she could have been better off (as in Single-Person Case), 
it instead falls to another individual, Bill. I believe that there is an important 
moral difference between these two states of affairs. This is because it is not 
possible in Inversely Correlated Case for both Ann and Bill to be 
simultaneously better off. Only one person can be better off. Whereas, in the 
independent risk cases it is possible for both to be better off. To illustrate 
further, I shall adopt and briefly expand on Hugh Lazenby’s account of the 
“uniqueness of experience” (Lazenby, 2014: 339-41). This is “the fact that a 
person experiences only the one life she actually leads, and not the other 
possible lives that there was a probabilistic chance that she might have had” 
(Lazenby, 2014: 340). Returning to the coin flip example, suppose that a 
faraway potential benefactor flips a coin, and if the coin lands heads I 
receive £1000. If it lands tails I receive nothing. The coin lands tails. It seems 
that I have gained nothing of concrete value since I only experience what I 
actually have. What I think does matter however, is whether other 
individuals experience the other possible futures that were open to me at my 
expense. If it was the case that when the coin landed tails the £1000 went to 
another person somewhere else, they are better off than me at my expense, 
since this potential future of mine (having £1000) goes to them, while I get 
nothing. Although I do not experience the possible life that I could have 
41 
 
lead, the fact that another individual does experience that life while I do not 
is something that is in itself potentially objectionable.  
For this relationship between fates to be objectionable, it must not only be 
the case that one person gains and another person loses as a causal flip-side 
of the others’ gain, but also that the one who is worse off is worse off than 
they would otherwise have been. Although it is the case in the coin-flip 
example above that one is better off as a flip-side of another being worse off, 
the person who is worse off than the other is not worse off than they would 
otherwise have been. It would be strange to think that the loser of the 
gamble (who ends up no different to before the gamble) could complain that 
now someone else is better off, since had the coin not been flipped at all, 
their predicament would be the same. Whereas, in the Inversely Correlated 
Risk Case it is true that the person who is worse off if A is selected is worse 
off than they would have been had treatment B been selected on their behalf. 
So it is the fact that one is worse off than one would have otherwise been, 
coupled with the fact that one’s being worse off is the causal flip-side of 
another person’s being better off that grounds the distinct complaint of one 
being better off at the expense of another. 
One may object that in cases like Inversely Correlated Risk Case, if an 
individual turns out to be worse off, the individual who is better off still had 
a chance to be better off, so although another individual is in fact better off it 
is not clear that the better off individual is experiencing the potential future 
of another since they both had the chance to be better off. In response, it is 
important that it is not possible in this case for both individuals to be better 
off. If an individual fails to receive the advantage, another person will 
receive it; their loss is always someone else’s gain. This is the core of the 
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complaint of being worse off at the expense of others. By contrast, in 
Modified Independent Risk Case, each individual has it in their potential 
future that they could be better off. It is possible for each to be better off 
simultaneously.  
A further challenge to this view is as follows. Suppose Tessa is facing the 
decision in Single-Person Case, believing that Ann is exposed to an 
independent risk if treatment A is selected. Tessa is about to select A. A 
person then comes along and says “Wait! Are you sure that the risk is fully 
independent? Might it not in fact be inversely correlated?” One might argue 
that it doesn’t make any difference to what Tessa ought to do in this case, 
and that she would have no reason to find out whether the risk is in fact 
inversely correlated. Surely, it may be argued, it is enough that this 
treatment is in Ann’s expected best interests. In response, I claim that it does 
matter whether the risk that Ann is exposed to is either an independent or 
an inversely correlated risk. It matters because it determines the sort of 
complaint that might be available to Ann (if at all) if she ends up badly off. 
Now suppose that treatment A is selected in this case and Ann ends up 
badly off. On her way home she discovers someone who was in fact a 
beneficiary of Tessa’s decision to select treatment A. Now Ann has grounds 
for complaint since someone is better off at her expense. In this scenario it 
may be objected that the fact there is now a beneficiary ought to count in 
favour of the justifiability of an action and not against it. In response, the fact 
that there turned out to be a beneficiary is not in itself something that counts 
against selecting treatment A, but it is rather the causal relationship between 
the benefit and the burden that matters: that one could only have the benefit 
if another had the burden. 
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In order to more precisely relate this distinction between different 
complaints of unfairness to the cases under discussion, consider the 
following two propositions: 
(i) Ann is better off at the expense of Bill; or Bill is better off at the expense of 
Ann. 
(ii) Ann is worse off and Bill is better off; Bill is worse off and Ann is 
better off.  
Proposition (ii) is true in Two-Person Intrapersonal Case and the pair of 
independent risk cases when there is outcome inequality, but proposition (i) 
is not true in these cases. Proposition (i) and (ii) are both true in Inversely 
Correlated Case. Proposition (ii) obtaining is insufficient for a complaint of 
unfairness, whereas proposition (i) obtaining is sufficient grounds for a 
complaint in a conflict of interest distributive case.  
Our discussion so far leads to the following characterization of when 
individuals have competing claims: 
Competing Claims: Competing claims obtain if and only if 
individuals’ interests conflict ex ante or, ex post, some might be 
better off at the expense of another. That is to say, either ex ante, 
all alternatives that are best for one individual are worse for 
another individual, or there is a chance that, ex post, all 
alternatives that are best for one individual involve that 
individual being better off at the expense of another.  
This view can explain why Tessa ought to select B in Inversely Correlated 
Case. In this case there are competing interests ex post. A feature of the 
complaint of some being better off at the expense of others is that the 
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interests of individuals are in conflict; a benefit to you will be a loss to me, 
and vice versa. In Inversely Correlated Case there will always be competing 
claims as the interests of the better off will always conflict with the interests 
of who is worse off. This is a decisive reason to select B in this case. This 
view also explains why there are no competing claims in Two-Person 
Intrapersonal Case and the independent risk cases. All of the alternatives 
that are best for one individual do not involve that individual being better 
off at the expense of another. There is no conflict of interest ex post in these 
cases. 
My view can be contrasted with Otsuka, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s account 
of competing claims.15 According to these authors, an individual has a claim 
to some benefit if and only if their interests are at stake, where the strength 
of this claim is determined by  
i) his potential gain in well-being; and 
ii) his level of well-being relative to others with whom her interests 
conflict.16 
As it stands, this view would state that competing claims exist in the 
independent risk cases discussed in Section 1.3, because there is an ex post 
conflict of interests between the winners and the losers of the gambles.17 
                                                          
15 It is also possible to distinguish my view from the Restricted Prioritarianism view 
outlined by Andrew Williams (2012). In intrapersonal cases, individuals have a claim on the 
alternative that maximises their expected utility. However, in interpersonal cases 
individuals have claims to be benefited that become stronger as their absolute position 
worsens. Because I do not explicitly engage with prioritarianism in this chapter, I leave out 
a detailed examination of this view. Benjamin Lange (forthcoming), however, examines the 
differences between Restricted Prioritarianism and the competing claims view of Otsuka, 
Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey.  
16 This specification of the view is from Benjamin Lange (forthcoming: 4). Voorhoeve and 
Fleurbaey (2012: 397) also provide a similar outline.  
17 One might argue that complaints can be discounted by the probability that inequality 
would occur. For example, in Fully Independent Risk Case (Table 3) inequality occurs in 
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Although the claims of the winners and the losers of the gambles in these 
cases are in competition with one another, in the respect that some are better 
off than others, it is not the case that the interests of each person are in 
conflict with one another in a way specified by my view. Under my proposal, 
competing claims do not merely obtain when the interests of individuals are 
in competition with one another, but rather only when some might be better 
off at the expense of another. To this extent, my view can be distinguished 
from Otsuka, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s view, by specifying when 
precisely competing claims obtain. Their view, as it stands, allows for more 
unfairness complaints than I think are warranted. My view limits the scope 
of cases where competing claims obtain to those cases where some are made 
better off at the expense of others. It holds that inequality itself does not 
determine the existence of complaints, but rather that complaints of 
unfairness arise from how one’s interests relate to others. 
 
To further illustrate the implications of the view that it matters whether one 
is exposed to an independent risk or an inversely-correlated risk, consider 
the following case inspired by Roger Crisp (2011: 107): 
Many-person Independent Risk Case: This is the same as Fully 
Independent Case, except that there are now 500 people. 
What one can infer from this case is that it is extremely likely that there will 
be outcome inequality if Tessa chooses A – indeed, that the pattern of 
outcome inequality will be similar to the inequality in Inversely Correlated 
Case, in that roughly half will be well off and half badly off. We might also 
                                                                                                                                                                   
half of the states of the world if treatment A is given to both, and as such one’s competing 
claims complaint at ending up worse off than another could be discounted by its 
improbability. Nevertheless, a competing claims complaint still exists. 
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think that here the Law of Large Numbers does the work that inverse 
correlation does in Inversely Correlated Case (Frick, 2013: 146). Crisp argues 
that in this case, one ought to select B for each child for prioritarian reasons 
(2011: 107) – in other words, applied to this case, it is more important to 
improve a person’s well-being from 0.65 to 0.8 than from 0.8 to 1. Otsuka 
and Voorhoeve agree with this conclusion, but for egalitarian reasons (2011: 
113). Contrary to these authors, however, I have argued that independent 
risk cases possess an important moral feature. If inequality obtains, 
individuals are not worse off to another’s benefit. Therefore, there are no 
competing claims. The outcome inequality does not constitute grounds for 
individuals’ complaints in this case. In this case proposition (ii) will be true 
and proposition (i) will be false. Even if the pattern of inequality turns out to 
be identical in Independent Risk Case (Table 1.3) and Inversely Correlated 
Risk Case (Table 1.5), individuals will not be better off at the expense of 
others in the former, but will be in the latter.18 
                                                          
18 It is worth briefly considering the possibility of competing claims complaints occurring in 
cases where risks are partially correlated. I have so far considered cases where risks are 
either strictly inversely-correlated or independent.  “Correlation between A and B’s fates in 
a risky context obtains if and only if learning about person A’s outcome alone should cause 
one to change one’s subjective probabilities for B’s outcome. For example, suppose that 
things were such that if we were to learn that A gets 1, then we would adjust our prior 
beliefs about the chance that B will get 0, then this would be a case of correlation. 
To illustrate, suppose that one must choose between certainly giving Ann 0.5 and Bill 0.25 
and the alternative outlined in the following table: 
 Equiprobable outcomes 
1 2 3 4 
Ann 1 0 0 1 
Bill 0 1 0 0 
Before we learn anything about Ann’s outcomes, we should believe that the probability of 
Bill getting 1 is ¼. Their outcomes are partially correlated here because we know that if Ann 
gets 0 then there is a ½ chance that Bill will get 1, and if Ann gets 1 then Bill will have 0 for 
sure. There is some inverse correlation, and three quarters of the time, someone will be 
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Of course, in Inversely Correlated Case, it is true that each individual still 
has a prospect of being the individual who is better off if A is chosen. This 
remains in favour of selecting A in this case, which has to be balanced 
against the unfairness of being worse off to another’s benefit. I submit that 
when risks are inversely correlated, it is permissible to select B for some 
small advantage in each person’s expected well-being of A over B. In other 
words, if risks are independent, one ought to select A for any d > 0, where d 
is the gain in expected well-being A has over the egalitarian alternative. 
However, because of the unfairness of some being better off at the expense 
of others, and the associated presence of competing claims, it is permissible 
to select B for some sufficiently small d > 0 when risks are inversely 
correlated.19  
1.5 Competing Claims and the Separateness of Persons 
In this section I shall consider how the competing claims account handles 
conflict of interest cases under certainty. I thereby hope to expand the part of 
the account which sees the badness of inequality in conflict of interest cases 
being the fact that some are worse off at the expense of others. I then 
demonstrate how the view reflects a concern for the separateness of persons.   
Consider the following case: 
Certainty Case: Ann will develop partial sight (0.8) and Bill will go 
wholly blind (0.65). Tessa can either give treatment A which moves 
Ann from her partial sight to full health (1), or provide treatment B 
                                                                                                                                                                   
worse off because of another’s success. The complaint to which this gives rise can, I 
propose, be discounted by the probability (seventy-five percent) that this situation will arise. 
As such, the view I am proposing is able to apply to partially correlated risks.” 
19 I leave it open to judgment for deciding when the value of the prospects each has to be 
better off can outweigh the complaint that some are better off at the expense of others.  
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which moves Bill from complete blindness to partial sight (0.8). (See 
Table 1.6.) 
Table 1.6: Final utilities for Certainty Case: 
 S1 
 Ann       Bill 
Treatment A 1          0.65 
Treatment B 0.8        0.8 
 
It is clear that Tessa ought to select B – there are competing claims in this 
case. The interests of Ann and Bill are in conflict, and providing A will only 
be in the best interests of Ann and contrary to the interests of Bill, who can 
never be better off than Ann. Ann starts off better off than Bill and selecting 
A will further benefit Ann at Bill’s expense. On the view I am proposing, this 
makes A especially problematic. In such cases of certainty the competing 
claims account has maximal force. Both individuals’ claims are in conflict 
both ex ante and ex post; it is never possible to have a joint satisfaction of 
claims. There is no greater value of chances that could outweigh the claim of 
unfairness in this case, unlike in Inversely Correlated Case (Table 1.5). How 
could Tessa justify the selection of A to Bill when he is much worse off than 
Ann, this treatment would never be in his best interests and he could gain 
nearly as much as Ann could if he were treated instead?20  
Throughout, I have appealed to respect for the difference between the unity 
of the individual and the separateness of persons in order to justify the view 
I am proposing. According to the “unity of the individual” an individual’s 
                                                          
20 Cf. Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009: 183-4). 
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life possesses a unity that makes it appropriate to balance benefits and 
burdens which accrue to her for her sake, but inappropriate to balance 
benefits to some with only costs to others (Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, 2012: 
381). This helps to justify the selection of the utility maximising treatment in 
Single-Person Case since the potential benefits and burdens only accrue to 
Ann. According to the “separateness of persons”, individuals’ lives have a 
separateness that renders it inappropriate to balance benefits and burdens 
that accrue to each person as if they accrued to a single life (Fleurbaey and 
Voorhoeve, 2012: 382). It is therefore worthwhile to see how the proposed 
view handles a case that clearly contrasts intra- and interpersonal trade-offs, 
adapted from Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey (2012: 387):  
Intra- versus Interpersonal Trade-off Case: In this case Ann and Bill will 
both soon go completely blind (0.65) unless Tessa intervenes and 
selects one of the available treatments. There are two scenarios: one 
interpersonal and one intrapersonal. 
Interpersonal Scenario: Treatment A (interpersonal) will with 50 
percent probability either give Ann an increase in well-being leading 
to full health (1) while ensuring Bill gains partial sight (0.8), or 
instead, with 50 percent probability Ann will gain partial sight while 
Bill remains blind. Treatment B will ensure that both Ann and Bill 
have partial sight 
Intrapersonal Scenario: Treatment A (intrapersonal) will ensure that 
Bill has partial sight, while giving Ann a 50 percent chance of full 
health and a 50 percent chance of partial sight. Treatment B will 
ensure that both Ann and Bill have partial sight (See Table 1.7.) 
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Table 1.7: Final utilities for Intra- Versus Interpersonal Trade-off 
Case: 
 S1 (0.5) S2 (0.5) 
 Ann         Bill Ann         Bill 
Treatment A 
(Interpersonal) 
1              0.8 0.8          0.65 
Treatment B 0.8           0.8 0.8           0.8 
 
Treatment A 
(Intrapersonal) 
1              0.8 0.65         0.8 
Treatment B  0.8           0.8 0.8           0.8 
 
In Interpersonal Scenario there is no prospect for Bill to ever be better off 
than Ann. If Tessa selects A then only Ann has a chance at being more 
advantaged, whereas Bill does not. Bill only has a chance of being 
disadvantaged. Tessa ought to select B in this scenario. The proposed 
view respects the separateness of persons by being sensitive to some 
only bearing a potential burden in order for others to only receive a 
potential benefit. The proposed view respects the unity of the individual 
by requiring the selection of A in Intrapersonal Scenario for Ann’s sake, 
since the potential benefits and burdens only fall to her. Treatment B is 
not permissible in Intrapersonal Scenario because there are no competing 
claims. By contrast, in Interpersonal Scenario there are competing claims 
because there is a conflict of interest ex ante. The competition between 
these claims favours B, because A would involve making one person 
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better off at another’s expense. In making these contrasting judgments, 
the view respects the difference between the unity of the individual and 
the separateness of persons.    
1.6 Conclusion 
I have argued that when the interests of only one person are at stake, one 
ought to act out of a concern for their best expected interests. A pattern of 
outcomes that contains inequality does not itself constitute grounds for 
individual complaints of unfairness. I also argued that the type of risk that 
one is exposed to can affect the permissibility of selecting certain treatments. 
If individuals are exposed to independent risks, there is both a compelling 
prudential justification that can be offered that appeals to the separate 
futures of distinct individuals and there is an absence of competing interests, 
so that one does not have to balance competing claims on behalf of a better 
off and a worse off person. By contrast, I have also argued that when there 
are competing interests (either ex ante or ex post) then one has reason to 
avoid inequality that would arise because some are worse off to others’ 
benefit. In sum, I have provided a competing claims account that guides 
how a decision-maker ought to act in conflict of interest cases involving risk 
and also in cases of certainty. I have shown that this approach respects both 
the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons.  
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Chapter 2 
Fairness and the Satisfaction of Unequal Claims21 
 
2.1 Introduction 
What does fairness require in cases where individuals have unequal claims 
to a good? Some have argued that what fairness requires depends on the 
strength of claims of those who have their interests at stake (Broome, 1990; 
Piller forthcoming). On this view, when claims are very unequal fairness 
requires giving the good directly to the person with the strongest claim, and 
when claims are slightly unequal fairness requires the use of a weighted 
lottery.22 Others have questioned the contribution to fairness made by 
weighted lotteries and have argued that fairness requires that the person 
with the strongest claim ought to receive the good directly (Hooker, 2005: 
348-9; Lazenby 2014). Hugh Lazenby, for example, has recently argued that 
“any contribution to fairness from entering claims into a lottery is lexically 
posterior to fairness in outcome.” (2014: 331).  
I shall argue for the inverse of Lazenby’s lexical ordering: that in distributive 
cases with indivisible goods and unequal claims, fairness requires that a 
weighted lottery be selected over an option that directly guarantees fairness 
                                                          
21 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the London Moral and Political 
Philosophy Worksop at UCL. I am grateful to the audience for helpful comments. 
22 Broome claims that whether it is fairest to give the good to the person with the strongest 
claim or hold a weighted lottery “depends on a complicated judgment” (1990: 98-99), where 
one has to weigh the fairness contribution of the lottery against the fairness that can be 
achieved directly in outcome. Broome suggests, however, that in cases where the difference 
between the strength of claims is slight, one ought to hold a weighted lottery, and when the 
difference is very great between claims then it is fairer to satisfy the strongest claim directly 
in outcome. 
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in outcome. Fairness in outcome is the fairness of the pattern of actual 
satisfaction of claims.23 In establishing this conclusion, I outline and defend 
an account of distributive fairness called Fairness as Proper Recognition of 
Claims. This account provides a justification for lotteries in cases with 
unequal claims and is appropriately sensitive to changes to the number and 
strength of claims. In Section 2.2 I outline Lazenby’s account and in Section 
2.3 I consider three objections. I outline my justification of weighted lotteries 
in Section 2.4 before responding to potential objections to my view in Section 
2.5. I offer my conclusion in Section 2.6. Before proceeding, I wish to 
emphasize that an option being fairer than another does not imply that it is 
all-things-considered superior. For example, even if it is fairer to destroy the 
good in question, considerations of utility might outweigh those of fairness. 
My focus in this chapter is on what fairness requires, rather than what one 
ought to do all things considered.24  
2.2 Fair Distribution and Unequal Claims 
2.2.1 Claims  
A “claim” is a kind of moral reason. This is a type of reason that is held by 
particular individuals, and their satisfaction is a duty owed to the holder 
(Lazenby, 2014: 332). Claims are in competition with one another when there 
is a conflict of interest and it is not possible to fully satisfy each claim in 
                                                          
23 The actual satisfaction of claims occurs when an individual actually receives the good that 
they have a claim to. The term “good” can include probabilistic goods such as lottery tickets 
(if that is what individuals have a claim to), or non-probabilistic goods. 
24 To this extent, I shall bracket a discussion of the debate between Broome (1998) and 
Frances Kamm (1993) on “saving the greater number”. In this debate, a distinction is drawn 
between what fairness requires and what goodness requires. In a case where one can either 
save one person’s life or five lives, Broome thinks that although fairness requires that each 
person is given equal chances, goodness overrides these considerations and as such we 
ought to save the five.  
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proportion to its strength. I shall assume that claims and the value of the 
resources that can satisfy them can be measured on a ratio scale.25 Claims 
can be satisfied in one of two ways: either through satisfaction in outcome, or 
through what is called surrogate satisfaction. Satisfaction in outcome occurs 
when a claimant actually receives a good in proportion to their claim. 
Surrogate satisfaction occurs when a claim is entered into a lottery and an 
individual is given a chance in proportion to the strength of the claim. By 
doing this, “a sort of partial equality in satisfaction can be achieved … each 
individual can be given a chance of getting the good” (Broome, 1990: 97-8). 
How a claim can be satisfied in outcome is uncontroversial. More needs to 
be said about how being given a chance of receiving a good can be a form of 
surrogate satisfaction for a claim, even if one does not receive that good. I 
return to this question in Section 2.4 when I defend an account of weighted 
lotteries.  
2.2.2 Unequal Claims and the Direct Receipt of an Indivisible Good 
Some have argued that in cases with unequal claims to an indivisible good, 
the individual with the strongest claim should directly receive the good. 
Brad Hooker, for example, questions whether there would be any unfairness 
in the strongest claimant receiving the good directly (2005: 349). Hooker 
claims that “weighted lotteries are not required by fairness – indeed are 
contrary to fairness” in cases when people have unequal claims to an 
                                                          
25 On a ratio scale, the difference between two values is meaningful, as is their ratio. For 
example, if well-being were measured on a ratio scale, then it would make sense to say that 
the difference between a well-being level of 10 and a well-being level of 20 is as large as the 
difference between a well-being level of 30 and a well-being level of 40. Moreover, it would 
make sense to say that someone with a well-being level of 20 has twice the well-being of 
someone with a well-being level of 10. The comparative strength of claims is also measured 
on a ratio scale. Suppose that Ann’s claim is 1.5 times stronger than Bill’s. This can be 
represented with claims of strength 6 and 4 respectively.  
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indivisible good (Ibid.). Some, such as Broome (1990: 98-99) and Piller 
(forthcoming: 18) claim that it would sometimes be fairer to give the good 
directly to the strongest claimant when there is a large difference between 
the strongest and weakest claims. Lazenby argues that it is fairer to give the 
good directly to the person with the strongest claim in unequal claim cases, 
rather than hold a weighted lottery (2014: 331). I shall focus on Lazenby’s 
account since it provides a thorough explanation for why the individual 
with the strongest claim should receive the good directly. 
2.2.3 Lazenby’s Argument 
Consider the following case: 
Distributive Case: There are two equally-situated 
individuals, Ann and Bill. The value of the good to be 
divided between them is 100. Ann has a claim of strength 
6, and Bill has a claim of strength 4. 
Lazenby defends the following ranking of options in order of most fair to 
least fair:26 
1.   Give 60 to Ann and 40 to Bill 
2.   Destroy the good 
3.   Give 100 to Ann 
4.   A weighted lottery – 60% chance of 100 to Ann, 40% chance of 100 
to Bill 
                                                          
26 Lazenby calls this ranking the “alternative conception”, as it is formulated as an 
alternative to Broome’s theory of fairness. Since I am not concerned with comparing the 
relative merits of Broome’s and Lazenby’s accounts, but rather the plausibility of Lazenby’s 
account as an independent conception of fairness, I shall simply refer to “Lazenby’s 
account”.  
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5.   Toss a fair coin – giving a 50% chance of 100 to each 
6.   Give 100 to Bill 
Underlying his ranking is the following view of fairness: 
Fairness as Lexically-prior Outcome Satisfaction (FLOS): 
fairness in outcome is lexically prior to the fairness 
provided by lotteries (Lazenby, 2014: 335). In cases with 
unequal claims and an indivisible good up for 
distribution, one ought to give the good directly to the 
individual with the strongest claim (2014: 344). 
Supplementing this principle is the view that, following Broome, fairness is 
a matter of the proportionate satisfaction of claims. Further to this, “whether 
a claim is satisfied proportionately is a matter of how well it is satisfied 
relative to other claims” (Lazenby, 2014: 334).27 Lazenby’s explanation for 
this ranking is as follows. Dividing the good in proportion to the strength of 
each individual’s claim is most fair as this ensures that claims are 
proportionately satisfied in outcome. Destroying the good ensures that Ann 
and Bill’s claims are more proportionately satisfied in outcome, and is fairer 
than giving the good directly to Ann. Giving the good directly to Ann is 
fairer than a weighted lottery, since giving the good directly to Ann has a 
greater expected fairness in outcome than the lottery. Giving each an equal 
chance is less fair than a weighted lottery, as equal chances provide less of a 
proportional surrogate satisfaction of each claim. The least fair option is 
giving the good straight to Bill, since there is no surrogate satisfaction of 
claims, and claims are least proportionately satisfied in outcome. The focus 
of my disagreement is with the ordering of options 3 and 4. I shall argue that 
                                                          
27 Although this view can be attributed to John Broome, Lazenby endorses it for his account. 
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in Distributive Case, a weighted lottery is fairer than giving the good directly 
to Ann. The rest of the paper is a defence of this claim. 
2.2.4 Proportionate Satisfaction 
Before outlining my three objections to Lazenby’s ordering, it is important to 
examine the nature of “proportional satisfaction”, as this plays a central role 
in determining Lazenby’s ranking. There is some ambiguity in this account 
about what precisely it means for a claim to be proportionally satisfied. 
There are at least three possible interpretations. First, proportional 
satisfaction may refer to a ratio where fairness requires that Ann receives 1.5 
times more than Bill. Some support for this interpretation can be found 
when Lazenby states that “if you and I both have claims to a good but my 
claim is twice as strong as yours, perfect fairness will only be achieved if my 
claim receives twice as much satisfaction” (2014: 332). However, what I take 
Lazenby to mean here is that perfect fairness requires that he receives twice 
as much, rather than twice as much satisfaction. It may be the case that Ann 
needs 3 doses of an expensive drug and Bill needs 2 doses of the drug. 
Giving both what they need is full satisfaction, but Ann gets something that 
is more valuable than Bill. The ratio view can explain why option 1 is ranked 
first: in option 1 Ann gets 1.5 times what Bill receives. However, this 
conception of proportional satisfaction is unable to explain the ranking of 
options 2-6. In these options, one of Ann or Bill receives 0, and the other 
receives 100. But if, for example, Ann is entitled to have 1.5 times what Bill 
receives, and Bill receives 0 and Ann receives 100, then the ratio of Ann’s to 
Bill’s receipts is 100 divided by 0, which is infinite. Meanwhile, if Bill 
receives 100 and Ann receives 0, the ratio of Ann’s to Bill’s receipts is zero. 
And infinity is not “closer” to the supposedly optimal ratio of 1.5 than zero 
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is. This interpretation of proportionate satisfaction therefore cannot generate 
Lazenby’s ranking. 
A second possibility is that proportionate satisfaction is measured relative to 
the “ideal” fair distribution. This view measures the aggregate absolute 
expected distance from the ideal distribution. In Distributive Case, by 
hypothesis the ideal distribution is that Ann receives 60 and Bill receives 40. 
The fairness ranking on this view is as follows:  
1. Give 60 to Ann and 40 to Bill 
2. Give 100 to Ann 
3. A weighted lottery – 60% chance of 100 to Ann and 40% chance of 100 
to Bill 
4/5/6. Destroy the good 
4/5/6. Toss a fair coin – giving a 50% chance of 100 to each 
6.   Give 100 to Bill. 
Dividing the good in proportion to the strength of claims is therefore the 
fairest distribution as it conforms to the ideal distribution. Giving the good 
directly to Ann is the second fairest because this leaves Ann with 40 above 
the ideal distribution and Bill 40 below. A weighted lottery would be the 
third fairest, as can be demonstrated by calculating its expected value.28 
There is some difficulty on this view, however, ranking the destruction of 
                                                          
28 This can be calculated by multiplying both the probability that Ann receives the good and 
that Bill receives the good in the weighted lottery. If Ann receives the good in the lottery 
then there is a deviation of 80 from the ideal distribution (Ann would have 40 more than she 
needs, and Bill would have 40 less). If Bill receives the good in the lottery, then there is a 
deviation of 120 from the ideal distribution. Ann has 60 less than she needs, and Bill has 60 
more). Multiplying these values by the probabilities of their occurrence in the lottery gives 
expected value of 96. This is a further deviation from the score that is given to option 2 
(where Ann gets the good directly) since this has a score of 80, because in this option Ann 
would have 40 more than she needs and Bill will have 40 less than what he needs. 
Therefore, on this view, option 3 would be less fair than option 2.  
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the good and a fair coin toss, since they both have the same expected 
deviation from the ideal distribution, by a score of 100.29 This is an 
implausible implication of the view because there are good grounds for 
thinking that a fair coin toss where one person gets the good should be 
ranked higher than destroying it. Someone will actually receive the good in 
the former case, and both are given equal chances.30 Giving the good directly 
to Bill is the furthest away from the ideal distribution. Although this view of 
proportionality yields the aforementioned implausible result, the ranking 
preserves Lazenby’s claim that giving the good directly to Ann is fairer than 
holding a weighted lottery.  
A third interpretation is an ordinal view of proportional satisfaction, where 
it matters that the person with the strongest claim has their claim satisfied 
more than weaker claimants. The “proportion” referred to in this account is 
a loose one, where all that matters is that the person with the largest claim 
receives more than the person with the smaller claim. This view of 
proportionate satisfaction is most closely aligned to FLOS, because this view 
mandates that the person with the strongest claim ought to receive the good, 
no matter how much stronger the claim is than others. In what follows, I 
shall argue that the second and third interpretations are also unsatisfactory 
because they support the claim that in Distributive Case it is fairer that Ann 
receives the good over the use of a weighted lottery.  
                                                          
29 If the good is destroyed then Ann is 60 away from the ideal distribution and Bill is 40 
away, giving a score of 100. The score of an equal-chance lottery can be calculated by the 
same method used in fn. 6, yielding the score of 100.  
30 One might argue that, on the contrary, destroying the good is fairer because there will be 
no outcome inequality whereby one person receives the good and another does not. 
However, this would be grist for my claim that destroying the good and giving each an 
equal chance are not equally fair. 
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My preferred account of proportionality is a modification of the first account 
discussed above. If Ann has a claim that is twice as strong as Bill’s, then 
fairness requires that Ann receives twice as much of the good as Bill. 
Proportionality here refers to a ratio. The ratio account originally ran into 
difficulties because it applied the same method to both divisible and 
indivisible goods. I submit that what fairness requires with respect to 
proportionality depends on whether there is a perfectly divisible or an 
indivisible good. For cases where there is a perfectly divisible good, it is 
possible to divide the good in a ratio proportionate to the claims of Ann and 
Bill. This leads to both individuals receiving full and proportionate 
satisfaction. In indivisible good cases, by contrast, it is not possible to 
proportionally divide the good with respect to a ratio. Indeed, as I explained 
above, the ratio account delivers implausible results when the ratio is 
applied to indivisible goods. As such, the ratio ought to apply to the chances 
of receiving the good, since, I shall assume, it is possible to divide these in 
line with the proportionate strength of claims.  
The view I am proposing consists of two stages: 
1. If those with a claim can all receive some of a good ex post then the 
good ought to be distributed in a ratio to strength of claims between 
the claimants.  
2. If it is not possible to divide the good in proportion to the ratio 
between claims, then chances of receiving the good ought to be 
divided in proportion to the strength of claims.  
To illustrate, suppose Ann has a claim of strength 6 and Bill has a claim of 
strength 4 and there is a perfectly divisible good of 100, then fairness 
requires that Ann receives 60 and Bill 40. Whereas, if the good of 100 is 
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indivisible then chances of receiving the good ought to be divided in 
proportion to the strength of claims, so that Ann receives a 60% chance and 
Bill receives a 40% chance of getting the good. This two-stage application of 
a ratio view of proportionality avoids the problems that beset the original 
ratio view considered above. Because the proportionate ratio of claims does 
not apply to the good in indivisible good cases, but instead to chances, there 
is no incoherence in saying that “Ann gets twice as much as Bill”.31 I develop 
this approach in Section 2.4 when I defend my account of weighted lotteries. 
Before doing so, I will now consider three objections to Lazenby’s fairness 
ranking. 
2.3 Three Objections 
2.3.1 Marginally Stronger Claims Objection 
My first objection to Lazenby’s ordering is that it has implausible 
implications in cases where one individual comes to have a slightly stronger 
claim than another. To illustrate, consider a variation of Distributive Case – 
call it the Equal Claims Case— where Ann and Bill now have equally strong 
claims to the good. It seems that Lazenby’s ranking would now involve the 
following: 
1. Give 50 to Ann and 50 to Bill 
2. Toss a fair coin, giving each a 50% chance of 100 
3. Give 100 to Ann, or give 100 to Bill.32 
                                                          
31 As it stands, this view does not provide a comprehensive fairness ranking, including the 
destruction of the good. The view is a defence of weighted lotteries as well as the claim that 
the fairness of a weighted lottery is ranked above what fairness can achieve by giving the 
good straight to the individual with the strongest claim.  
32 I bracket for now the option of destroying the good, since its place in the ranking has no 
effect on the claims that I make. 
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It would be preferable to give half of the good to each over holding a lottery. 
Giving each half of the good ensures that both claims are satisfied, whereas a 
lottery will only satisfy one claim. It would then be preferable to toss a coin, 
giving each a 50% chance of receiving the good rather than simply giving the 
good to either Ann or Bill. Given that Ann and Bill are equally situated and 
both have a claim of the same size, there are no good reasons to give the 
good directly to either of them, rather than flipping a coin. A reason in 
favour of flipping a fair coin is that it gives each an equal (and 
proportionate) chance of receiving the good. This is not true when giving the 
good directly to Ann or to Bill.   
Suppose now that due to unexpected natural causes, Ann’s claim becomes 
slightly stronger, at strength 5.1, while Bill’s claim remains at 5.33 Call this 
the Almost Equal Case. On Lazenby’s original ranking, from the perspective 
of fairness a distributor ought to prefer giving the good directly to Ann. 
Support for this claim can be found when Lazenby says that his view “holds 
that we should give the kidney directly to [Ann] because her claim is 
strongest and that this answer does not depend on how much stronger 
[Ann’s] claim is” (2014: 344). This is because there is greater expected 
fairness in outcome by giving the good to Ann than by holding a weighted 
lottery. This implication of the ranking is implausible. It is implausible that 
the slight change in the strength of Ann’s claim should morally require us to 
let Ann have a 100% chance over each having a 50% chance, whereas when 
Ann’s claim is just slightly weaker we are required to give them each a 50% 
chance rather than giving the good outright to Ann.  
                                                          
33 I am assuming that there is a discernible difference in the size of claims and that 
proportionate chances can be assigned to such claims. James Kirkpatrick and Nick 
Eastwood (2015) critique this possibility.  
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A further issue is the following. Whether or not one has the strongest claim 
depends on the strength of others’ claims. In certain circumstances, this too 
can be cause for complaint. This complaint can be drawn from Almost Equal 
Case when FLOS is followed. When Ann’s claim becomes slightly stronger 
than Bills’, Bill can say the following: 
“I had a claim of strength 5, and I had a 50% chance of 
receiving the good. Now, because Ann’s claim has 
increased slightly I have a 0% chance of receiving the 
good, even though my claim remains the same strength.” 
It seems unfair that an individual’s chance of receiving a good should go 
from 50% to 0% just because of the slight change in the claim of another. A 
weighted lottery, by contrast, can avoid this complaint by updating the 
chances that each individual has of receiving the good to reflect the 
comparative strength of claims. On this view, Bill will have a slightly 
diminished chance of the good and Ann will get a slightly larger chance of 
receiving the good. This, I hold, is a fairer distribution of chances. 
Bill’s complaint highlights the dependency of chances in distributive cases 
with indivisible goods. By dependent chances, I am referring to the fact that 
one person’s chances for a good affects the chances that another person has. 
The interests of Ann and Bill in Distributive Case are in conflict with one 
another, and as such giving the good directly to Ann or holding a weighted 
lottery are zero-sum.34 Either Ann receives a 100% chance and Bill gets a 0% 
chance, or Ann 60% and Bill 40% and so on. Because their interests are 
                                                          
34 This is not true for cases where chances are independent, i.e. where the chance given to 
one person does not depend on chances that are given to another. A simple example would 
be a fair coin flip to see if you win a prize or not. The chances of this fair coin flip are not 
affected by the chances that another person has for a separate prize.  
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connected in this way, it is fairer to hold a weighted lottery to guarantee a 
more equitable distribution of chances consistent with the claims of 
individuals.  
2.3.2 Multi-Person Objection 
The second objection is that Lazenby’s ordering has difficulties in plausibly 
accounting for cases of more than two individuals involving unequal claims. 
By way of illustration, consider the following case: 
Multi-Person Case: There are five individuals, Ann, Bill, 
Catherine, David and Eleanor. Ann has a claim of strength 
2.2, and the other four individuals have a claim of strength 
1.95. There is a single, indivisible good of value 100. 
FLOS would rank giving the good to Ann lexically higher than a weighted 
lottery, because this would give a higher expected fairness in outcome over 
holding a weighted lottery. On the contrary, it seems to me that it is 
preferable to hold a weighted lottery in which each of the five individuals’ 
chances of winning are proportional to the strength of their claims, so that 
Ann has a 22% chance of receiving the good, and the other four each have a 
19.5% chance of receiving the good. The latter option is a more egalitarian 
distribution of chances, and more consistent with recognition of each 
person’s claims, than giving it outright to Ann. While it may be the case that 
a weighted lottery has a lower expected fairness of outcome, this is different 
to having lower expected fairness all things considered. 
There is, moreover, stronger reason to hold a weighted lottery the more 
individuals’ claims are at stake. It is worse for a larger number of 
individuals to receive no chance at receiving a good to which they have a 
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claim, than it is for a smaller number of individuals to be so deprived.35 I 
submit that the explanation is that it matters for fairness not only whether 
claims are satisfied in proportion to their strength, but also whether claims 
are given what I call “proper recognition”. For a claim to be given proper 
recognition, a claimant’s chances of receiving an indivisible good ought to be 
proportionate to the strength of their claim. One may press the opposite 
view, and argue that the greater the number of individuals with weaker 
claims, the more important it is that the strongest claimant receives the good 
directly. For example, suppose that there is a case where there is one 
individual with a claim of strength 4, and one hundred thousand 
individuals each with a claim of strength 0.00006. In this case the expected 
outcome is for one of the individuals with a very weak claim to win the 
lottery, as the probability that a very weak claimant will get the good is .6. 
As such, one might argue that fairness requires that the good ought to go 
directly to the strongest claimant. But I take the thought here to be that there 
are other reasons than fairness, such as a reason to maximise expected 
goodness, which may sometimes overrule considerations of fairness.36 This 
influences the thought that we ought to give the good directly to the 
individual with the strongest claim. In some cases, when one is deliberating 
about what to do all-things considered, it may be appropriate to give the 
good directly to the strongest claimant, but this is separate from the claim 
that that would be what fairness requires. Section 2.4 considers in more detail 
                                                          
35 To illustrate, suppose that in a modification to Multi-Person Case there are now nine 
individuals, where Ann has a claim of strength 2 and the other eight have a claim of 
strength 1. If the good is given directly to Ann then there are eight unsatisfied claims that 
did not receive a chance of being satisfied. Whereas, I take it to be a worse state of affairs 
when there are ninety-eight individuals with unsatisfied claims that did not receive a 
chance. This is because there are more unsatisfied claims in this case than the former.  
36 See, for example, Broome (1990: 90; 1998: 956-7) and Kamm (1993: 107-8). 
66 
 
the claim that in such cases of unequal claims fairness requires a weighted 
lottery. 
2.3.3 Relational Unfairness Objection 
Leading on from the preceding two objections is a third: FLOS is insensitive 
to the relational complaint that some may have stronger claims than others 
due to no fault or choice of their own. In Distributive Case, FLOS would 
recommend giving the good directly to Ann over holding a weighted 
lottery. It seems unfair that just because one happens to have a weaker claim 
than another that one has no chance at all of receiving the good one has a 
claim to. It is a mere contingent fact that others happen to exist with stronger 
or weaker claims. One may respond and claim that this isn’t a cause for 
complaint at all. So long as there was some degree of ex ante randomisation 
with respect to who had a claim of a particular size, then it could be said that 
Bill did have a chance of having the strongest claim. To develop this response 
further, we can draw on the following from Kornhauser and Sager: 
Principle of Convolution: “However badly biased the 
[chance device] may be, the equiprobability of the initial 
fair draw of the [lots] produces equiprobability overall in 
the candidates’ chances of getting the prize” (1988: 486). 
To illustrate, suppose that there is a loaded die that always comes up 6. 
There is a prize up for grabs, and six people. If the allocation of numbers to 
people itself gives each an equal chance of receiving a particular number, 
then the use of a biased die is not unfair, since each person had an equal 
chance of being allocated to 6. Following this, we might think that Ann and 
Bill had an equal chance of ending up as the person with the strongest claim. 
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As such, it would not be unfair to simply give the good directly to Ann in 
Distributive Case. However, it seems unlikely that one can guarantee that 
prior claims have been randomised with the degree of precision required to 
make such a process fair.37 Although it may be true that one does not know 
what the size of one’s claim will be in a particular case, this does not mean 
that one’s chances of having a particular-sized claim are equal. Given that 
we often do not know the likelihood of particular individuals having 
particular sized claims, it is reasonable to assume that individuals did not 
have an equal chance at ending up with the strongest claim.  
2.4 An Account of Weighted Lotteries 
2.4.1 The Argument  
This section outlines a distinct view of fairness for conflict of interest cases 
with unequal claims that provides a justification for weighted lotteries, and 
provides a more plausible rationale for how one should act in Almost Equal 
Case and Multi-Person Case. My argument for the use of weighted lotteries in 
distributive cases is the following: 
1. Fairness requires that affected claims be given proper recognition. 
2. In cases with unequal claims to indivisible goods, giving claims 
proper recognition requires the assignment of chances in proportion 
to the strength of claims. 
3. A weighted lottery is necessary and sufficient for giving chances 
proportionate to the strength of claims.  
                                                          
37 Ben Saunders provides a critique of this claim: “there is no sense in which [Bill] – as a 
concrete individual – has any chance of being in the [most advantaged position]. He had a 
chance only if we appeal to something like the “original position”, in which his identity was 
unknown and he could have been one of [Ann or Bill]” (2009: 282).  
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4. Therefore, fairness requires a weighted lottery in cases with 
indivisible goods and unequal claims. 
The important premises in my argument are 1 and 2. Regarding premise 3, 
there is no other method of assigning proportionate chances to individuals 
that is not some form of weighted lottery, where chances are assigned in 
light of the differing strengths of claims. I shall now turn to a defence of the 
important premises.  
2.4.2 Premise One 
The first premise states that fairness requires that affected claims be given 
proper recognition. There are at least two important ways that a decision-
maker can take into account the claims of individuals. First, the claims of 
individuals can be weighed. For this “the right thing to do, and the right way 
to distribute a good is determined by the balance of reasons, whether claims 
or not” (Broome, 1990: 93). Broome argues that claims cannot be satisfied 
simply by weighing them against other reasons or other claims. This is 
because claims are held by particular, separate individuals, and so one does 
not satisfy these claims merely by weighing them against other claims and 
reasons.   
Second, claims can be given proper recognition. When giving a claim proper 
recognition, it is important to do more than merely take notice of the claim 
and compare its strength to the claims of others. It matters that a claim is 
given appropriate consideration. The starting point for this view is the claim 
that the pattern of claims and their (expected) satisfaction do not exhaust the 
considerations that are relevant for fairness. Claims and their satisfaction are 
important, but so is the manner in which claims are treated. It will be helpful 
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here to consider Stephen Darwall’s account of “recognition respect”. On this 
view, “to say that persons as such are entitled to respect is to say that they 
are entitled to have other persons take seriously and weigh appropriately 
the fact that they are persons in deliberating about what to do” (1977: 38). I 
propose that something similar is true with respect to claims. One ought to 
take seriously the fact that people have claims to a good.38 A variety of 
different objects can be the object of recognition respect (Dillon, 2014). The 
following case from Kamm (1993: 114-19)39 helps to further draw out what it 
means for claims to be given proper recognition. Suppose there are two 
individuals, A and B, who are stranded on separate islands. We can only 
save one from drowning at little cost to ourselves. We ought to flip a fair 
coin in order to decide who gets saved, since there are no good reasons for 
directly favouring one person over the other. Suppose now that C is added 
alongside B. If we continue to flip a coin, then we would be ignoring C’s 
presence, since we will be acting in exactly the same way as if C was not 
there.40 
To give claims proper recognition is to appropriately take them into account. 
Part of what this means is that a change in either the number or intensity of 
claims should make a difference to what a decision-maker ought to do. It 
should also make a continuous difference, so a slight change in the strength 
                                                          
38 Support for this idea is provided by Kamm’s account of fairness, whereby fairness 
requires us to give proper respect to individuals as individuals. For Kamm, fairness requires 
that we maintain our ties to individuals as individuals (Kamm, 1993: 88; Broome, 1998: 957). 
In the case at the end of this paragraph, Kamm argues that “we retain our ties to each of A 
and B when we give each of them as much of a chance as is consistent with retaining our tie 
to the other”, and when C is added alongside B, “[i]f we then save the greater number 
[(B+C)], this means severing our tie to A before giving him an equal chance” (Kamm, 1993: 
88). When it is possible to either save A or B, Kamm argues that tossing a fair coin “allows 
the [decision-maker] to remain attached to each as an individual” (Ibid).  
39 T. M. Scanlon (1998: 232-3) also discusses this case. 
40 This scenario is discussed in more detail by Frances Kamm (1993), Scanlon (1998) and 
Otsuka (2006: 114). 
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of a claim should warrant a slight change to what one ought to do.  For 
instance, in Almost Equal Case when Ann’s claim increases from 5 to 5.1 
whilst Bill’s stays at 5, FLOS states that Ann should now receive the good 
rather than hold a weighted lottery. From a small change in the strength of a 
claim there is a large change in the chances of the individuals. Instead, a 
weighted lottery would be sensitive to the small changes in comparative 
claim size. 
One might argue that one can give proper recognition to claims by simply 
recognising the fact that individuals have claims of different strengths, and 
then accepting the fact that a decision-maker’s action should be based on the 
fact that an individual’s weaker claim is trumped by another’s stronger 
claim. However, this view fails to respect the separateness of persons as it 
resolves interpersonal conflicts in a way that fails to respect the moral 
relevance of interpersonal boundaries. The view nominally takes into 
account the claims of different individuals, but only so far as the claims are 
sorted in order of strength and the person who happens to have the 
strongest is given the good directly. Parallels can be drawn with the 
argument against utilitarianism on the same grounds:  
“Utilitarianism [...] confronts the [...] objection when it 
recommends giving a resource to a well-off agent over a 
badly-off agent on the sole ground that the well-off agent 
will derive slightly more benefit from the resources than 
the badly-off agent” (Hyams, 2015: 219). 
For FLOS the “sole ground” for giving a resource to one person than another 
is the fact that they happen to have a stronger claim than another. By doing 
so, it ignores intuitions about the moral relevance of interpersonal 
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boundaries. The view I am proposing respects the separateness of persons 
because it takes seriously the distinction between individuals. By giving 
claims proper recognition, one respects the distinctness of each particular 
individual’s claim. Claims aren’t simply overridden on the account I am 
proposing. 
2.4.3 Premise Two 
Further support for the claim that lotteries give proper recognition to claims 
can be found in justifications of the fairness of lotteries with equal chances. 
David Wasserman, for instance, argues that “lotteries are fair if they respect 
the claimants’ equal entitlements to the scarce good” (1996: 48, italics 
added). Although Wasserman discusses only equal chance lotteries, there is 
no good reason for thinking that weighted lotteries cannot also respect 
people’s unequal claims. By holding a weighted lottery in Distributive Case 
the distributor respects the claims of Ann and Bill by apportioning the 
chances to reflect their comparative strengths. Peter Stone (2007) builds his 
account of the justness of lotteries on cases where individuals have equal 
claims to a good, and such equal-chance lotteries are “uniquely appropriate 
for the just indeterminacies in allocation” (2007: 280). I wish to challenge the 
idea that equal-chance lotteries are uniquely appropriate for indeterminacies 
in allocation, rather than lotteries per se.41  
                                                          
41 Peter Stone appears to recommend a similar proposal to Lazenby in deciding what one is 
required to do in cases with unequal claims. Stone argues that “an agent charged with 
allocating [a] good in a case [with unequal claims] should rank order the claimants 
according to the strength of their claims. […] Stronger claims should gain access to the good 
before weaker claims do” (2007: 278). On this view, lotteries are only appropriate for cases 
where claims are equal.   
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In cases where the claims of individuals are equal and the good is indivisible 
it is generally thought that one ought to hold a lottery at equal odds. Part of 
the justification for this I take to be the following principle: 
Principle of Proportionality: In conflict of interest cases with 
an indivisible good and more than one individual, chances 
of receiving the good for each individual ought to be 
proportional to the strength of their respective claims. 
In other words, if individuals have equal claims to a good then it would be 
unfair for one individual to get higher chances of receiving the good than 
another. The Principle of Proportionality, I submit, applies not only to cases 
with equal claims, where the fairness of lotteries has typically been 
endorsed, but also to cases of unequal claims. For cases of unequal claims, 
chances ought to be proportionate to the claims of individuals. One may 
resist this move and argue that the Principle of Proportionality should only 
apply to cases where claims are equal. It may be argued that a lottery at 
equal odds functions merely as a “tie-breaker” between equally-situated 
individuals and that for cases with unequal claims one ought to give the 
good to the individual with the strongest claim, or use some other rubric.42 
In response, there is no good reason for the Principle of Proportionality to only 
                                                          
42 In support of this claim, one may argue that a lottery merely functions as a tie-breaker in 
cases of equal claims due to the impartiality that the lottery offers. Each individual will 
receive equal chances of receiving the good, and as such the distributor fails to be partial 
towards one of the claimants. However, the defender of a lottery in such cases must be after 
something stronger than a merely impartial procedure. This is because it is possible to use 
certain impartial procedures for breaking a tie that do not give individuals an equiprobable 
chance of receiving the good (Sher, 1980: 207-12).  For example, giving the good to the 
person with the largest pancreas (Kornhauser and Sager, 1988: 490). If one then thinks that a 
lottery is preferable to such impartial procedures, then it must be because of the lotteries 
allocation of probabilities to the claimants. If the allocation of probabilities bears the value 
of the lottery for such equal-claims cases, then it is difficult to see why this value only 
occurs in cases with equal claims. 
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apply to cases of equal claims. In the same way that equal chances reflect 
how individuals are equally situated with respect to the size of each other’s 
claims, unequal chances ought to reflect the claims’ unequal strength. A 
reason for thinking that proportionate chances ought to be given to 
individuals with unequal claims is that giving chances to an individual 
tracks the value of the claim that an individual has, thereby signifying the 
claim’s importance.  
The following principle underlies the view that changes in the strength of 
claims ought to make a continuous difference to what a decision-maker 
ought to do: 
Fairness as Proper Recognition of Claims: Fairness requires 
that when individuals have a claim to a good, and it is not 
possible to proportionately satisfy all claims in outcome, 
these individuals be given the highest chances that 
correspond to the ratio of respective claims.  
Under this principle it would be unfair to give the good directly to the 
individual with the strongest claim. Because there are competing claims, and 
because fairness requires giving proper weight to the claims of the 
individuals who have their interests at stake, a distributor ought to hold a 
weighted lottery. It doesn’t just matter that individuals have proportionate 
chances, but that they are the highest proportionate chances that are 
possible.43  Giving claims proper recognition requires the application of the 
                                                          
43 For example, suppose that Ann has a claim that is twice as strong as Bill’s claim. it would 
be would be proportionate to give Ann a 2% chance of getting a good and Bill a 1% chance 
of receiving the good, with a 97% chance of the good being wasted. Whereas, given the 
choice between the previous option and the following, it ought to be preferred that an 
option is selected where Ann gets a 67% chance and Bill gets a 33% chance (rounded). If Bill 
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Principle of Proportionality to the ratio of claims. If one does not give 
proportionate chances in such cases, or if one simply gives the good directly 
to one of the claimants, then proper recognition is not being given to the 
claims. In a case with a single individual, and no competing interests of 
others, this individual ought to directly receive the good as this maximises 
their chances of receiving the good, and does not conflict with any chances 
given to others.  
2.4.3.1 Broome and Surrogate Satisfaction  
I shall now distinguish my view from that of Broome. According to him, 
when it is not possible to satisfy claims in proportion to their relative 
strengths, a claim may receive “surrogate satisfaction” by being entered into 
a lottery.  How exactly a claim receives surrogate satisfaction is not 
immediately clear (Lazenby, 2014: 337-8). One interpretation is that “lotteries 
give something of value to the claimants even if they do not receive the 
scarce good” (Wasserman, 1996: 47). One might think that this thing of value 
is then “deducted” from the individual’s claim, making it weaker than it was 
before. To illustrate what this means, suppose that Ann and Bob initially 
have equal claims to a good and Ann receives a 50% chance to receive this 
good and Bill does not – for example, a coin is tossed and Ann receives the 
good if it lands “heads”, while the good remains temporarily undistributed 
if it lands “tails”. Suppose further that her chance comes to nought. Then, so 
the “deduction” account goes, her claim is thereby weaker than Bill’s, even 
though she has ended up with no actual good (Lazenby, 2014: 337). This is a 
problematic implication of the view that chances provide surrogate 
                                                                                                                                                                   
gets a higher chance than 33% then this will come at the expense of Ann’s chances of 
receiving the good. 
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satisfaction on the same metric as the claim itself, because although Ann had 
a chance of receiving the good, she does not have any of the good. There is 
no actual satisfaction of the claim. One might instead posit that there are 
grounds for thinking that Bill should receive the next chance, separate from 
the thought that Ann has part of her claim satisfied by having received a 
chance. 
Another strategy is to claim that surrogate satisfaction constitutes an 
“improvement in fairness without satisfaction” (Ibid). On this view claims 
are not diminished by being entered into lotteries. Lazenby, however, argues 
that this view gets the wrong result in an amended version of the above 
case. Suppose that Ann receives a chance of a good that fails to materialise. 
Bill receives nothing. There is now a lottery ticket that can be distributed 
between them. On the “improvement in fairness view” there should be a fair 
lottery to decide who gets the ticket, since there is no change in Ann’s claim 
after having the previous chances. Lazenby argues that the ticket should go 
directly to Bill since he has not had a chance previously, whereas Ann has. I 
maintain the right answer depends both on whether there is a divisible or 
indivisible good, and whether claims are in competition when a good is 
distributed. When there is an indivisible good, such as the lottery ticket, 
there ought to be a lottery to decide who gets the ticket, since in the case of 
an indivisible good there is a conflict of interests where not all claims can be 
satisfied simultaneously. This is not the case with divisible goods. The fact 
that Ann had an unfulfilled chance of receiving a good in the past (when 
only she stood to gain and nobody else did, and giving her this chance did 
not, at that time, diminish anyone else’s chances, because there was as yet no 
conflict of interests) ought not to diminish her claim when it is in 
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competition with another. To this extent, I submit that it makes a moral 
difference whether one received a (chance of a) good when there were no 
competing claims on the good, and when one receives a (chance of a) good 
when there are competing claims with others. 
I assert that it is a mistake to see an individual as receiving something when 
their claim is entered into a lottery.44 It is not helpful to see a claim being 
satisfied in outcome when an individual receives a chance. I propose a 
different approach. The “improvement in fairness” view can be developed 
into an account of what it means to give proper recognition to a person’s 
claim. This is a more deontological approach which focuses not on whether a 
lottery can partly or fully satisfy a claim (either directly in outcome, or by 
depreciating the strength of the claim), but on whether a claim was 
appropriately taken into account in an agent’s deliberation.45 Fairness as 
Proper Recognition of Claims is an instance of this deontological approach. 
2.4.4 Fairness as Proper Recognition versus FLOS 
To bring out the differences between the two accounts, consider the 
following case:46 
Additional People Case: At t1 Ann has a claim of strength 4 
for an indivisible good. At t2 Bill materialises alongside 
                                                          
44 The language of an individual “receiving” something when their claim is entered into a 
lottery refers to what Wasserman calls the “distributive view” of lottery fairness. On this 
view, “lotteries treat equally-entitled claimants fairly by giving each claimant some 
intangible good in equal measure” (1996: 30). Although individuals trivially receive a chance 
of getting the good, I submit that they do not receive anything that satisfies the claim in 
outcome. 
45 Other accounts also reject the claim that lotteries provide some sort of surrogate 
satisfaction for claims. See, for example, Peter Stone (2007) and David Wasserman (1996). 
46 There is an important disanalogy between the “rescuing the greater number” case and the 
distributive cases under consideration in this paper. The good of survival that is at stake in 
the rescuing cases can be available to more than one person, whereas in the distributive 
cases under discussion the good can only go to one single individual.  
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Ann with a competing claim of strength 3.5 for the 
indivisible good. A few moments later at t3 Clara 
materialises alongside Ann and Bill with a competing 
claim of strength 2.5, leading to three individuals at t3 with 
unequal claims.  
What is the fairest action to perform at each stage? According to FLOS, 
fairness requires that the option of giving the good directly to Ann ought to 
be ranked first in each stage. I disagree. FLOS ignores morally significant 
differences among these stages. The account of weighted lotteries that I 
provide gives a more plausible recommendation for this case. At t1 Ann 
should receive the good directly. At t2 the fairest action would be to hold a 
weighted lottery with chances in proportion to the strength of the claims of 
Ann and Bill. At t3 the chances in the weighted lottery ought to be modified 
in order to accommodate the extra claim of Clara.47 Although the actions at 
t2 and t3 do not have a greater expected fairness in outcome, since they do 
not guarantee that the individual with the strongest claim gets the good, 
they are nevertheless fairer all things considered. This is because, on my 
view, the claim of each additional person is taken into account and suitably 
modifies what one ought to do.  
One may argue that it is unfair that Ann fails to be guaranteed the good at t2 
and t3 since at these times she has the strongest claim. Ann’s chances of 
receiving the good in t1 were 100%, and they drop to 40% in t3. In t1 there 
was no conflict of interest. Only Ann’s interests were at stake and so it was 
                                                          
47 At t2 the chances of Ann and Bill would be 53.5% and 46.5% respectively, to reflect the 
fact that Ann’s claim is 1.15 times bigger than Bills. In t3 the chances of Ann, Bill and Clara 
will be 40%, 35% and 25% respectively, to reflect the fact that Ann’s claim is 1.15 times 
bigger than Bill’s and 1.6 times bigger than Clara’s. 
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appropriate to give her the good, whatever the strength of her claim. In t2 
and t3 there is a conflict of interest. Only one person can receive the good, 
and it would be inappropriate to give the good directly to Ann. Other 
people also have claims to the good, and this is something that ought to be 
taken into account in conflict of interest cases. Fairness isn’t simply the 
satisfaction of claims proportionately in outcome, especially in cases when it 
is not possible for all claims to receive satisfaction. 
2.4.5 Summary  
My proposal can be summarised as follows. In a distributive case with 
claims to a divisible good, the good ought to be distributed in proportion to 
the strength of claims. In a distributive case with an indivisible good, with 
multiple people and unequally-sized claims, it is fairer to provide a 
weighted lottery over giving the good directly to the individual with the 
strongest claim. Given my account of weighted lotteries, option 3 and 4 
ought to be reversed in Lazenby’s ranking. The account I have given is 
sensitive to changes in the size of claims and the number of people, and also 
gives proper recognition to the claims of each affected person. This account 
provides a more plausible rationale for identifying the fairest option in 
Almost Equal Case, Multi-Person Case and Additional People Case. 
2.5 Objections and Replies 
2.5.1 Does Fairness Require a Weighted Lottery? 
One may question whether fairness requires proper recognition and not, like 
Broome argues, that “claims should be satisfied in proportion to their 
strength” (1990: 95). On my account, fairness requires that claims are given 
proper recognition. What follows from this is that in cases with unequal 
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claims to indivisible goods, fairness requires a weighted lottery. This is not 
the case on Broome’s view. For Broome, whether it is fairest to hold a 
weighted lottery or give the good directly to the strongest claimant 
“depends on a complicated judgment” (Ibid: 98-99) between the fairness that 
can be achieved directly in outcome versus a lottery that provides surrogate 
satisfaction of claims. Broome endorses weighted lotteries in cases where the 
difference between the strength of claims is slight (Broome, 1990: 99; Piller, 
forthcoming: 19). If fairness requires that claims are satisfied in proportion to 
their strength, then for cases with unequal claims fairness does not always 
require a weighted lottery, because this aim can sometimes be achieved by 
giving the good directly to the person with the strongest claim.   
In response, Fairness as Proper Recognition of Claims guarantees 
proportionality through a commitment to proper recognition of claims. 
Claims should be satisfied in proportion to their strength in cases with 
divisible goods, but proportionality ought to apply to chances in indivisible 
good cases. A key difference between the two views is that Broome’s view 
allows for claims to sometimes be overridden when the difference between 
claim strength is great. This is because there are two values of fairness at 
play: the fairness that can be achieved directly in outcome, and the fairness 
contribution of chances. Proportionate satisfaction of claims applies to both, 
and the values are to be balanced against each other. Fairness as Proper 
Recognition of Claims, by contrast, gives a determinate answer to what 
fairness requires, and plausibly incorporates a consideration of 
proportionality, even though it is not the starting point of the account.   
2.5.2 “But the Claim is Stronger!”  
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One might argue that as a matter of fairness, stronger claims just ought to be 
satisfied over weaker claims. For example, Stone argues that weighted 
lotteries do 
“violence to the whole idea of impartially considering the 
strength of claims. Any grounds that an agent could have 
for assigning a higher weight to the chance that x will get 
the good than the chance y will get the good should count 
as grounds for simply giving x, and not y, the good 
outright” (2007: n287). 
I agree that x having a stronger claim than y counts as a ground for simply 
giving the good to x, but it does not follow that the strength of claims alone 
determines what action is most fair in a distributive case with an indivisible 
good. When other individuals have claims to an indivisible good, fairness 
demands that our distributive actions are responsive to their claims too. This 
would not be achieved if one simply gave the good directly to the individual 
with the stronger claim. A related worry is that one will override the claims 
of those with weaker claims. This is what happens if the good is given 
directly to the person with the stronger claim, even though additional 
people are added who also have a claim, such as in Multi-Person Case and 
Additional People Case. A weighted lottery avoids this worry. 
2.5.3 Very Unequal Claims  
One general objection to the use of weighted lotteries is that it runs counter 
to our intuitions in cases where there are very unequal claims. To illustrate, 
consider the following case: 
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Very Unequal Claims: There are two equally-situated 
individuals, Ann and Bill. Ann has a claim of strength 9, 
and Bill has a claim of strength 1. 
In this case Ann is entitled to the good nine times more than Bill. Her claim 
is far stronger than Bill’s. Why shouldn’t the good just go straight to Ann? 
This thought is echoed by Brad Hooker, who questions the plausibility of 
holding a weighted lottery when there are very unequal claims:  
“Suppose your claims to some indivisible good are very 
much weightier than mine. Is there any unfairness in your 
getting the indivisible good rather than my getting it?” 
(Hooker, 2005: 349). 
Giving the good directly to Ann would have greater expected outcome 
fairness than holding a weighted lottery. And intuitively, one might think 
that because Ann’s claim is so strong and Bills is so weak by comparison, we 
should give the good straight to Ann. This sort of case supports Lazenby’s 
claim that what fairness can achieve directly in outcome is superior to what 
fairness can be achieved by holding a weighted lottery. However, I submit 
that fairness requires a weighted lottery in this case. By holding a weighted 
lottery there is still a large expected fairness in outcome. There is a 90% 
chance that the person with the larger claim gets the good. But crucially, the 
weighted lottery also gives proper recognition to Bill’s claim by giving him a 
chance of receiving the good that is proportional to the size of his claim. This 
plurality of factors ought to be taken into account in a plausible account of 
distributive fairness. 
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One may respond and argue that there is less fairness-based reason to 
perform a weighted lottery the more extreme the difference between claims. 
Christian Piller (forthcoming: 13-19) considers this possibility when 
defending Broome’s theory of fairness. Piller states that there are two 
“layers” of fairness. The first is with respect to outcomes, where it is more 
unfair that the person with the weaker claim receives the good in a weighted 
lottery compared to if the person with the stronger claim receives the good. 
There is outcome unfairness even if the person with the stronger claim 
receives the good because the person with the weakest claim will receive 
nothing, whilst they receive something. Piller states that “the bigger the 
difference between the stronger and the weaker claim, the bigger the 
[outcome] unfairness will be if the weaker claim wins” (Ibid: 17). The second 
aspect of fairness applies to how claims are treated in the procedure of 
distribution. A weighted lottery can be said to be fair if it gives chances 
proportional to the size of claims as this treats claimants fairly. These two 
aspects of fairness have to be traded off against one another. Proportionate 
lotteries are fair with respect to the ex ante treatment of claims, but there is a 
chance that there will be outcome unfairness ex post where the person with 
the weakest claim receives the good over the person with the strongest 
claim.  
Piller states that: 
“Proportional lotteries are fair in a way. They are unfair in 
another way. This further unfairness increases as the 
difference in the claim strength increases. Thus, weighted 
lotteries are overall fair only when people have claims of 
similar strength” (Ibid: 19). 
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There are two problems with this approach. Firstly, Piller’s statement of the 
fairness of weighted lotteries struggles with cases with more than two 
people. Recall Multi-Person Case where there was one person with a claim of 
strength 2.2 and four with a claim of strength 1.95. The claims are of similar 
strength, but if a weighted lottery is run then there is a 78% chance that a 
person with the weakest claim gets the good over the person with the 
strongest claim. It is more likely that someone with a weaker claim will get 
the good, but the difference in claim strength is only slight. Because failing 
to satisfy the strongest claim leads to greater unfairness than failing to 
satisfy the weakest claim, then there should be reason to think, on Piller’s 
view, that one should give the good directly to the person with the strongest 
claim. This is because there is a 78% chance that there will be greater 
outcome unfairness than if the person with a claim of strength 2 received the 
good directly. However, there is a reason against giving the good to the 
person with the strongest claim because the claims are of similar strength. 
The preceding objection arises because of the two “layers” of fairness which 
can be traded off with one another. Because Fairness as Proper Recognition of 
Claims does not hold this view, it is not vulnerable to the objection, since the 
account provides a determinate answer to what one ought to do in 
indivisible goods cases.   
Secondly, the view that weighted lotteries are fair overall only when people 
have claims of similar strength can be challenged by considering the 
following example: 
Unequal Claim Case: Ann and Bill have unequal claims to a 
good with the value of 10. 
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Table 2.1: Expected Outcome Unfairness of Holding a Weighted 
Lottery versus Giving the Good Directly to the Person with the 
Strongest Claim. 
Ann’s 
claim 
strength 
Bill’s 
claim 
strength 
Expected 
outcome 
unfairness of a 
weighted 
lottery 
Expected 
outcome 
unfairness of 
giving good 
directly to Ann 
Expected 
outcome 
unfairness 
“cost” of 
lottery48 
 
9.5 0.5 1.9 1 .9 
9 1 3.6 2 1.6 
8.5 1.5 5.1 3 2.1 
8 2 6.4 4 2.4 
7.5 2.5 7.5 5 2.5 
7 3 8.4 6 2.4 
6.5 3.5 9.1 7 2.1 
6 4 9.6 8 1.6 
5.5 4.5 9.9 9 .9 
5 5 10 10 0 
 
Table 2.1 compares the expected outcome unfairness of holding a weighted 
and the expected outcome unfairness of giving the good directly to Ann. 
This is calculated for ten different scenarios where the claim strengths are of 
                                                          
48 The higher the number, the larger the expected unfairness cost of holding a weighted 
lottery over giving the good directly to Ann.  
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differing magnitudes.49 It is then possible to calculate the “cost” of using a 
weighted lottery by taking the expected outcome unfairness of holding a 
weighted lottery and deducting the expected outcome fairness of giving the 
good directly to Ann. This is the loss in expected fairness when one holds a 
weighted lottery over giving the good directly to Ann. The first observation 
to note is that there is a lower expected outcome unfairness when one gives 
the good directly to Ann in all cases apart from when Ann’s and Bill’s claims 
are equally strong. In this scenario the expected unfairness is the same for 
giving the good directly to Ann as it is for holding a lottery. A reason in 
favour of holding a lottery in this case is that the expected unfairness cost of 
the lottery is zero. The alternative of giving the good directly to Ann, 
although having the same expected outcome unfairness as holding the 
lottery, would be fairer for reasons additional to the expected outcome 
unfairness.  For example, it is unfair that Bill has no chance of receiving the 
good given that his claim is exactly the same strength as Ann’s.  
There is, of course, greater expected outcome fairness in giving the good 
directly to the person with the strongest claim, but I have argued in this 
chapter that fairness demands that claims be given proper recognition, and 
as such the fairest alternative is not always the one that will have the 
                                                          
49 The expected outcome unfairness of holding a weighted lottery is calculated as follows. 
First, I introduce a distance measure between what both Ann and Bill receive under a 
particular lottery and what an ideal distribution of the 10 would be. The distance measure 
that I adopt is the “sum of absolute differences”. I use this particular measure because it 
captures Piller’s claim that the larger the distance between claims, the larger the unfairness 
if the weaker claim wins. If Bill has a weak claim, and does not receive any of the good, then 
this is reflected in a low score. Whereas, if Ann has a much larger claim than Bill (and Bill 
then receives the good), a higher score is given to reflect the greater unfairness of Bill 
receiving the good. An illustration of how this is calculated with the scenario where Ann 
has a claim of strength 7 and Bill a claim of strength 3 is as follows. Outcome 1: with 70% 
chance, Ann gets 10 and Bill gets nothing. The sum of absolute differences would be (10-7) + 
(0-3) = 6. In outcome 2, with 30% chance Ann gets 0 and Bill gets 10. The calculation of the 
absolute difference is as follows: (7-0) + (3+10) = 14. The expected outcome unfairness is then 
the following: 0.7*6 + 0.3*14 = 8.4. 
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greatest expected fairness in outcome. This is because, following Broome, I 
take fairness to be about how one treats claims to a good (Piller, 2017: 214). A 
weighted lottery treats claims in a proportionate way, unlike the rule of giving 
the good to the strongest claim. There may be outcome inequality as a result of 
the weighted lottery, whereby the person with the weaker claim gets a good 
and the stronger claim does not, but this does not always unfair, where 
unfairness is about how claims to a good were treated. 
A second observation is that the marginal outcome fairness cost of holding a 
weighted lottery decreases as the comparative claim strength moves away in 
either direction from the case where Ann has a claim of strength 7.5 and Bill 
a claim of 2.5. As such, the expected outcome unfairness of holding a 
weighted lottery decreases as the difference between the strength of claims 
gets very large and very small. Therefore, holding a weighted lottery with 
very unequal claims may have lower or equal expected outcome unfairness 
cost to a lottery that is held with moderately unequal claims. If one’s 
motivation for holding a weighted lottery when claims are close in strength 
is that there is a low fairness cost to the lottery, then one should not be 
resistant to the use of a weighted lottery with very unequal claims if the 
expected fairness cost is the same.   
Broome and Piller may object that Table 2.1 fails to reflect the severity of the 
unfairness if Bill receives the good when his claim is very small. Table 2.2, 
below, demonstrates the expected unfairness of holding a weighted lottery 
where the severity of the unfairness if Bill gets the good is weighted by the 
distance between the claims of Ann and Bill. This is to reflect Piller’s claim 
that it is more unfair if a person receives the good when they have a much 
smaller claim, than it is when they have a nearly equal claim to the good.  
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Table 2.2: Expected Outcome Unfairness of Lotteries Conditional 
on the Person with the Weaker Claim Receiving the Good.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To reflect the greater unfairness of the weaker claimant receiving the 
indivisible good in the lottery, the value of the good is multiplied by the 
distance between the claims of the stronger and the weaker claimant. This 
provides a measure of the severity of the outcome unfairness if the weaker 
claimant receives the good in the lottery. The larger the number, the greater 
the outcome unfairness. The expected value of the lotteries is calculated by 
multiplying the probability of the strongest claimant receiving the good by 
the value of the good and then adding it to the probability of the weaker 
Claim Strengths Distance 
between 
claims 
Expected 
unfairness of the 
lottery 
Ann Bill 
9.5 0.5 9 14 
9 1 8 17 
8.5 1.5 7 19 
8 2 6 20 
7.5 2.5 5 20 
7 3 4 19 
6.5 3.5 3 17 
6 4 2 14 
5.5 4.5 1 9 
5 5 0 10 
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claimant multiplied by the weighted value of the good.50 Even when the 
severity of the unfairness of Bill receiving the good when his claim is very 
weak is included in the calculation of the expected unfairness of the lotteries, 
there is as much expected unfairness as cases where claims are of nearly 
equal strength. Table 2.1 and 2.2 both illustrate that there is greater expected 
unfairness when a weighted lottery is held when claims are around 7.5 and 
2.5 in comparative strength. When claims are either very unequal or almost 
equal, there is less expected unfairness. The small chance of the very weak 
claim being satisfied discounts the large unfairness. As such, if one holds, as 
Broome and Piller do, that weighted lotteries ought to be held when claims 
are slightly unequal (because there is lesser expected outcome unfairness), 
then weighted lotteries ought to also be favoured when claims are very 
unequal. I have demonstrated why this ought to be the case through the use 
of two different measures of expected outcome unfairness.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that in distributive cases with indivisible goods, 
unequal claims, and no other morally relevant factors, it is fairer to hold a 
weighted lottery than give the good directly to the individual with the 
largest claim. This conclusion stands in contrast to Lazenby’s claim that one 
ought to rank giving the good to the individual with the strongest claim 
above holding a weighted lottery. I defended an account of fairness that is 
                                                          
50 To illustrate, in the case where Ann has a claim of 8.5 and Bill has a claim of 1.5, the 
expected value is calculated as follows: .85 * 10 + .15 * 70 = 19. The value of the good that Bill 
receives is multiplied by the distance between Ann and Bill to reflect the severity of 
unfairness, where it is less unfair that Bill gets the good when the claims are roughly equal 
and vastly more unfair if Bill gets the good when the distance between claims is very 
unequal.  
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sensitive to both changes in the size of claims and the number of claimants, 
and which adequately respects the claim of each affected person.  
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Chapter 3 
Ambiguity and Fairness51 
3.1 Introduction 
A decision-maker is in a risky situation when they can assign at least 
subjective probabilities to possible states of the world and the associated 
outcomes of their actions. They are in an ambiguous situation when they 
cannot assign such subjective probabilities (Bradley and Drechsler, 
2014:1231). The ethics of distribution under risk has been extensively studied 
(see, e.g. Diamond 1967; Broome 1984 1990; Otsuka and Voorhoeve 2009; 
Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey 2012, 2016; Bovens 2015; Hyams 2015 and 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis). By contrast, the ethics of distribution under 
ambiguity has been much less discussed. This lacuna is important, because 
in many real-world cases, a decision-maker does not have a basis for 
assigning probabilities (Gilboa et al. 2009). For example, when evaluating 
climate policies, one often cannot obtain precise objective information about 
the probability of particular future scenarios; nor can one be expected to 
assign precise subjective probabilities to them (IPCC 2014a: 9).   
This chapter considers what the implications of such ambiguity are when 
making a distributive decision. It argues against the use of a version of the ex 
ante Pareto principle applied to ambiguous prospects, or “Pareto under 
                                                          
51 This chapter is joint work with Alex Voorhoeve. I am lead author of the material 
presented here. I presented earlier versions of this chapter at the Warwick Graduate 
Conference in Political and Legal Theory, the VI Meetings on Ethics and Political 
Philosophy at the University of Minho (Portugal), the Society of Applied Philosophy 
Conference at the University of Edinburgh, the Workshop on Ethics of Social Risk at the 
University of Montreal, and the 14th Pavia Graduate Conference in Political Philosophy in 
Italy. I am grateful to the audiences at these conferences for their very helpful feedback. 
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Ambiguity”, for short. It rejects this principle on two grounds. One is 
familiar from discussions of the ex ante Pareto principle under risk, namely 
that it conflicts with egalitarian concerns (see, e.g. Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve 
2013 and Chapter 1 of this thesis). The other is novel: we show that prospects 
that are ambiguous at the individual level may be far less so at the social 
level. An ambiguity-averse distributor, who rightly considers the latter level, 
may therefore correctly favour a set of ambiguous individual prospects that 
eliminates social ambiguity, even when one would not prefer this set of 
individual prospects on any individual’s behalf.  
The argument proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces a first set of cases 
and contrasts the implications of Pareto under Ambiguity with those of an 
egalitarian view. Section 3.3 considers the distinction between ambiguity at 
the individual and the social level, and argues that this provides a further 
reason to reject Pareto under Ambiguity. It also shows how the egalitarian 
and social-level ambiguity considerations are independent, and can either 
reinforce each other or work in opposing directions. Section 3.4 concludes.  
3.2 Ellsberg Cases and Distributive Fairness 
The two distributive examples that are the focus of this paper are 
modifications of the two cases used by Daniel Ellsberg to formulate his 
eponymous paradox, which kick-started the literature on decision-making 
under ambiguity (Ellsberg 1961). Ellsberg’s examples involve a self-
interested decision-maker choosing between different gambles, with varying 
degrees of probabilistic information, each with a prospective cash prize. He 
had both an empirical purpose (to argue that people would respond 
differently to ambiguous gambles than to risky gambles, and in particular, 
that many of them would be averse to ambiguity, in a sense to be defined 
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below) and a normative purpose (to argue that such a differential response 
was rational). The examples we will construct also involve a morally-
motivated decision-maker selecting between different gambles containing 
varying degrees of probabilistic information. However, each gamble will 
lead to a distribution of an indivisible good to others. Moreover, we will be 
concerned with the following normative question: supposing that some 
aversion to ambiguity is rational (as Ellsberg argued), how should a 
decision-maker act under conditions of ambiguity? 
3.2.1 Pareto under Ambiguity and Fairness 
Suppose that a morally-motivated stranger, Tim, comes across two children, 
Ann and Bill. Both children are in urgent need of a kidney. Unless Tim acts, 
both Ann and Bill will die. There is only one kidney available, and it cannot 
be split between Ann and Bill. Tim must allocate the kidney on the basis of a 
random draw of a ball from an urn with 100 balls which are either red or 
black. There are three such urns to choose from. The first, Risky Equal 
Proportion urn, is known to have precisely 50 red and 50 black balls, so that 
the chance of either colour being drawn is equal. The second, Ambiguous 
Urn, has an unknown number of red and black balls, so that the chance of 
either colour being drawn is unknown. The third, Risky Unequal Urn, is 
known to have precisely 45 red and 55 black balls, so that the chance of red 
being drawn is 45% and of black being drawn is 55%. Ann wins if (and only 
if) red is drawn, Bill if (and only if) black is drawn. These urns are 
represented in Table 3.1. The number 1 represents the utility of receiving a 
kidney, and the number 0 represents the utility of not receiving a kidney.  
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Table 3.1: Final utilities for Three Urn Case 
Risky, Equal Proportion Urn 
 Number of Balls 
Act Person 50  
Red 
50  
Black 
A Ann 
Bill 
1 
0 
0 
1 
Ambiguous Urn 
 Number of Balls 
100 
Act Person Red Black 
B Ann 
Bill 
1 
0 
0 
1 
Risky, Unequal Proportion Urn 
 Number of Balls 
Act Person 45 
Red 
55 
Black 
C Ann 
Bill 
1 
0 
0 
1 
 
In evaluating these urns, one relevant issue is how one should value them 
on each individual’s behalf. As in Chapter 1, we shall assume that when 
evaluating risky prospects, one ought to respect the Von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms and therefore maximize expected well-being. With 
respect to ambiguous prospects, however, we will depart from standard 
decision theory by assuming that it is rationally permissible to have a 
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preference for known over unknown (ambiguous) probabilities on an 
individual’s behalf. This means, for example, that on Ann’s behalf, one may 
rationally prefer act A (a draw from the Risky, Equal Proportion Urn), which 
offers her a 50% chance of receiving the kidney, to act B (a draw from the 
Ambiguous Urn), which offers her anywhere from a 0% to a 100% chance of 
a kidney. Indeed, we shall assume that Tim takes the rationally permissible 
view that, when considering each person’s prospects alone, prudence 
requires that one be moderately averse to ambiguity, so that on Ann’s behalf, 
one should even favour act C (a draw the Risky, Unequal Urn), with its 
known 45% chance for her of getting a kidney, over B (a draw from the 
Ambiguous Urn). Though the rational permissibility of ambiguity aversion 
is disputed (see, for instance, Al-Najjar and Weinstein 2009), these 
assumptions seem to us plausible. In the absence of probabilistic knowledge, 
and when the stakes are as high as in this case, it seems sensible to be 
conservative. When evaluating the Ambiguous Urn on Ann’s behalf, such 
conservativeness involves giving somewhat greater weight to the less 
favourable possibilities (which involve there being fewer than 50 red balls in 
the urn) and somewhat lesser weight to the more favourable possibilities 
(which involve there being more than 50 red balls). Such conservatism or 
pessimism has long been defended as a rational response to ambiguity (see, 
e.g. Hurwicz 1951, Ellsberg 1961, Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989, Binmore 2009, 
Gilboa et al. 2009). Indeed, empirically, when faced with gambles of this 
kind involving moderate probability gains, the predominant finding is that 
individuals are at least moderately ambiguity averse (for a recent survey of 
the literature, see Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015, especially p. 96).  
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In sum, because of this moderate ambiguity aversion, Tim’s preferences on 
Ann’s behalf are A (the Risky, Equal Proportion Urn) > C (the Risky, 
Unequal Proportion Urn) > B (the Ambiguous Urn). By similar reasoning, 
the preferences on Bill’s behalf are: C > A > B. This is because C gives Bill the 
highest precise chance of receiving a kidney, A gives him the second-highest 
precise chance, and B gives him an unknown chance.52  
What should Tim, our decision-maker, do? One could offer at least a partial 
answer to this question by drawing on these two sets of rankings from each 
person’s prudential perspective. For note that on both Ann’s and Bill’s 
behalf, B is strictly dispreferred to the other alternatives. And Tim should, 
one might think, follow this unanimous preference. In other words, one 
might draw on the following principle, which is the analogue under 
ambiguity of the ex ante Pareto principle under risk: 
Pareto under Ambiguity:  
                                                          
52 It is possible to turn ambiguous probabilities into subjective probabilities by simply 
assigning equal probability to each of the outcomes in the three acts. But while this is 
certainly possible, one must ask why, in the absence of any information at all about the 
proportion of red and black balls in the urn, it is rationally required to do so. Isn’t any such 
assignment of probabilities entirely arbitrary in the absence of such information? And can 
rationality require such an arbitrary assignment rather than a different decision procedure 
that simply keeps in mind the full range of possible probability distributions and responds 
somewhat conservatively to that. While such an approach is controversial, it is defended by 
many leading decision-theorists, and appears to be applied by a large proportion of 
respondents in surveys. This chapter therefore takes the view that it is worthwhile 
exploring what would follow if such an ambiguity-averse approach were rationally 
permissible and adopted by an egalitarian decision-maker. We add that if one were to assign 
equal subjective probabilities by adopting the Principle of Insufficient Reason, one gets the 
unpalatable result that one ought to be indifferent between the Ambiguous Urn and the 
Equal Proportion Urn. This is unpalatable for the reason that we think there are good 
reasons for preferring the Equal Proportion Urn to the Ambiguous Urn because we know 
for sure that each individual has an equal chance of receiving the kidney, whereas we do 
not know that in the Ambiguous Urn. In fact, there is reason to think that it would be 
unlikely that the proportion of balls would be equal..    
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(a, ‘universal strict preference’) If, for every person, a first alternative 
provides prospects that are prudentially superior to the prospects 
provided by a second alternative, then the first alternative should be 
strictly preferred to the second. 
In what follows, we will also draw on the following extensions of this Pareto 
under Ambiguity principle, each of which has its analogue in familiar 
versions of the ex ante Pareto principle under risk: 
(b, ‘weak preference for all and strict preference for some’) If, for 
every person, a first alternative provides prospects that are 
prudentially at least as good as the prospects provided by a second 
alternative and the first alternative provides prospects that are strictly 
superior to the second for at least one person, then the first alternative 
should be strictly preferred to the second; 
(c, ‘universal weak preference’) If, for every person, a first alternative 
provides prospects that are prudentially at least as good as the 
prospects provided by a second alternative, then the first alternative 
should be weakly preferred to the second; 
(d, ‘universal indifference’) If, for every person, a first alternative 
provides prospects that are prudentially precisely as good as the 
prospects provided by a second alternative, then the decision-maker 
should be indifferent between the two alternatives. 
Pareto under Ambiguity would, in sum, demand that Tim prefer C to B and 
A to B. (It would be silent about how to rank C and A, and permit a choice 
between them to be made on other grounds.) 
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However, we will now argue that Tim ought not to choose fully in line with 
Pareto under Ambiguity. Instead, he ought to have following preference 
ordering over the three alternatives and choose accordingly:  
A > B > C 
Consistently with Pareto under Ambiguity (although not demanded by it), A 
ought to be preferred to C on egalitarian grounds, because A gives each 
individual an equal chance of receiving the kidney whereas C gives Bill a 
greater chance than Ann of receiving the kidney. In line with Pareto under 
Ambiguity, we submit that Tim ought to prefer A to B. But this is not merely 
(as Pareto under Ambiguity has it) because one would prefer A to B on each 
person’s behalf, but also on grounds of equality. For A gives each individual 
an equal chance of receiving the kidney for sure, whereas, even though B 
treats Ann and Bill symmetrically, it is unknown in B whether Ann and Bill 
are given an equal chance. In fact, it is very likely that the proportion of 
balls, once revealed, is skewed in favour of one of the individuals.53  Finally, 
and contrary to Pareto under Ambiguity, there is reason for Tim to select B 
over C. For even though there is uncertainty about the proportion of the 
balls in B, each individual is treated equally (by being given equally valuable 
prospects) and therefore fairly by Tim, whereas if Tim selected C, he would 
be knowingly favouring Bill over Ann. Moreover, such equal treatment, 
while it comes at the cost of the ambiguity-weighted value of one person’s 
                                                          
53 The phrase “very likely” does not involve assigning a precise probability to the event that 
there will turn out to be a different number of red and black balls in the urn. Instead, it is 
merely based on the idea that among the one hundred and one different possible 
combinations of balls that may be in the urn, only one is an equal proportion of red and 
black balls. This is, in my view, enough on which to base a range statement, say, a “more 
than 90% chance” that the proportion of the balls will turn out to be skewed in one person’s 
favour. But this is not to say that any precise chance is assigned to any event; nor could one 
conclude from it that there is an equal chance of Ann or Bill winning. 
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(Ann’s) prospects, does not come at the cost of the expected goodness of the 
distribution of final well-being. For while individual prospects are 
ambiguous under B, the anonymized (and therefore, impartially considered) 
social distribution of final well-being is known and unaffected by the choice 
of B over C. What is best for each individual, from the perspective of their 
interests alone, ought therefore not to always determine what one ought to 
do considering both fairness and expected goodness.54 
In sum, the proposed reason to depart from Pareto under Ambiguity is 
fairness. But there is more to be said about Pareto under Ambiguity. 
Notably, we have, as yet, barely explored the possible relationship between 
ambiguity at the individual level and at the social level. Nor have we 
considered reasons relating to inequalities in final well-being (as opposed to 
prospects). We turn to these topics in the next section.   
3.3 Inequality in Final Well-being and Individual versus Social-Level 
Ambiguity  
Suppose that Tim must choose between four ways of using a random draw 
from a single urn to distribute transplant kidneys. The urn contains 90 balls; 
30 red balls and 60 white or black balls in an unknown proportion. This 
Single-Urn Case is outlined in Table 3.2.  
                                                          
54 However, one may press the following objection. In B the proportion of balls could be 
wildly skewed in the favour of one of the individuals. One may think that it is preferable to 
be somewhat unfair to Ann for certain in C rather than select B which may be even more 
unfair in the distribution of objective chances. What if, for example, there were 49 red balls 
and 51 black balls in C? Should Tim still prefer B to C? In response, Tim ought to still prefer 
the act with more ambiguity, because even though it may be the case that when the 
proportion of balls is eventually revealed the proportion of balls is unequal, Tim does not 
know when making the decision who it is that is favoured. Whereas if Tim chooses C he 
knows that he will be favouring Bill over Ann. If Tim cares about fairness, then he ought to 
select the act which has greater ambiguity when it is fairly distributed, even if he could 
instead select an act that had less ambiguity but known unfairness in chances. 
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Table 3.2: Final utilities for Single-Urn Case 
 Number of Balls 
30 60 
Act  Person Red Black White 
D Ann 
Bill 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
E Ann 
Bill 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
F Ann 
Bill 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
G Ann 
Bill 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
As before, we will assume the following rational, ambiguity-averse 
preferences over these acts on behalf of Ann: 
G ~ D > E ~ F. 
And the following preferences on behalf of Bill: 
G > D ~ E ~ F. 
The reasons for these preferences are as follows. Acts D and G both give Ann 
a precise 2/3 chance of receiving a kidney. This is because if a black or a 
white ball is drawn from the urn, Ann will receive a kidney (60 out of the 90 
balls in the urn). Act E (in which Ann gets the kidney if red or black is 
drawn) gives Ann a chance of receiving a kidney that ranges from 1/3 to 1 
(inclusive). This is because, in the worst case, there are no black balls and 
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Ann has only a 1/3 chance; in the best case, there are 60 black balls and Ann 
gets a kidney for sure. Similar reasoning establishes that F also gives Ann a 
chance of winning that ranges from 1/3 to 1. Due to ambiguity aversion, 
when he is considering her interests alone, Tim will therefore prefer an 
option that exposes her to less ambiguity and will therefore prefer D or G to 
E or F.  
As for Bill, G is the only option which gives him a known chance of 
receiving a kidney, namely 2/3. In contrast, D, E and F each expose Bill to an 
ambiguous prospect with a chance of a kidney ranging from 1/3 to 1. This is 
why Tim will prefer G to all of the others on Bill’s behalf.  
From the above individual orderings, it follows that Pareto under 
Ambiguity yields the following social ordering: 
G > D > E ~ F 
We shall now explore whether Tim should indeed adopt this ordering. In 
deliberating about what Tim’s preferences ought to be, we should consider 
the aforementioned distinction between ambiguity at the individual level 
and ambiguity at the social level. Ambiguity at the individual level refers to 
ambiguity contained within an individual’s prospects, such as the ambiguity 
that Ann and Bill are exposed to in prospect E. This is distinct from 
ambiguity at the social level. When a decision-maker evaluates an act in 
terms of the moral value of the distributions of final well-being that this act 
makes possible, ambiguity may or may not be present. For example, in terms 
of the distribution of final well-being E yields no ambiguity from the social 
perspective, because Tim knows that there is a 1/3 chance that two 
individuals will get a kidney and a 2/3 chance that only one individual will 
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get a kidney. Though Tim doesn’t know who will get the kidney in the latter 
scenario, because he is impartial, insofar as he is considering the distribution 
of final well-being, he is indifferent whether Ann or Bill receives the kidney, 
and so indifferent to the events over which he lacks precise probabilistic 
information (that is, whether black or white is drawn). This is not true, 
however, for D. If Tim chooses D, it is not known what the chances are of the 
two possible patterns of final well-being. There is a chance ranging from 0 to 
2/3 that both will receive a kidney (if a white ball is drawn). There is a 
chance ranging from 1/3 to 1 that precisely one person will receive a kidney. 
D therefore contains ambiguity at both the individual and social level, as it 
contains an ambiguous prospect for Bill and it is not known precisely how 
likely it is that particular anonymised patterns of final well-being will occur. 
We will assume that when dealing with such social ambiguity, Tim rightly 
adopts the same degree of moderate ambiguity aversion, or conservatism, 
that he has on each individual’s behalf. That is, insofar as he considers the 
anonymized distributions of final well-being to which they may give rise, he 
rightly favours the socially risky E over the socially ambiguous D. 
We will now argue that, considering both each individual’s perspective and 
the social perspective, Tim ought to adopt the following preference ordering: 
G > F > D and G > E > D, with all relative rankings of F and E being 
permissible. 
This ordering is the result of applying the following four criteria: 
(i) Reducing ambiguity in individual prospects, in the sense that, other 
things being equal, less ambiguity yields a more valuable 
prospect. 
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(ii) Reducing ambiguity at the social level, in the sense that, other things 
equal, less ambiguity about the anonymized distribution of final 
well-being is better. 
(iii) Reducing inequality in the value or individual prospects, in the 
sense that, holding other things constant, less inequality is better. 
(iv) Reducing equality in final well-being, in the sense that, other 
things equal, less inequality is better.   
The first two criteria are obvious, given the assumption of rational 
ambiguity aversion. The subsequent two egalitarian criteria can be justified 
as a natural extension of familiar egalitarian views. Just as under risk, equal 
chances can help mitigate the unfairness (and therefore badness) of outcome 
inequality, we propose that the equal ambiguity can help mitigate the 
badness of outcome inequality. This implies that insofar as the burden of 
ambiguity is present at the individual level, it is better that it is distributed 
equally. Of course, outcomes matter too; and more equal outcomes are 
therefore fairer. In sum, in line with egalitarian views which value both 
equality of chances and outcomes (Arneson 1997, Temkin 2001, Voorhoeve 
and Fleurbaey 2012, Hyams 2015), the view holds that one must therefore 
rank acts by taking account both the distribution of risk-or-ambiguity 
weighted prospects and the possible distributions of final well-being. 
Applying these criteria, G is clearly best. First, there is no ambiguity about 
Ann and Bill’s prospects. G therefore offers them prospects which are 
prudentially at least as good as any other alternative that Tim might choose. 
Second, there is no social ambiguity: it is known that there is a 2/3 chance 
that both will end up with a kidney and a 1/3 chance that both will go 
without. Third, the prospects for Ann and Bill are ex ante of equal value with 
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this option, and each is given equal chances for sure. Finally, there is no 
inequality in outcomes: either both will end up with no kidney or both will 
end up with a kidney.  
While G is uniformly best, in ranking the remaining alternatives, our four 
criteria sometimes pull in opposite directions. Consider F. First, if F is 
selected, there is ambiguity from the individual perspective as the precise 
proportion of black and white balls is unknown. Both Ann and Bill have a 
chance of receiving a kidney ranging from 1/3 to 1. There is also ambiguity 
from Tim’s point of view, as he knows only that the chance of both people 
receiving a kidney ranges from 1/3 to 1 and the chance of neither receiving a 
kidney ranges from 0 to 2/3. Both forms of ambiguity count against F; 
indeed, the fact that F is ambiguous at the social level is especially 
problematic in the light of the fact that F allows for an unknown probability 
of a disaster, in which neither gets a kidney. Standard ambiguity-averse 
decision criteria are conservative, and hence give special weight to the worst 
possible probability distribution over outcomes (see e.g. the Hurwicz 
criterion discussed in Binmore 2009 and Binmore et al. 2012 and the criterion 
proposed in Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989). This means giving special weight 
to the possibility that the chance of a white ball being drawn is in fact 2/3, 
and consequently to the possibility that this disaster occurs.  
On the other hand, F does ensure full equality. For the prospects it gives 
Ann and Bill are ex ante subjectively and objectively equally valuable. 
Moreover, F gives Ann and Bill equal (though unknown) objective chances, 
as each will receive a kidney if a red ball is drawn, and each will receive a 
kidney if a black ball is drawn. So whatever the number of black balls turns 
out to be, Ann and Bill will have an equal objective chance of receiving a 
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kidney. Finally, whatever happens, there will be no outcome inequality: 
either both get a kidney or neither gets one. F is therefore perfectly fair, both 
ex ante and ex post.55  
Next, consider E. If Tim chooses E, both Ann and Bill have ambiguous 
prospects. However, there is no ambiguity at the social level: Tim knows 
that the chance of both receiving a kidney is 1/3 and of one receiving a 
kidney is 2/3. As regards equality: the prospects of Ann and Bill are equally 
valuable, although it is very unlikely that they each possess objectively equal 
chances. Finally, there is likely to be inequality in final well-being. In sum, E 
represents a mixed bag: individual but no social ambiguity, some equality in 
prospects but possibly not in outcomes. How one ranks it compared to F is 
therefore a matter of how averse to ambiguity at the social level one is (the 
more ambiguity averse one is, the better E looks compared to F) and how 
averse to inequality in final well-being one is (the more inequality averse 
one is, the worse E looks). Striking an overall balance is a matter of 
judgment, with different rankings being reasonable.  
Finally, consider D. If D is selected, then Bill, but not Ann, will face an 
ambiguous prospect. Ann’s chances of receiving a kidney will be exactly 2/3, 
while Bill’s will range from 1/3 to 1. Moreover, there will be ambiguity at the 
social level. For the chances of precisely one person receiving a kidney will 
range from 1/3 to 1, and the chance of both receiving a kidney will range 
from 0 to 2/3. Moreover, Bill will have less valuable prospects than Ann; 
Ann and Bill are also very unlikely to face equal objective chances. Finally, 
there is a chance of between 1/3 and 1 of inequality obtaining. In sum, D is 
                                                          
55 For further support for this claim, see Chapter 1 of this thesis. For the fairness of no one 
receiving a good, see Section 2.1.4 in fn. 27. 
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strictly worse than E and F in terms of both equality in prospects and 
outcomes. It is also worse than E, and on a par with F, in terms of ambiguity 
at the social level. It is only somewhat better than E and F with regard to 
individual ambiguity. On balance, it therefore seems that D ought to be 
Tim’s least preferred alternative.  
The resulting ranking disagrees with Pareto under Ambiguity. The most 
important point of disagreement is that it ranks D below F and E. It does so 
despite the fact that D offers Ann more valuable prospects than either F or E 
does, and offers Bill prospects that are just as valuable as either F or E does. 
There are two rationales for this departure from what one would weakly 
prefer on each person’s behalf. First, D involves more inequality than F. In 
this respect, our argument to favour F contrary to Pareto under Ambiguity is 
in line with well-known egalitarian reasons for rejecting ex ante Pareto 
offered in the context of risk (see, e.g. Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve 2013). 
However, the second rationale is particular to the context of ambiguity: the 
strongest reason for favouring E over D, contrary to Pareto under 
Ambiguity, is not equality, but the absence (in E) as opposed to the presence 
(in D) of ambiguity at the social level. One can put it this way: even if Tim 
were an ambiguity-averse utilitarian, who cared not at all about inequality, 
then he would have reason to favour E over D, because E yields a 
distribution with one kidney with a probability of 2/3 and of two kidneys 
with a probability of 1/3, whereas D yields a distribution of one kidney with 
a chance ranging from 1/3 to 1 and a chance of two kidneys ranging from 0 
to 2/3. Since ambiguity aversion at the social level implies giving special 
weight in decisions to the worst possible probability distribution (that is, for 
D, to a 100% chance of only one kidney being distributed), D counts as 
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worse than E for an ambiguity-averse decision-maker even in the absence of 
inequality aversion. This reason for rejecting an anticipatory Pareto principle 
is novel and particular to the context of ambiguity.  
It is noteworthy, then, that even a utilitarian would, if they were ambiguity 
averse, rank E over D, despite the fact that E levels down Ann’s prospects. In our 
view, this finding weakens the force of the levelling down objection in 
prospects that is sometimes raised against egalitarians (see, e.g. McCarthy 
2015).  For it shows that such levelling down is merely a by-product of moral 
considerations that arise not at the level of the individual, but at the social 
level. Equality is only one such consideration; the way people’s prospects 
together generate knowledge (or the lack thereof) of the chances of various 
distributions of final well-being is another.   
3.4 Conclusion  
The central conclusion of this chapter is that Pareto under Ambiguity should 
be rejected. It is worth emphasising the two distinct grounds we have 
offered for rejecting Pareto under Ambiguity. The first, familiar one is 
inequality aversion. The second, novel one is ambiguity aversion at the 
social level. These grounds are logically independent. Moreover, either one 
of these grounds is sufficient for rejecting Pareto under Ambiguity, but 
together they provide a more powerful case.  
Though we have focused on stylized cases, the form of ambiguity-averse 
egalitarianism articulated here can be used to evaluate public policy 
alternatives. For example, many public policy evaluations (climate policy 
being an obvious example) do not contain precise probabilistic information 
107 
 
with respect to potential events.56 The egalitarian view can take account of 
this lack of precise probabilistic information when evaluating the fairness of 
policy alternatives. Another potentially useful feature of the egalitarian 
approach is that it is sensitive to distributional concerns in different policy 
alternatives. For instance, it may be known that one alternative leads to a 
higher precise chance of European countries benefiting from a mitigation 
policy, with the rest of the world having ambiguous chances of benefitting, 
whereas another alternative exposes all regions to equally ambiguous 
chances of benefitting. Even if the former involves less individual-level 
ambiguity, the latter may be deemed more desirable overall, because it is 
fairer. 
In sum, Pareto under Ambiguity ought to be rejected. The ambiguity-averse 
egalitarian position outlined in this chapter provides a more plausible 
rationale for deciding how to act in distributive cases under conditions of 
ambiguity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 Throughout the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, a special 
uncertainty framework is used to communicate the likelihood of potential events. For 
example, one such statement is the following: “It is likely that land temperatures over Africa 
will rise faster than the global land average, particularly in the more arid regions” (IPCC 
WG II, 2014b: 1202). The term ‘likely’ refers to a probability interval of 66%-100%.  
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Chapter 4 
When is it Permissible to Impose a Risk of Harm?57 
4.1 Introduction 
Risk is a pervasive feature of modern societies. Many activities impose risks 
of harm on others.58 Some risky activities such as driving a car or taking a 
commercial flight are generally seen as permissible, whereas other risky 
activities such as playing Russian roulette on an unsuspecting victim or 
drunk driving are not. This chapter examines when it is permissible to 
impose risks of harm on others.59  
Section 4.2 examines four candidate views of what it is that gives risking in 
and of itself moral significance (rather than the outcomes of risky actions). 
By “moral significance” I refer to what it is about an imposition of risk itself 
that calls for justification. The first view states that risks of harm are not 
themselves harms, and therefore, if imposing a risk of harm were to possess 
moral significance it is not because of its harmfulness (Perry, 1995, 2003). A 
second view states that the potential impermissibility of imposing a risk of 
harm arises from the fact that a risky act may itself wrong the victim. A third 
view is that an imposition of a risk of harm’s impermissibility stems from 
the fact that it curtails the victim’s autonomy (Oberdiek, 2009, 2012). A 
fourth view uses a preference-based account to argue that an imposition of a 
                                                          
57 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the VII Meetings on Ethics and Political 
Philosophy at the University of Minho in Portugal. I thank the audience for their helpful 
comments.   
58 In this chapter I shall, for the sake of brevity, often refer to activity of imposing risks of 
harm as “risking”.  
59 I will not be here be concerned with the separate yet important question of whether there 
is a right against having risks of harm imposed. Sven Ove Hansson (2003), Madeleine 
Hayenhjelm & Jonathan Wolff (2011), Sune Holm (2016), and David McCarthy (1997) are 
notable examples of authors who discuss this particular question  
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risk of harm is itself a harm and thereby possesses moral significance 
(Finkelstein, 2003). I argue that each of these approaches fails to adequately 
capture the moral significance of risking.  
Section 4.3 then outlines and defends a novel account of the moral 
significance of imposing a risk of harm, called the Insecurity of Interests 
Account. It is argued that what gives an imposition of a risk of harm its 
moral significance is that it renders the victim’s interests less secure. This 
constitutes a distinct form of harm, and grounds the potential 
impermissibility of imposing a risk of harm. Section 4.4 concludes.  
4.2 Accounts of the Moral Significance of Risking 
This section critiques four views of the moral significance of risking. I argue 
that each view fails to provide a plausible account. 
4.2.1 No Harm Account 
The first runs as follows: 
No Harm Account: Impositions of a risk of harm are not 
themselves harms. If they possess moral significance it is 
because of some other factor than the mere risk. 
This view has initial plausibility because risks of harm themselves need not 
have any impact on the victim. This can be illustrated with the following 
example: 
Drunk Driver: A drunk driver careers down a road, 
narrowly avoiding a pedestrian. The pedestrian is 
unaware of the actions of the drunk driver. 
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The drunk driver imposes a risk of harm on the pedestrian. However, the 
harm that the risky activity forebodes fails to materialise. He walks home 
unscathed and does not suffer from feelings of shock or fear. This is an 
example of an imposition of a “pure” risk of harm.60 This can be contrasted 
with an “impure” risk of harm, where the risk does yield a harm. Before 
proceeding, I shall stipulate a definition of harm. A common account of 
harming states that an individual is harmed when her interests are set back 
(Feinberg, 1987: 35).61 Feinberg makes the clarification that the sorts of 
interests that matter for whether an individual is harmed are the “important 
interests”, which are “presumably of a kind shared by nearly all his fellows, 
in the necessary means to his more ultimate goals, whatever the latter may 
be” (Ibid: 38). For example, an important interest of mine is not being 
physically injured. If a person assaults me, they thereby thwart my interest 
in not being injured. The important feature in this conception of harm is that 
it can allow for material as well as non-material setbacks to a person’s 
interests.62 So although there appears to be no causal impact on the material 
interests of the victim, because they walk home unscathed, there may be an 
impact on the pedestrian’s non-material interests.  
                                                          
60 Judith Thomson (1986: 173) coins this terminology. I make the extra stipulation that the 
victims of the risk imposition are not aware of the risk or the risky act. This is to avoid other 
possible harms that might arise from individuals being aware of the risk imposition. Robert 
Nozick (1974: 65-6) considers this possibility. 
61 This definition is endorsed by the main figures in the risk and harm literature, such as 
Finkelstein (2003: 971), Oberdiek (2012: 351-3) and Perry (2003: 1285-7).  
62 The terminology of “material” harm and “nonmaterial” harm is borrowed from John 
Oberdiek (2012: 342), who uses the former term to refer to the harms that ripen from a risky 
act, such as being hit by a car, and the latter term to refer to set backs to interests that have a 
non-physical impact on the victim, such as a set-back to a person’s autonomy. 
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Can a risk of harm itself be a harm? Stephen Perry is the most notable 
defender of the No Harm Account.63 According to Perry, there is no such 
thing as “risk damage”, where risk damage is the harm caused only by a risk 
of harm itself (1995: 322).64 In establishing this claim, Perry considers the 
English legal case of Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Authority. In this 
case, the plaintiff suffered an injury that initially went undiagnosed by the 
health authorities. The injury then developed into a much worse condition. 
According to the facts of the case, there was a 0.75 chance that the plaintiff’s 
condition would have deteriorated even after an initial diagnosis. However, 
when the injury was eventually diagnosed later on by the health authorities 
it turned out that the chance of the condition’s deterioration was certain, 
rather than 0.75. The plaintiff argued that this increase in the risk of 
deterioration was itself an injury that ought to be compensated. Perry claims 
that given an objective account of probability as relative frequency, it is true 
that if there were one hundred people with the initial injury, seventy-five 
would go on to suffer the deterioration anyway, and twenty-five would not. 
As such, Perry argues, it is true that each of the one hundred will end up 
having either a zero percent chance or a one hundred percent chance of 
having their condition deteriorate. Either a person is harmed or a person is 
not harmed. In presenting his view, Perry assumes that determinism is true. 
This is important, because if this is assumed then it becomes difficult to see 
that the plaintiff suffers risk damage as a distinct form of harm. As Perry 
                                                          
63 Perry considers the possibility that a risk of harm may itself be a wrong, even if it does not 
itself constitute a distinct form of harm (2001: 76). 
64 Perry uses the term “damage” synonymously with “harm” and “injury” (1995: n.1). One 
concern with this nomenclature is that “damage” gives the impression of physical setbacks 
to interests, which would preclude the possibility of “risk damage” being something non-
material. Further support this claim can be found when Perry states that “harm involves 
interference with some aspect of well-being, and such interference can ordinarily be 
expected to have objective existence in the physical world” (1995: 332). 
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claims, “if the Plaintiff’s injury was treatable, then the defendant caused him 
physical damage; there is no reason to say that it also caused him another, 
separate harm that takes the form of risk damage” (1995: 334). Whereas, if 
the injury was, in fact, untreatable then the defendant didn’t cause the 
plaintiff any damage. Perry argues that we do not need to know which 
particular partition of the reference class a particular person will be a 
member of:  
“If the causal processes involved are deterministic then a 
distinction can be drawn in principle between the two 
categories of case, whether we have the knowledge to do 
so in practice or not, and so long as such a distinction is 
possible in principle, it makes no sense to claim that the 
plaintiff suffered, at the hands of the defendant, a 
peculiar, non-physical injury of the kind I have labelled 
risk damage” (Ibid: 334). 
The important factor here is that because it is possible in principle to know 
whether a person will fall into a particular category, there can be no distinct 
form of “damage” over and above the damage that actually occurs. Risk 
damage does not occur, Perry claims, merely as a result of our ignorance 
about how things will actually turn out.   
Before engaging with the view per se, we should note that Perry’s case is one 
where the risk is caused by allowing the condition to develop on its own, 
rather than the risk arising from the actions of the health authorities. In 
Perry’s example, the risk of harm arises naturally from the health conditions 
of the plaintiff. By contrast, the cases we are interested in involve impositions 
of a risk of harm. This is morally important, because we do not typically 
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think of naturally occurring risks, such as the chance of an individual’s 
medical condition worsening if untreated, as something that can be imposed 
by another without their intervention.65 There is a moral asymmetry between 
doing and allowing harm. It is typically worse to act so as to bring about a 
harm than it is to not act and allow a harm of the same magnitude to occur.66 
In what follows, I shall therefore focus on cases of imposing harm and not 
on Perry’s own case. 
One objection to Perry’s view is that it merely assumes risk away. It takes a 
purely ex post view, looking only at final burdens and who will bear them. 
From this point of view, there are only those who are materially harmed and 
those who are not. However, from an ex ante point of view, the identities of 
the particular individuals who will be harmed are not known.67 This is 
relevant, because although there may be some objective fact of the matter 
about who will or will not be harmed that is presently unknown, there may 
still be an epistemic risk where it is believed that an agent is imposing a risk 
of harm on others.  
There are grounds for thinking that this ignorance about how the world will 
turn out does, contra Perry, possess moral significance. Individuals do not 
act from an omniscient perspective, even though it is determined what will 
                                                          
65 Perry stipulates that the augmented probability of the plaintiff contracting the illness is an 
“agent-imposed risk” (1995: 331), but this stretches what is intuitively thought of as an 
imposition of risk. Indeed, there might be less reason to think of the plaintiff being harmed if 
there is no active imposition of risk, as there is in Drunk Driver.  
66 Some authors object to this equivalence (Rachels: 2001). However, I shall assume for the 
sake of this chapter that it is worse for an agent to actively impose a risk of harm on 
another, than it is to fail to prevent a risk of harm of the same magnitude befalling another. 
The moral difference between doing/allowing is also considered in Chapter 5. 
67 The moral significance of this distinction between ex ante and ex post points of view has 
been considered by authors such as Johann Frick (2013), Sophia Reibetanz (1998), and 
Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve (2013). This lack of information also forms part of the “prudential 
justification” for selecting a utility maximizing treatment on a person’s behalf in Chapter 1. 
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happen. Parallels can be drawn with the evidence-relative sense of 
wrongness. Suppose that, completely unbeknownst to you, your phone has 
been tampered with such that when you phone your friend, the phone 
signal detonates a bomb that severely injures your friend’s neighbour. Judith 
Thomson (1990: 231-233) argues that you have infringed a claim of your 
friend’s neighbour. Thomson endorses an objective sense of “ought”, where 
what one ought to do is determined by facts that the agent need not be 
aware of. So, for instance, you ought not to phone your friend, even though 
the reasons why you ought not to phone your friend are not available to 
you. T. M. Scanlon, however, argues that the point of view expressed by this 
view of “ought” “involves a kind of omniscience that prevents it from being 
identified with the point of view of a deliberating agent” (2008: 48). 
Something similar is true regarding one’s ability to know facts about the 
outcome of a risky action where the outcome is determined but unknown.  
There is also a second objection to this view. Consider the following case:  
Risky Rifles: There are one hundred people sitting 
separately in a park. Alice (who is concealed in foliage) 
has one hundred rifles, each simultaneously aimed at a 
separate one of the one hundred people, and linked up to 
a central trigger. There are seventy-five bullets. At the 
moment of pulling the trigger, a random process 
distributes the bullets between the rifles, leaving seventy-
five rifles with a bullet and twenty-five rifles without a 
bullet. Alice does not know which rifles contain bullets. 
Alice pulls the trigger.    
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In this case, seventy-five people will be shot and killed by Alice, and twenty-
five will not be shot. Assuming determinism is true, it is the case that before 
firing the rifles each individual will either be in the reference class of “shot” 
or “not shot”. Those who were lucky enough to have an empty rifle pointing 
at them are materially unscathed. According to Perry’s view, there is no 
harm of the risk itself in either case. I submit that there are grounds on 
which one of the twenty-five can claim to be harmed by the actions of 
Alice.68 For each of the twenty-five it was true that they could have been one 
of those who were killed. In Risky Rifles, each individual is exposed to an 
objective 0.75 probability of being shot. This is something that remains true 
even after the state of the world has been settled and individuals have been 
divided into groups of “shot” and “not shot”.69 To the extent that an 
individual has an interest in not having arbitrary interference with their 
more basic interests of bodily integrity and autonomy, say, having a risk of 
harm imposed runs contrary to this interest.70 This is true regardless of 
whether a harm befalls an individual.  
One may respond that although the process is a random one, it is still subject 
to deterministic laws, and as such it is possible in principle to determine 
whether a person will fall into a particular reference class. There can still be 
cause for complaint, however, given the openness of counterfactuals. A 
process is counterfactually open when “supposing that we initiate it, there is 
                                                          
68 Of course, those in the 75 also have grounds for complaint. 
69 Perry notes that objective probabilities can exist in a deterministic universe. He states that 
“even if the preceding state of the universe determines the outcome of any given coin flip, 
the statement that there is a probability of 0.5 that the coin will come up heads expresses a 
fact about the physical world. As a practical matter, of course, we cannot predict whether a 
coin will come up heads or tails” (1995: 324).  
70 One further explanation might be that the victims’ basic interests in dignity have been 
violated by the gratuitous and intentional imposition of a risk of harm without their 
consent, thereby harming them because of the interest in guarding one’s dignity (Placani, 
forthcoming).  
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no fact of the matter about what its outcome would have been if we had not 
initiated it” (Hare, 2012: 380). To illustrate, the following counterfactual is 
true: “If I had flipped the coin then it would have landed either heads or 
tails”. But this is consistent with neither of these counterfactuals being true: 
“If I had flipped the coin then it would have landed heads” or “if I had 
flipped the coin then it would have landed tails”.71 Suppose we make two 
modifications to Risky Rifles. First, the random process that distributes the 
bullets between the rifles is in constant flux, such that if the trigger is 
pressed at t1 it is unlikely to generate the same distribution of bullets to 
rifles at t2 and the same for t3 and so on. Second, the precise time at which 
the random process distributes the bullets to the rifles is extremely sensitive 
to the precise pressure applied to the trigger. Suppose now that Ann decides 
not to pull the trigger, then given these facts about the case, the 
counterfactual that: “If Alice pulled the trigger then 75 people will be shot, 
and 25 people won’t be shot” is true, but the counterfactual that: “If Alice 
pulled the trigger then these 75 particular named individuals, A, B, C … 
would be shot, and these particular named individuals W, X, Y … would not 
be shot” is false. To this extent, there is no fact of the matter about who 
would be shot and who would not be shot had the trigger been pulled. 
Because there is no fact of the matter about who will be shot, each individual 
has a complaint at the moment before Alice applies pressure to the trigger 
that it could be them who would be shot.  
                                                          
71 For this to be the case, the antecedent conditions have to be very specific. Hare gives the 
example of the following counterfactual: “If I had flipped the coin while its center of gravity 
was between 1.48318 and 1.48319 meters from the floor, applying between 2.899 and 2.900 
Newtons of force to its upper edge at an angle of...then it would have landed heads.” (2012: 
382).  
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There would, then, be cause for complaint from each of the one hundred 
people as Alice begins to apply pressure to the trigger. This is because which 
particular determinate outcome will occur depends very sensitively on the 
timing of the trigger. Because it is not settled at which particular moment the 
guns will fire, the one hundred have a complaint that it could be them who 
is shot, when Alice’s finger begins putting pressure on the trigger up until 
the moment that the trigger is activated. It would be implausible to suggest 
that the complaint evaporates when the gun actually fires a split second or 
so after pressure is applied to the trigger, and it becomes known who in fact 
is determined to live and who to die. Perry’s view therefore doesn’t seem to 
be able to do justice to these complaints. 
Perry’s overall position is, I submit, weakened when one considers what he 
writes about indeterministic causal processes. If Risky Rifles were amended 
so that there was an indeterministic rather than a random process that 
distributed the bullets to the rifles, then it would not be possible in principle 
to determine who will in fact be shot and who will not. Perry states that for 
such indeterministic causal processes, “there seems to be a true detrimental 
shift in position that is simply not present in the deterministic case” (1995: 
337). In the indeterministic case, it is easier to see the complaint that 
individuals may raise at being subjected to the risk, since the chances of 
harm will be objective and in principle unresolvable in advance. But, by 
appealing to the fact of open counterfactuals, I have argued that the position 
of each person in the indeterministic version of Risky Rifles is sufficiently 
similar to the position of each person in the deterministic version up until 
Alice activates the trigger.   
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For the reasons given above, the No Harm Account is unsuccessful at 
demonstrating that there is no moral significance to risk itself.  
4.2.2 The Wronging Account 
Even if it is granted that there is no particular harm that a risk itself causes, 
there seems to be something objectionable about the risk imposer’s actions. 
One strategy is to say that risk impositions are not themselves harms but 
rather wrongs. This view can be stated as follows: 
The Wronging Account: Impositions of a risk of harm are 
morally significant when and because they wrong the 
victim.  
One author who supports this view is Rahul Kumar who states, in relation 
to Drunk Driver, that: 
“there is nothing suspect about the claim that one has 
been wronged by the drunk driver (expressed, perhaps, as 
resentment to him or anger directed towards him), simply 
in virtue of his having, without justification, taken your 
life in his hands by exposing you, even briefly, to so 
serious a risk” (2003: 103). 
Kumar states that a person is wronged when another’s conduct intentionally 
or negligently flouts particular requirements which flow from a person’s 
standing as someone to whom justification is owed (2015: 30).72 At first 
                                                          
72 These particular requirements include regulating one’s conduct such that it “respect[s] the 
value of persons, as being capable of assessing reasons” with the ability to govern their lives 
accordingly (Kumar, 2015: 30). This account of what it takes to wrong someone is influenced 
by T. M. Scanlon (1998: 271). I bracket a discussion in this chapter of how contractualism 
more generally deals with cases of risk imposition. For authors who have engaged with this 
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glance, this does give a principled explanation of what happens in Drunk 
Driver. The drunk driver wrongs the pedestrian by taking his life into the 
driver’s unreliable hands. However, John Oberdiek (2012: 355) objects to this 
approach to Drunk Driver because, he states, it is an account of culpability or 
blameworthiness, rather than an account of permissibility: it “revolves 
around the reasoning of the person imposing the risk, not the risk 
imposition itself” (Ibid). Although it true that it is a fact about the situation 
that the drunk driver is taking the pedestrian’s life into his hands, the 
Wronging Account sees it as morally important that the drunk driver is acting 
recklessly, without a concern for the well-being of those around him. This is, 
as Oberdiek suggests, a problem for the Wronging Account. By focussing on 
the reasoning and intentions of the person imposing the risk, the account, so 
I shall now demonstrate, is insensitive to whether a wrongful act actually 
imposes risk. 
To illustrate, consider the following case: 
Russian Roulette: David plays Russian roulette on Eleanor 
without her knowledge as she walks down the street. 
There are six chambers and one bullet. It turns out that 
when he pulls the trigger there is no bullet in the chamber. 
Eleanor never finds out about the risk of harm imposed on 
her. 
Although David does not physically or emotionally harm Eleanor, David 
can be said to wrong her. He takes her life into his hands. He flouts the 
requirements which flow from a person’s standing to whom justification is 
                                                                                                                                                                   
question, see Barbara Fried (2012), Aaron James (2012), Rahul Kumar (2015), and James 
Lenman (2008).  
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owed, since he acted in a way that was unjustifiable to the victim. But 
suppose now that the case is modified in the following way:  
Deactivated Russian Roulette: Unbeknownst to David, the 
Russian roulette gun that he picks up is a deactivated gun. 
There are six chambers and one bullet. It is not possible for 
the gun to fire. David aims the gun at Eleanor, believing it 
to be a regular six shooter, and pulls the trigger. 
In this case, it is not possible for David to kill Eleanor. Eleanor is unaware of 
David’s actions. According to the wronging account, David wrongs Eleanor. 
David has the same dispositions as in Russian Roulette, and is exhibiting 
exactly the same behaviour and intentions. However, it is the case that 
David could never have shot Eleanor due to the fact that the gun could not 
fire. The objective chance of Eleanor befalling harm was zero. As such, the 
Wronging Account delivers the verdict that Eleanor is wronged in both 
Russian roulette cases, regardless of whether an objective risk is imposed. 
One might respond that the morally relevant feature is that the risk imposer 
reasonably believes that he is imposing a risk on the victim. David is 
imposing an epistemic risk of harm on Eleanor, even though he is not 
imposing an objective risk of harm on her. However, it is hard to see how a 
purely epistemic risk, by itself, could possess moral significance. In 
Deactivated Russian Roulette there is an epistemic imposition of a risk of harm 
given David’s justified belief, grounded in the evidence available to him, 
that the gun works. What David does is clearly wrong, and he wrongs 
Eleanor through his attempt to take her life into his hands. But does the 
epistemic risk itself, taken aside from David’s wrongful dispositions to 
endanger Eleanor’s life, possess moral significance? It is implausible to think 
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that this pure epistemic risk can itself carry moral significance. This is 
because there is no possibility for Eleanor’s interests to be negatively 
affected by the action. Eleanor walks down the street unscathed and 
unaware of David’s action.   
This brings out an important distinction between a subjective and an 
objective perspective which we encountered above in our discussion of 
Thomson’s view. These perspectives can be taken on both wronging and 
harming. On the subjective perspective, whether David wrongs Eleanor is 
down to his (reasonable) beliefs about how he treats others. By contrast, 
according to the objective perspective, David can wrong another even if he 
doesn’t believe that he is wronging her. I submit that the subjective reading 
is more plausible, because it focuses on the deliberations and attitudes of the 
acting individual, and thereby on how he dispositionally relates to the 
victim.73  
According to the subjective perspective on harming, a person is harmed 
when they (reasonably, given the information available) believe that they are 
harmed (if one takes the perspective of the subject of the harm) or (if one 
takes the perspective of the agent) when the person acting (reasonably) 
believes that they are imposing a risk of harm. According to the objective 
perspective, whether a person is harmed is belief-independent. On this view, 
for example, my interests could be set back even though I am not aware of 
any such set back. The objective perspective about harming is the most 
                                                          
73 Feinberg, for example, builds the notion of intentionality or recklessness into an account 
of what it means for one to wrong another: “one person, A, can be said to wrong another, B, 
when he treats him unjustly. More precisely the injustice occurs when A's act or omission has 
as its intention to produce an adverse effect on B's interests, or is negligent or reckless in 
respect to the risk of such an effect” (1987: 108, emphasis added).  
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plausible one to take.74 I could falsely believe that I have been harmed, even 
though none of my interests have been set back75, and another’s belief that I 
have been harmed is not necessary or sufficient for me actually being 
harmed. The discussion of the Russian roulette cases demonstrates that the 
criterion that is relevant for determining whether an individual is wronged 
is distinct from the criterion that establishes whether a person has been 
harmed. David wrongs Eleanor, but he does not harm her.    
The Wronging Account is insensitive to the presence of objective risk. David 
wrongs whether or not there is an objective risk that he might kill Eleanor. 
Furthermore, there is reason to think that epistemic risks themselves do not 
carry moral significance. The reason that the Wronging Account claims that 
Eleanor is wronged is due to the reasoning and intentions of David, and not 
due to the risk itself. The acts are identical in Russian Roulette and Deactivated 
Russian Roulette. As such, this account cannot explain the moral significance 
of the act itself of imposing objective risk. 
4.2.3 The Autonomy Account 
Oberdiek (2009, 2012) provides the following autonomy-based account to 
explain the moral significance of risking: 
The Autonomy Account: Impositions of a risk of harm are 
morally significant when and because they diminish the 
victim’s autonomy. 
                                                          
74 Authors in the literature who agree with this include Finkelstein (2003: 973) Perry (1995: 
333-4). 
75 This may indeed serve as a harm if the thoughts themselves lead one to be anxious, angry 
etc. at the belief that one has been harmed. But this is a separate form of harm to whether or 
not one’s interests have been set back. 
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On this view, impositions of risk are potentially impermissible because they 
foreclose previously safe options available to individuals. As Oberdiek 
states: “It is the bare curtailment of autonomy that risking can involve that 
calls for justification, grounding the moral significance of risking as 
potentially impermissible” (Oberdiek, 2012: 353). At the heart of this account 
is a particular conception of autonomy: that one ought to be able to plot 
one’s own life and to have a range of acceptable options from which to 
choose in doing so.76 To illustrate his view, Oberdiek uses an analogy of 
laying traps. A risk imposition curtails the autonomy of the victim just like a 
trap laid near the victim curtails the number of safe options available to 
them. For example, by playing genuine Russian roulette on you while you 
walk down the street, I am making the option for you of walking down the 
street less safe than it was before. I have made the set of options that are 
objectively acceptable smaller. I have thereby set back your autonomy 
interest in having your actions be ones you would wish to pursue with full 
knowledge of the situation. I also set back your interests in having what 
happens to you be determined by you and in leading your own, self-directed 
life. This diminution of autonomy is what gives risking its moral 
significance.  
However, the Autonomy Account struggles with the following modification 
to Drunk Driver: 
Computer Assisted Drunk Driver: This case has the same 
structure as Drunk Driver, with the modification that now, 
unknowingly, the driver has stepped into a computer 
                                                          
76 The conception of autonomy that is used is Joseph Raz’s (1988: 410-11), where autonomy 
requires the availability of an adequate range of options. 
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assisted, rather than regular, car. The software in the car 
makes it the case that it will avoid all collisions. The 
software doesn’t need to be activated, however, as the 
drunk driver’s path takes the exact same route as Drunk 
Driver, narrowly avoiding the pedestrian.  
In this case, the act itself of driving drunk is exactly the same as Drunk 
Driver, but it is not the case that the pedestrian has a safe option removed 
that would not otherwise have been removed. There was no possibility for 
the drunk driver to hit her. No safe options were – or could have been – 
removed. The walk along the pavement turned out to be just as safe for the 
pedestrian in Computer Assisted Drunk Driver as it was in Drunk Driver. The 
autonomy of the pedestrian in Computer Assisted Drunk Driver has obviously 
not been diminished. However, Oberdiek argues that in Drunk Driver “[t]he 
harm is imposed by virtue of the removal of safe options available to those 
in the drunk driver’s vicinity, and that it is an aspect of the act itself of 
driving drunk.” (2012: 355, emphasis added). But this reasoning supports 
the implausible conclusion that a safe option of a pedestrian can be removed 
even if there was no chance that they would be hit, since the act itself of 
driving drunk is exactly similar in both drunk driver cases.  
A second objection to the autonomy account is that the potential 
impermissibility of impositions of risk is explained by something more 
fundamental than a curtailment of autonomy. For instance, suppose that 
while Bill is in a temporary coma, I stand beside him, point a Russian 
roulette gun at him, and pull the trigger. No bullet is fired. What explains 
the potential impermissibility of what I have just done? On Oberdiek’s 
account, the potential impermissibility of the risk imposition arises from the 
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fact that it has curtailed Bill’s autonomy. He has fewer safe options than 
before I aimed the gun at him. But Bill has no present capacity for exercising 
autonomous choice. And, while, at the moment of pulling the trigger, there 
was a chance that his future autonomy would be curtailed by his being 
killed, in fact, no such curtailment took place. Nonetheless, my act was 
wrong. I conclude that the curtailment of autonomy is not a necessary 
condition for the moral significance of risking and that the Autonomy Account 
doesn’t give the intuitively correct explanation of what it is that makes my 
act impermissible. I have taken Bill’s life into my own hands, and I have now 
made it vastly more likely that he will come to serious harm than if I hadn’t 
aimed the gun at him.77 Cashing out this state as one where the victim now 
has diminished autonomy is a second-order explanation. It may be possible 
to explain what is potentially impermissible about my actions with reference 
to autonomy, but this does not mean that it is the risk impositions’ effects on 
autonomy that grounds its moral significance.  
A third objection stems from a recent development of Oberdiek’s view (ms.). 
Oberdiek adopts what is called the evidence-relative reasonable person 
perspective on risk.78 On this view, what matters is the judgment that is 
formed about the nature of the risk that is being imposed, where this 
judgment must reasonably cohere with the evidence available. Oberdiek 
                                                          
77 I think that the reasoning that I have just supplied carries over to cases where Bill does 
have the capacity for autonomous choice. For example, if he is walking down the street and 
I aim the gun at him and pull the trigger, the moral significance of the risk I impose on him 
more plausibly derives from the fact that I have taken his life into my own hands. This 
remains true whether or not he has the capacity for autonomous choice.  
78 This terminology was coined by Derek Parfit (2011: 150-1), who made the following 
distinctions. First, an act is “wrong in the fact-relative sense just when this act would be 
wrong in the ordinary sense if we knew all of the morally relevant facts”. Second, an act is 
“wrong in the belief-relative sense just when this act would be wrong in the ordinary sense if 
our beliefs about these facts were true”. Thirdly, an act is “wrong in the evidence-relative 
sense just when this act would be wrong in the ordinary sense if we believed what the 
available evidence gives us decisive reasons to believe, and these beliefs were true”. 
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states that “the characterization [of the risk] must be mutually justifiable – 
justifiable to the patient as well as to the agent whose conduct is at issue. 
This simply means, though, that the risk imposition must be given the 
gravest characterization compatible with the agent’s evidence-relative 
reasonable person perspective” (ms.: 45). Oberdiek also notes that this 
particular approach “captures the sense in which risks don’t have a 
freestanding ontology but are rather the product of reasoning” (Ibid: 38, fn 
54). Oberdiek plausibly states that a fact-relative interpretation of risk would 
be too demanding, since from the risk-imposing agent’s perspective they 
cannot be expected to know the precise likelihood that harm will arise from 
their action.  
I shall now argue, however, that if risk is to be characterised in the way that 
Oberdiek suggests it should, then it is difficult to see how risk impositions 
could negatively affect the victim’s interests.79  
To illustrate, recall Deactivated Russian Roulette. Does David impose a risk of 
harm on Eleanor? If risk is to be interpreted as purely epistemic – a feature 
of the evidence-relative beliefs of the risk-imposer – then David does impose 
a risk of harm on her. But suppose now that Eleanor in fact knows with 
certainty that David’s gun is deactivated and therefore harmless. Eleanor 
then walks down the street with the knowledge that if David attempts to 
shoot her, he will fail. David believes that he is imposing a risk of death on 
Eleanor, and Eleanor knows that David is imposing zero chance of death on 
her. Is David still imposing a risk of harm? It would be implausible to claim 
that he is, since there is no objective chance of harm befalling Eleanor, and 
                                                          
79 A similar point is raised by Perry (1995: 332-3). 
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she knows this. Furthermore, the fact that the victim knows this defeats 
Oberdiek’s claim that David curtails the autonomy of Eleanor.  
For a risk of harm to impact on a person’s non-material interests, it must be 
able to have an effect on them. If an imposition of a risk of harm is merely 
the evidence-relative beliefs of the imposer, then the risk itself need not 
directly impact on the victim’s interests.80 Oberdiek’s example of impositions 
of risk being analogous to traps making a path unsafe gives the impression 
that a risk imposition has the power to affect the options of the victim. For 
risks to be harms, then there must be a discernible effect on the victim’s 
interests. On a purely evidence-relative conception of risk, this cannot be the 
case. To tie this back to the distinction made earlier, whether a person is 
harmed ought to be determined from the aforementioned objective 
perspective.  
In summary, the Autonomy Account fails as a plausible account of the moral 
significance of risking. A risk imposition of harm may set back an 
individual’s autonomy, but such a set-back is not necessary for risking’s 
moral significance.  
4.2.4 The Preference Account 
The fourth candidate view is a preference-based account for the moral 
significance of risking, most notably defended by Claire Finkelstein (2003). 
Finkelstein argues that a risk of harm just is itself a harm. This grounds the 
moral significance of risk impositions, because harming is itself morally 
significant and therefore calls for justification. Finkelstein adopts the view 
                                                          
80 It is still, nevertheless, deeply wrong to attempt to play Russian roulette on someone, but 
the moral significance of this act does not rest on there being a chance that he could be shot, 
rather it is on the evidence-relative beliefs of the risk imposer and the way he treats the 
victim. 
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that harm is the setback to a legitimate interest and states that “a common 
way in which the term ‘interest’ is used is as a synonym for ‘preference’” 
(2003: 972). Finkelstein therefore appeals to a preference satisfaction 
conception of well-being. Finkelstein claims that individuals prefer that risks 
of harm are not imposed on them, and because whatever one disprefers sets 
back one’s interests, the risk imposition itself constitutes a harm.81 Call this: 
Risk Is Harm: “Exposing someone to a risk of harm itself 
harms him. That is, exposure to risk entails a reduction of 
an agent’s welfare, regardless of whether the risk 
eventuates in outcome harm” (2003: 967). 
On this view, a risk imposition reduces an agent’s welfare whether or not 
the agent is aware of the imposition. A person is worse off than they would 
be had the risk not been imposed. To illustrate this point, Finkelstein 
considers the following example: 
Defective Plane: An airline is negligent in maintaining its 
planes. Unbeknownst to Cara one of two engines on the 
plane she is on quits mid-flight. Cara only finds out about 
this after the flight. 
Finkelstein argues that Cara has been harmed. This is because the increased 
risk of harm that Cara was exposed to from the defective engine is itself a 
harm. Finkelstein claims that Cara has been harmed compared to a similarly 
situated passenger on a flight without engine failure (Ibid: 971). What might 
be doing the work here is the fact that Cara finds out about the defective 
                                                          
81 Finkelstein (2003: 967-970) treats symmetrically the increase in welfare that chances of a 
benefit give to individuals, and cases where an individual has a chance of receiving a 
burden. Oberdiek (2012: 346) also emphasises Finkelstein’s use of a preference-based 
account of well-being.  
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engine only later. By finding out later, Cara’s informed preference would be 
to not board the flight, and as such Cara is harmed by the fact that she did in 
fact board the flight. But what if we suppose that Cara never did find out 
about the defective engine – would she still have been harmed on the 
preference-based account? It is plausible to at least think that Cara has been 
wronged by the airline for its negligent maintenance of the aircraft. The 
preference account has difficulties accounting for why it is that Cara has 
been harmed if this is the case.    
There is reason to think that the preference-based account cannot 
satisfactorily answer this question. Consider the well-known point that what 
we actually prefer might also end up being bad for us (Griffin: 1988: 11). A 
rational preference account can avoid the pitfalls of an actual preference 
view, but is vulnerable to a different set of objections. For example, Oberdiek 
argues that rational preferences are fully informed preferences; preferences 
formed as if one has all the available information pertaining to what one 
would prefer. From this perspective, he argues, “risk just disappears” (2012: 
346). This is because if preferences were formed with all available 
information, one’s preferences would reflect knowledge of how the world is 
and will actually be, and will therefore be devoid of risk. Further, it is not 
clear how precisely a person’s life can go better if a preference is satisfied 
without one being aware of the fact (Parfit, 1983: 495-6). Our intuitions about 
whether Cara suffers a loss in well-being might be influenced by the fact that 
she also stands to benefit from the flight. To eliminate such considerations of 
benefit, consider the following alternative: 
Polynesian Islanders: A plane flies over an isolated 
inhabited Polynesian island, thereby imposing a very 
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small risk of death of the islanders through falling debris 
from the plane. The islanders do not stand to (or wish to) 
benefit from any of the benefits from this particular flight, 
or from air travel more generally.82  
Suppose, too, that the probability that Cara befalls a material harm is the 
same in Defective Plane as it is for an islander befalling material harm in 
Polynesian Islanders. I submit that it is implausible to think that the islanders 
suffer a loss in welfare because air travel imposes a risk of harm on them, 
and this is something that they disprefer. There is no apparent objective 
harm. One may counter that their interests are being set back by the fact that 
they do not stand to benefit from either the particular flight or the practice of 
air travel generally. Further, one may argue that these islanders are worse 
off than similarly situated islanders who are not under a flight path. The 
islanders are obviously not materially harmed by the plane flying above 
them. But it is difficult to see how the islanders could be non-materially 
harmed by the flight either. This is because there is a failure of the risk 
imposition to have a causal impact on the interests of the islanders.  
In response, Finkelstein could argue that a risk imposition of harm sets back 
a second-order interest; an imposition of a risk of harm frustrates an interest 
we have in not being exposed to risks of harm. Because we prefer to not be 
exposed to risks of harm, a risk imposition sets back this second-order 
interest. However, Perry claims that “risking cannot be regarded as 
adversely affecting any interest that has a strong or plausible claim to be in 
                                                          
82 There has been debate considering the justifiability of risky activities that impose risks of 
harm on some people without any corresponding benefits. See, for example, Elizabeth 
Ashford (2003: 298), Rahul Kumar (2015: 34-35), Veronique Munoz-Darde (2013), and 
Michael Otsuka (2015: 79-80). 
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the set of core or primary interests” (2003: 1306). For Perry, second-order 
interests are defined recursively, with an example being the interest a person 
has that others do not subject them to a risk of physical injury. It is an 
interest that others do not attempt to set back an important interest. Perry 
says that if one acts contrary to the aforementioned interest then his “strong 
intuition” is that you do not harm them. This is because the further away we 
get from the core interests that constitute our well-being, the less likely we 
are to say that an infringement of this interest itself constitutes a harm. This 
is a problem for the preference-based account because harmful risks are 
defined recursively to the harm that the risk threatens. As such, the 
preference-based account does not give a satisfactory response to what it is 
that harms the Polynesian islanders. If the harm is that the islanders prefer 
not to have a risk of harm imposed on them, then the account is vulnerable 
to Perry’s critique.    
The preference account is found wanting as an account of the moral 
significance of risk impositions of harm. There are problems with grounding 
the account in the preference account of well-being. It is also implausible to 
think that an individual is harmed when they are exposed to risk merely 
because this is something that they disprefer.  
4.2.5 Summary 
In summary, the four accounts fail to pinpoint to the moral significance of 
risking. The Wronging Account is insensitive to whether an objective risk of 
harm is imposed, and the Autonomy Account and the Risk Is Harm view both 
attempt to ground the moral significance of risk in risks alleged 
harmfulness. I have argued that these attempts fail. A successful account of 
the moral significance of risk has to recognise the fact that risks themselves 
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have no causal impact on the victim’s material interests, and that the risk, if 
it harms, must harm the victim “objectively” – independent of the beliefs of 
the imposer or the victim. My view, which I will now develop, meets these 
desiderata. This view is grounded in an account of what it means to have 
secure interests.   
4.3 Risk Impositions and the Insecurity of Interests 
4.3.1 The Insecurity Account 
This section defends the following view: 
Insecurity of Interests Account: An imposition of a risk of 
harm is pro tanto impermissible when and because it 
renders the victim’s interests objectively less secure than 
they were before the imposition. 
The starting point for the account is the fact that mere risk impositions have 
no causal impact on the victim. Nonetheless, they can still harm the victim. 
Things can be bad for a person even if they are not aware of those things. 
For instance, Thomas Nagel writes: “the discovery of betrayal makes us 
unhappy because it is bad to be betrayed – not that betrayal is bad because 
its discovery makes us unhappy” (1979: 5). Risk impositions, I claim, operate 
in much the same way. It is bad for me that someone, unbeknownst to me, 
aims a Russian roulette gun at me and pulls the trigger, but we do not have 
to spell this out with an account of preference. 
To unpack this claim, I shall adopt the following terminology from Judith 
Thomson: “if it would be good for X to get a thing Z, and Y makes it 
probable that X will get a thing Z, then Y gives X an advantage” (1990: 244). 
Correspondingly, Y disadvantages X by making it probable that X gets Z, 
133 
 
where Z is a something that will be bad for X. The size of the advantage or 
disadvantage is partly determined by the amount by which Y increases the 
probability that X will get Z and partly by the magnitude of the good or ill 
that Z would bring (Thomson, 1990: 170). Higher probabilities will confer a 
greater (dis)advantage, and lower probabilities will confer a smaller 
(dis)advantage, other things being equal. Being put at a disadvantage is a 
worsening of the victim’s situation. It is better for the victim not to be 
subjected to a worsening of their situation.  
An individual is disadvantaged by a risk imposition in virtue of it rendering 
their interests insecure. I shall make the following argument: 
1. The moral significance of an imposition of a risk of harm is that it 
renders the victim’s interests less secure than they were before the 
imposition. 
2. Rendering an individual’s interests less secure is itself a harm. 
3. An action that harms an individual is pro tanto impermissible. 
4. Therefore, an imposition of a risk of harm is pro tanto impermissible 
when and because it renders the victim’s interests less secure than 
they were before the imposition. 
The core premises are 1 and 2. I shall assume the truth of premise 3.83 I will 
now address premises one and two in turn. 
 
 
                                                          
83 One might argue that harming a person may be permissible if there are some other 
sufficiently weighty reasons for the harm, such as in order to avoid a greater quantity of 
harm. But my point here is that there is merely a “case to answer” for the permissibility of 
an act if it harms another.  
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4.3.2 Premise One 
Once it is settled what an individual’s important interests are84, individuals 
have a further interest in the security of those interests. Pure risks themselves 
do not have a causal impact on the victim’s core first-order interests since 
the risk does not ripen into the harm that it portends. But pure risks can 
make it the case that some interests of an individual are made less secure by 
being threatened by the risk imposing act. Recall the following case: 
Russian Roulette: David plays Russian roulette on Eleanor 
without her knowledge as she walks down the street. 
There are six chambers and one bullet. It turns out that 
when he pulls the trigger there is no bullet in the chamber. 
Eleanor never finds out about the risk of harm imposed on 
her. 
Eleanor’s situation is worsened by David’s playing Russian roulette. It is bad 
for her that the gun is aimed at her, even without her knowing. Eleanor’s 
situation is worsened by David because the gun being aimed at her makes it 
the case that her interest in bodily integrity is being rendered less secure 
than before the gun was aimed at her.85 This is true even though there isn’t a 
causal impact on this core first-order interest. Rather, there is an impact on 
Eleanor’s interest in her interests being secure. It is important to distinguish 
this type of explanation from the one given by the Autonomy Account. 
According to that account, the moral significance of risking is derived from 
                                                          
84 Joel Feinberg (1987: 38) leaves it open what the comprehensive list of core interests would 
be, but he provides examples of such interests: the integrity and normal functioning of one’s 
body, at least minimal income and financial security, physical health and vigour, etc.  
85 Of course, there is also something objectionable about David’s conduct, but as I have 
argued in Section 4.2.2, it is not his conduct itself that explains the moral significance of 
imposing risks of harm. 
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the fact an individual has fewer acceptable options. This explanation surely 
applies to Russian Roulette, as David makes the option of walking down the 
street less safe for Eleanor. Eleanor’s option of walking down the street is 
less safe than before the gun was aimed at her, but this is not what is 
fundamentally significant about David’s actions. The risk itself worsened 
Eleanor’s situation and threatened her interest in bodily integrity. It may be 
that as a consequence of this that Eleanor’s autonomy is diminished, but this 
is not what, at base, is morally significant about the risk, which is that it 
renders the interests of Eleanor less secure. The risk itself interferes with this 
second-order interest. This sets-back her second-order interest, even though 
there isn’t a causal impact on the first-order interest.   
4.3.3 Premise Two 
The interest in having security of one’s core interests is a second-order 
interest that is of great importance to an individual. Having one’s interests 
made insecure without one’s knowledge is bad for that person. This interest 
can be set back by impositions which threaten the security of an individual’s 
particular, first-order interests. A set back to important interests is itself a 
harm. For example, imposing a risk on someone such that there is a chance 
that their necessary medical supplies are destroyed makes the victim’s 
interest in the maintenance of their physical health insecure. This harms the 
person even if turns out that they never need the medical supplies and are 
ever aware of the imposition of risk. Another example is if I put a person’s 
life savings at the mercy of a fair coin flip where either the savings are 
destroyed if the coin lands heads, or left as they are if the coin lands tails. To 
the extent that that person has interest in financial security, I make that 
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interest less secure than it was before my intervention. In both of these cases, 
my action interferes with the victim’s second-order interest. 
Seth Lazar has recently argued that security is a “robustly demanding good” 
(2017: 8). This is because our enjoyment of the good depends not only on 
how our actual life goes, but also how our life goes in the counterfactual 
scenarios where we may not be so lucky. Lazar argues that “we are insecure 
to the extent that others make our avoidance of wrongful harm depend on 
luck” (Ibid). Furthermore, Lazar claims that “the more you depend on luck, 
the less control you have over your life, and so the less autonomous you are. 
Autonomy is non-instrumentally valuable, so its constituent parts – such as 
control over whether your most important interests are satisfied – are non-
instrumentally valuable too” (Ibid; italics added). To this extent, the security 
of interests is something of high importance for an individual. There is good 
reason to think that, given the importance that the security of our interests 
has for how our life goes overall, there is a distinct locus of an interest the set 
back of which can cause us harm. The setting back of this interest harms us 
because of the value of the core interests such as autonomy that it protects. 
4.3.4 Objections and Replies 
A first objection is that the insecurity of interests account is merely re-
describing risk. Risk impositions – by definition – make an individual’s 
interests less secure. In response, the insecurity of interests account provides 
a unique conceptualisation of how a probability of harm can itself set back a 
second-order interest without having a causal impact on the victim’s first-
order, core interests of bodily integrity, autonomy etc. The account identifies 
a particular non-material interest that impositions of a risk of harm set back. 
As such, it is not a mere re-description of risk. One may object that 
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identifying this second-order interest leads to an implausible inflation of 
harms. Risks are imposed on others all of the time, and as such this second-
order interest is constantly being set-back. The Insecurity Account, however, 
provides a framework for establishing what it is about impositions of risks 
of harm that call for justification. It may be the case that a great many of the 
risks arising from transportation, nuclear power, and other risky social 
practices are justified in light of the benefits they bring, even though they 
render individuals’ interests less secure. The insecurity account provides a 
framework for when an imposition of a risk of harm is pro tanto 
impermissible. 
Second, one may object to premise two and claim that set-backs to second-
order interests do not harm a person. This is the same objection that was 
levelled against the preference account. In response, the interest in security 
of one’s interests is not defined recursively in the way that the interest that 
others do not attempt to set back an important interest is. This is because the 
second-order interest introduces a new object of concern that individuals 
plausibly have an important stake in: that their interests not only be 
promoted, but that they also be secure. The Insecurity Account therefore 
avoids the objection. This is not the case for the preference-based account 
because the interests that are set back by impositions of risk are defined 
recursively. To support the idea that this second-order interest is very 
important, recall Feinberg’s criteria for “important interests”: they are 
“presumably of a kind shared by nearly all his fellows, in the necessary 
means to his more ultimate goals, whatever the latter may be” (1987: 35). 
The second-order interest in the security of one’s interests is a strong 
candidate for inclusion in the set of a person’s core interests. A person’s life 
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goes better when, not only do they avoid set-backs to their interests, or when 
their interests are furthered, but when these interests are secure; when there 
is the absence of a chance that the interests will be set-back.86  
One might deny that one’s life necessarily goes better if one’s interests aren’t 
rendered insecure. If someone plays Russian roulette on Eleanor without her 
ever finding out, and she is unscathed, she is still able to pursue her life’s 
projects. But, I submit, even if it turns out that she was not physically 
harmed by such a risk, we can still say that she was made worse off. Because 
at the moment the trigger is pulled, we do not have epistemic access to 
whether she will be shot; her second order interest can be deemed insecure. 
And even looking back with knowledge of what happened, one could 
sensibly say that her life was not secure and therefore that her interest in 
such security was thwarted. It turned out that she was fortunate not to be 
killed. This claim can be strengthened by imagining that Eleanor has Russian 
roulette played on her every day without her knowledge. As her life unfolds 
we can say that her interests are being made insecure by the evil game since 
there is a possibility that she will be killed, yet we do not know which day, if 
at all, this will happen.  
A third objection is that the Insecurity of Interests Account is vulnerable to 
Perry’s critique of the idea that risk itself does damage. Recall that Perry 
                                                          
86 Shelly Kagan argues that “it is one thing for a person to be well-off, and another thing for 
that person’s life to go well” (1994: 318). According to Kagan, changes to well-being involve 
changes in either the body or the mind. Whereas, changes in how one’s life goes need not 
have any effects on the mind or body of an individual. For example, a person may be 
enjoying decent levels of well-being, but it so happens that they are being deceived by 
everyone around them. Their spouse cheated on them, their relatives only pretended to like 
them in order to use their wealth etc. Kagan argues that the deceived person’s life is not 
going well, but this can be distinguished from the person’s well-being, which is unaffected 
by the deception. Oberdiek also draws on this wider sense of a person’s “normative life”, 
which are one’s interests that go beyond mere facts about one’s body and mental states 
(2012: 351). It is in this wider sense of a person’s life that impositions of risk have an effect.     
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claimed that because determinism is true it is possible in principle to 
determine whether one will in fact come to be harmed as a result of a risk, or 
whether one will not. As such, there is no harm to the risk itself. In response, 
I note that one’s interests can be made insecure even though risky processes 
are governed by deterministic laws. To illustrate, consider the following 
case: 
Poison Assassin: Jane slips a potentially lethal slow-acting 
poison into Kevin’s tea. The poison may have no effect on 
Kevin, or it may eventually kill him. Which particular 
result obtains will be revealed in one years’ time when the 
poison has its final effect on Kevin.  
The poison and its effects on Kevin are subject to deterministic laws. 
However, I submit that Kevin has been harmed due to his interests being 
made less secure than they were before the poison was administered. The 
act itself of putting the poison in the tea made Kevin’s interests less secure. 
This is because the risk itself constitutes an interference with the second-
order interest, even if there is no outcome harm from the risk. This is true 
even though he will either be killed by the poison, or not killed. Jane has 
made it the case that Kevin’s interest in the integrity and normal functioning 
of his body is threatened. As such, Jane harms Kevin even though it is not 
settled yet whether he will in fact be killed by the poison.  
A fourth objection to the Insecurity of Interests Account is that there is no 
apparent distinction between itself and the Wronging Account with the 
verdicts it gives. The accounts differ in the feature that they pick out for 
determining what it is about a risk imposition that makes it impermissible. I 
have argued that the “wronging criterion” is unsuccessful, and as such the 
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accounts differ in their success at explaining cases. The two views come apart in 
cases that highlight the presence or absence of objective risk. I argued that the 
wronging account is insensitive to the presence of objective risk. For example, in 
Deactivated Russian Roulette the wronging account states that the risk imposition 
of harm is potentially impermissible in the same way that it is in Russian 
Roulette. Whereas, the insecurity of interests account would draw a distinction 
between the two cases due to the fact there is no set-back to a second-order 
interests in the Deactivated case, but there is such a set-back in Russian Roulette. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The Insecurity of Interests Account plausibly explains why risk impositions of 
harm may themselves be potentially impermissible. For example, in Drunk 
Driver the driver sets back the pedestrian’s interest in the security of his first-
order interests, even though there is no causal impact on the latter. The 
Autonomy Account and the preference-based account both suggest that risk 
impositions of harm are themselves harms because they respectively set 
back one particular interest (in leading one’s own life) and a preference. The 
Wronging Account plausibly accounts for the objectionable nature of the 
reasoning and intentions of risk imposing individuals in the various cases 
considered in the chapter, but it fails to provide an account of how risk 
imposing acts themselves can have moral significance. The Insecurity of 
Interests Account provides a plausible rationale for how an individual can be 
harmed when there is no causal impact on their first-order interests.87 This 
                                                          
87 Although this chapter has focused on the moral significance of imposing risks of harm, 
there is scope for a development of the theory to account for what is termed “social risk”. 
Johann Frick (2015: 178-9) coins the term social risk to describe a set of risky actions that 
have the following features: (i) affect a large number of people; (ii) give burdens to some 
individuals which are greater than the benefits to others; (iii) rarely affect the same person 
twice, and as a result, one cannot assume that over time everyone will come to benefit from 
the action; and (iv) the risky action is intuitively permissible. One suggestion for how the 
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second-order interest is a plausible candidate for inclusion within the set of 
an individual’s core interests.  
Parallels can be drawn with the discussion of the value of chances in 
Chapter 1. Chances of a benefit can have positive value for an individual. 
The Insecurity of Interests Account explains why it is that impositions of a risk 
of harm can themselves be of negative value for an individual in virtue of 
setting back an interest in having security of one’s interests. To illustrate, 
consider the following modification to Poison Assassin. Jane slips a 
potentially lethal poison into Kevin’s tea, and thereby renders his interests 
less secure. This chance has negative value for Kevin. Now suppose that 
another individual, Liam, makes it such that there is a probability (let’s 
assume it’s the same probability that the poison will take effect on Kevin) 
that Kevin will have access to an antidote for the poison. Here Liam is 
rendering Kevin’s interest more secure. This chance has positive value for 
Kevin. As such, there is reason to think that there is symmetry to the value 
and disvalue of chances.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Insecurity Account can be adapted to social risk is through an account of when an individual 
can accept the burden of insecure interests for the sake of greater (expected) benefits in 
return. Authors who appeal to expected benefit in a similar way include Frick (2015), Sven 
Ove Hansson (2003) and Oberdiek (2009).      
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Chapter 5 
Providing Aid and Foreseeing Harm88 
5.1 Introduction 
Sometimes, in order to aid individuals, one must do things that will 
foreseeably enable evildoers to better pursue their harmful aims. This 
chapter addresses the following question. In the pursuit of the greater 
(expected) good, when is it permissible to foreseeably contribute to the harm 
of innocent others through such enabling of the agency of evildoers? I 
provide what I call the Moral Purity Account to both explain when it is 
permissible to provide aid in such cases, and determine when aiders bear 
moral responsibility for the harms imposed by another.    
The chapter consists of three sections. I begin in Section 5.2 with two real-
world motivating cases from Rwanda and Somalia, where the provision of 
aid led to the foreseen, but unintended, imposition of harm on some through 
the agency of militant groups. I then outline a more general case, called Aid 
Case, where the provision of aid enables an evildoer to impose harms that 
would not have otherwise been imposed. 
In Section 5.3, I examine Jennifer Rubenstein’s (2015) recent 
conceptualisation of the predicament facing aid workers in Aid Case, after 
considering two candidate views. Rubenstein offers what she calls the 
“spattered hands approach”. According to this view, aid workers sometimes 
have a responsibility to grudgingly accept contributing to injustices 
                                                          
88 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Brave New World conference at 
Manchester University. I thank the audience for their helpful comments. I also wish to 
thank Luc Bovens for very helpful comments on a previous draft. 
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perpetrated primarily by others. When they do so, they bear a degree of 
moral responsibility for these harmful actions. 
In Section 5.4, I outline and defend the Moral Purity Account. I argue that this 
account is superior to Rubenstein’s approach. Against Rubenstein, I argue 
that when suitably motivated, aiders are not blameworthy for the actions of 
evildoers. Instead, I argue that although aid workers may be knowingly 
causally responsible for the circumstances that lead to an evildoer imposing 
harm, this does not entail that they are morally responsible. I argue that agent 
regret is a more suitable reaction to foreseen causal responsibility for the 
harmful effects of the agency of another.  
5.2 Motivation  
Consider the following two real-world cases: 
Somalia Famine: The 2011-2012 East Africa drought caused a 
famine that lead to the deaths of around 250,000 people. Parts 
of the most severely affected regions were controlled by the Al-
Shabaab militant group, widely considered a terrorist 
organisation. Most aid agencies were expelled or prevented 
from operating in the areas under Al-Shabaab control. Often, 
remaining aid agencies were permitted to operate in the 
controlled areas only if they paid the Al-Shabaab militants. Al-
Shabaab desired to co-opt and materially and politically benefit 
from the provision of aid. Aid provision helped to alleviate the 
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suffering of civilians, whilst also strengthening the hand of Al-
Shabaab.89 
Rwandan Genocide: In 1994, Hutu-dominated Rwandan Armed 
Forces (Forces Armées Rwandaises or FAR) fled with around 2 
million predominantly Hutu civilians to humanitarian camps in 
neighbouring Tanzania, Burundi, and what was then Zaire. 
These civilians included many genuine refugees. “Ex”-FAR 
members siphoned off vast quantities of aid intended for 
civilians and used the civilian presence as an opportunity to 
militarily regroup. The provision of aid ended up sustaining the 
perpetrators of genocide, and helping them reorganise.90  
In both cases, individuals (who we can call “rescuers”) attempt to save some 
from severe misfortune. 91 A foreseen but unintended consequence of their 
attempt is that it facilitates the harmful aims of others. The provision of aid 
is inextricably tied up with facilitating the potential wrongdoing of others. 92 
There are two ways in which the actions of rescuers can contribute to the 
harmful projects of others. The actions may help sustain the harmful aims of 
                                                          
89 Abdi Aynte & Ashley Jackson, 2013, ‘Al-Shabaab engagement with Aid Agencies’, 
Overseas Development Institute, Policy Brief 53. See also: Ashley Jackson, ‘A deadly dilemma: 
how Al-Shabaab came to dictate the terms of humanitarian aid in Somalia’, Overseas 
Development Institute, 2013, http://www.odi.org/comment/8066-al-shabaab-somalia-
negotiations  
90 Rubenstein, Jennifer, 2015, Between Samaritans and States: The Political Ethics of 
Humanitarian INGOs, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 88-89. Further details of this case 
can be found in “Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire and Tanzania 1994-1995”, Medicins San 
Frontieres¸ Laurence Binet et al. 
91 For the purposes of argument, I shall assume that the individuals in need would not be 
aided by other individuals if the rescuers failed to provide aid.  
92 In reality, at least some of those who stand to gain from the provision of aid are not 
threatened by an aggressor, and at least some of those who are threatened by an aggressor 
do not stand to gain from the provision of aid. It might make a difference to the 
permissibility of intervening if it would be to the expected advantage of each individual to 
run the “gamble” of being the one who is killed by the aggressor, in order to have the 
greater chance of being one of those who is saved.   
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others. For example, Al-Shabaab’s hand was strengthened through the 
provision of aid. This helped Al-Shabaab sustain their activities. The actions 
of rescuers may also facilitate new harmful threats; threats that would not 
have existed had the rescuers not provided aid. This is evident in Rwandan 
Genocide, where the humanitarian camps provided by rescuers enabled the 
“ex-FAR” members to militarily regroup so that they could carry out new 
threats. For the purposes of this chapter, I shall assume that the harmful acts 
of evildoers are new acts; acts that would not have occurred were it not for 
the acts of rescuers.93 
In order to highlight the structure of the motivating real-world cases, I shall 
refer to the following stylised case throughout the paper: 
Aid Case: Rescuers are deciding whether to provide 
essential aid to a group of 100 individuals. A foreseeable 
consequence of the rescuers providing aid is that a 
villainous aggressor is enabled to establish new threats 
which will kill 20 separate individuals. If the rescuers 
decide not to provide aid, then those who require aid are 
left worse off than they would have otherwise been. If the 
rescuers provide aid then 100 will be saved, but the 
villainous aggressor will kill 20 individuals, who did not 
have a chance of being aided.  
                                                          
93 It may be the case that new threats arise through the sustaining of a pre-existing threat. For 
example, by facilitating a terrorist group one may be helping it sustain its threats, but also, 
in virtue of doing this, the terrorist group is allowed to pursue new harmful threats. These 
threats would not necessarily have occurred were it not for the actions of the aider. I 
therefore submit that it is preferable to focus on new threats.   
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This case is one way of capturing core elements of the motivating cases.94 In 
this case there are competing claims between those who wish to be saved, 
and those who wish to avoid harm. Jennifer Rubenstein considers and 
rejects several different attempts to find principles appropriate to the Aid 
Case.95 I shall consider each in turn before moving to Rubenstein’s positive 
proposal.96 
5.3 Theorising the Aid Case  
5.3.1 Complicity 
According to the complicity view, “INGOs97 are complicit in the injustices to 
which they knowingly contribute, even if they are furiously opposed to 
those injustices” (Rubenstein, 2015: 98). I think that the structure of the 
rescuers’ intentions is important for assessing the level of complicity. Being 
“complicit in injustice” has the ring of sharing the aims of the injustice. 
                                                          
94 Aid Case is stylised to the extent that there are a simplifying assumptions about both the 
contributory factors involved and the numbers of individuals. Although this itself is a 
limitation of Aid Case, it does not detract from the overall analysis of permissibility and 
blameworthiness.   
95 More particularly, Rubenstein is interested in “stay or go questions”, where rescuers must 
decide whether to stay and continue providing aid or to leave. Aid Case is structurally 
similar to this predicament, absence the fact that rescuers are already providing aid. 
However, this does not affect the discussion of permissibility and blame. One may claim 
that it does make a difference because of the distinction between withdrawing and 
withholding aid. There may be a difference in the negative effects of aid provision in cases 
where aid is withdrawn (such as a vacuum in the provision of basic services), to when aid is 
merely withheld. I shall bracket a consideration of these negative effects, and focus instead 
on the consequences caused directly by both the aid workers and the villainous aggressor. 
96 Rubenstein considers the “do no harm” approach, but I omit a discussion of this in order 
to focus on the other approaches in more detail. 
97 Rubenstein uses the term ‘INGO’ (International Non-Governmental Organisation), 
whereas I use the term ‘rescuers’. These terms can be treated synonymously. Rubenstein 
calls the situation in question the “INGO Predicament”, and outlines it as follows: “INGOs 
(1) have mostly good intentions, (2) some good effects, yet (3) contribute knowingly to 
injustices perpetrated primarily by others” (Rubenstein, 2015: 104). I take the INGO 
Predicament and the situation faced by rescuers as described in Aid Case to be sufficiently 
similar. In Aid Case the rescuers are motivated by the desire to aid others, they do indeed aid 
others, but a side-effect of their aiding is that there is a chance that a villainous aggressor 
will be enabled to harm others. 
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Rubenstein points out that this would wrongly characterise the intentions of 
INGOs negatively (Ibid: 99). I shall assume in this chapter that the rescuers 
do not share the aims of the evildoers. Rubenstein argues that a further 
weakness of this approach is that it leaves out of consideration the good that 
INGOs do. I think that Rubenstein is correct to point out the limitations of 
this approach, although the approach highlights the fact that although that 
INGOs aim to do good, they sometimes knowingly contribute to injustices 
committed by others.98 This is a point worth highlighting, because Aid Cases 
deal with instances where the evil action is dependent on the beneficial 
action being performed.  
Lepora and Goodin provide a framework for measuring complicity. On their 
view an agent is complicit in the wrongdoing of another if that agent makes 
a contribution to their wrongdoing. This is different from sharing the aims of 
the wrongdoer, or being a co-principal agent with the wrongdoer. The 
minimum conditions for an agent being complicit with the wrong another in 
her wrongful actions is that there is (a) a contribution to her wrongful actions, 
and (b) knowledge that you are contributing to her doing wrong (2013: 82). 
On this view, acting under the knowledge that one’s causally contributory 
act will foreseeably contribute to the wrongful action is enough to make one 
complicit in that action.   
According to Lepora and Goodin the level of pro tanto blameworthiness for 
a complicit act is a function of the following four variables: the moral 
badness of the principal wrongdoing, the responsibility for the contributory 
                                                          
98 There are different types of complicity that may be relevant. Firstly, it is possible for 
rescuers to merely be aware that if they provide aid then others will cause harm. Secondly, 
rescuers may be complicit in harmful actions by actively collaborating with the villainous 
aggressor.  
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act, the extent of the contribution, and the extent of a shared purpose with 
the principal wrongdoer (2013: 99).99 It is left open how to precisely weigh 
and measure the variables. The higher the values of the variables, the higher 
the level of blameworthiness of the contributory agent for their act.  
On this view, rescuers in Aid Case would be complicit in the wrongdoing of 
the villainous aggressor because their provision of aid is a causal 
contribution to the wrongdoing carried out by the aggressor, and they also 
foresee that this wrongdoing will occur as a result. Even though the rescuers 
do not share the purposes of the villainous aggressor, they would also 
possess a degree of pro tanto blameworthiness for their contribution to the 
wrongdoing. This is because the actions of the rescuers are voluntary, and 
there is knowledge both of their own causal contribution the wrongdoing 
and the severity of the harm that the aggressor carries out.100 For now it is 
sufficient to signpost this view, as I argue in Section 5.4 that rescuers are not 
blameworthy either for their own actions or those of the villainous 
aggressor.   
5.3.2 The Doctrine of Double Effect 
The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) states that “the pursuit of some good 
tends to be less acceptable where a resulting harm is intended as a means 
                                                          
99 Not every variable has to be satisfied for an individual to be pro tanto blameworthy. 
Lepora and Goodin write that “not all complicit secondary agents necessarily share the 
wrongful purposes of the principal. […] Sharing the wrongful purposes of the principle 
wrongdoer […] is something else for which the complicit agent bears blame, in addition to 
whatever blame she bears for that causal contribution” (2013: 111-2).  
100 More explicitly, Lepora and Goodin argue that an agent is complicit and bears more or 
less pro tanto blame for contributing to a principal wrongdoing if there is knowledge of 
their own contribution and of the magnitude of the wrongdoing the principal wrongdoer, 
as well as voluntary causal contribution to the wrongdoing (Ibid: 110).  
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than where it is merely foreseen” (Quinn, 1989: 335).101 Part of the doctrine is 
a proportionality constraint – that the good end must be proportionate to the 
foreseen negative effect. Rubenstein argues that the DDE is helpful because 
of the focus on proportionality. It would prohibit cases where rescuers had 
good intentions, saved individuals, but a foreseen consequence was the 
death of many more individuals. Rubenstein outlines two problems with the 
DDE for assessing actions in Aid Case (Ibid: 100). First, most applications of 
the DDE are to cases where harm is direct but unintended, not cases 
contributing knowingly but unintentionally to harms perpetrated primarily 
by others.102 According to Rubenstein, because the INGOs’ contributions to 
harm are unintended side effects to achieving a good outcome “they 
therefore almost always fall on the ‘possibly morally permitted’ side of the 
DDE’s main distinction” (Ibid).103 It is not clear why this would be a 
problem, but perhaps Rubenstein has in the mind the possibility that so long 
as harm is not intended by rescuers, and the prospective foreseen harm does 
not outweigh the prospective good, then any intervention meeting these 
conditions would be judged permissible by the DDE. This is seen as 
problematic by Rubenstein, since the DDE would prescribe that INGOs 
ought to stay so long as the benefits outweigh the costs. As such, Rubenstein 
states that the DDE “does not offer much leverage” (Ibid.) on the Aid Case. 
Although it is unclear precisely what this means, I take Rubenstein to mean 
                                                          
101 It is difficult to give a unique definition of the DDE, since there are different formulations 
(Liao, 2012: 704). I settle for the Quinn (1989) definition here. 
102 There is an interesting question here about the applicability of the DDE for cases where 
the foreseen harm of one agent’s action is the intentional imposition of harm by another. If 
the agent’s original action creates the circumstances which allow another agent to impose a 
harm does it make sense to call this resulting harm foreseen or is it instead intended? I 
address this question in Section 5.4 when I develop the Moral Purity Account.  
103 It is not made explicit whether Rubenstein thinks that this is a problem, however she 
argues that the DDE is unhelpful for determining whether an INGO ought to “stay” in or 
“leave” conflict situations because the harmful actions that their aiding facilitates are side 
effects, and therefore permitted other things being equal.    
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that the DDE does not adequately apply due to the exclusive focus on 
permissibility.  
The second main purported limitation to the DDE is that it does not provide 
any account of the “felt experience” of the moral conflicts faced by actors. 
The DDE does not remark on the “felt experience” of the individual acting, 
that rescuers may feel guilt or remorse for doing what they do because it 
facilitates harm to others. This is unsurprising, given that the DDE is about 
the moral permissibility of actions, rather than the appropriateness of 
particular emotional responses. Nonetheless, I maintain that this is an 
important desideratum for a plausible account that conceptualises Aid Case. 
A plausible account will explain not only the permissibility of intervening, 
but the reasonable moral emotions of those who are providing aid where 
harms are likely occur as a result of their intervention. Due to the two 
problems discussed above, Rubenstein takes the DDE to be unhelpful for 
theorising Aid Case, and as such attempts to look elsewhere. By contrast, I do 
not believe that Rubenstein’s argument works due to the unconvincing 
critique of the DDE. I shall therefore appeal to the DDE in developing the 
Moral Purity Account in Section 5.4. First, however, I shall consider 
Rubenstein’s alternative. 
5.3.3 Rubenstein’s Account 
Rubenstein offers a positive account called the “spattered hands” account. 
On this account, “INGOs sometimes have a responsibility to allow their hands 
to be spattered – that is, they sometimes have a responsibility to grudgingly 
accept contributing to injustices perpetrated primarily by others” (2015: 
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104).104 The account is named “spattered hands” because the hands of the 
INGOs are only dirty indirectly, primarily through the actions of others. This 
is in contrast to the theory of “dirty hands” which focuses on the direct 
dirtying of one’s hands when engaged with a morally testing scenario.  
Rubenstein considers and rejects a “dirty hands” account of the situation as 
falling short at offering a plausible conceptualisation of Aid Case. Political 
rulers get their hands dirty when they do the right thing in utilitarian terms, 
but are also guilty of a moral wrong (Walzer, 1973: 161). For example, 
allowing the torture of a suspected terrorist in a ticking time-bomb scenario 
in order to save thousands of innocent people. Dirty hands captures the felt 
experience of rescuers, unlike the DDE. Rubenstein argues, however, that to 
say that rescuers have dirty hands is “melodramatic” (2015: 103). The 
negative effects of the actions of rescuers in Aid Cases, she claims, are 
typically less violent and less severe than dirty hands cases. Rubenstein 
notes another problem that the dirty hands approach faces: the harms that 
occur in Aid Case are typically indirect, unlike in traditional dirty hands cases 
where the harms typically perpetrated by the actor themselves. I think that 
this is an important point, since in Aid Cases it is the agency of a villainous 
aggressor that commits evil acts, and not the rescuers themselves.  
Rubenstein’s account suggests that an INGO may continue to provide aid to 
individuals so long as: 
                                                          
104 I shall bracket a discussion of whether and when rescuers have a responsibility to 
intervene and provide aid. It is not made clear how the permissibility of intervening comes 
apart from the responsibility to intervene, in Rubenstein’s account. My focus is instead on 
when it is permissible to intervene, and who is blameworthy for the potential harms that 
may arise. 
152 
 
(a) The INGO’s work does more good than harm, and (b) 
the resultant harms are only begrudgingly foreseen by the 
INGO (Ibid: 108).105  
As it stands, the account is quite permissive. So long as more good than 
harm is done, and the harms are only begrudgingly foreseen, rescuers are 
permitted to provide aid. This account is structurally similar to the DDE, but 
with the addition of the claim that rescuers may sometimes “spatter their 
hands” by contributing to injustices caused primarily by others. Rubenstein 
suggests that it is not merely the case that rescuers have a permission to 
provide aid when the benefits of aiding outweigh the negative effects, but 
that rescuers may sometimes have a duty to get their hands spattered (2015: 
106). According to this view, rescuers cannot discontinue the provision of 
aid in order to “keep their hands clean”, when the benefits of their aid 
outweigh the costs. To this extent, Rubenstein’s account remarks on the 
permissibility of intervening in Aid Case, as well as providing grounds for 
when it is obligatory for rescuers to provide aid. I bracket a discussion of 
when it is obligatory to provide aid, and my focus is instead on when it is 
permissible.  
On the “spattered hands” account, rescuers’ hands are spattered by the 
blood of others but “INGOs’ good intentions do not shield them from moral 
responsibility for the predictable effects of their actions, even if those effects 
are indirect” (Rubenstein, 2015: 105, emphasis added). This is the core 
feature of the “spattered hands” account. Rubenstein does not provide an 
                                                          
105 To give further support to this, Rubenstein states that “INGOs should focus primarily on 
the likely consequences of their actions. Rather than simply “doing no harm”, they should, 
as the DDE suggests, seek to implement a principle of “proportionality … if the negative 
effects of staying outweigh the benefits, INGOs have a duty to withdraw” (2015: 105-6). 
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account of moral responsibility to guide when precisely rescuers are morally 
responsible for the predictable effects of their actions. On one account, what 
is meant by moral responsibility is that a person X is responsible for a given 
action when “it is appropriate to take it as a basis of moral appraisal of that 
person” (Scanlon, 1998: 248). On this view, a person is morally responsible 
for X, if X can be properly attributed to her (Ibid: 277). Nothing is implied, 
on this view, about what an appropriate appraisal should be. I don’t think 
that this is what Rubenstein has in mind, here. It would be trivially true that 
the rescuer’s actions are a basis of moral appraisal. Because Rubenstein’s 
account is centred on “spattered hands”, where moral dirt “clings” to 
rescuers in some cases, I think that by moral responsibility Rubenstein has in 
mind blameworthiness. By way of a working definition, a person is morally 
responsible for X when he or she is blameworthy or praiseworthy for X.106 To 
say that a person is liable to blame is to say that this person is liable to a 
negative emotional response, such as resentment or indignation (Rosen, 
2004: 295-6).107 Henceforth, I shall concentrate on blameworthiness.  
Rubenstein argues that rescuers do not bear moral responsibility for all the 
things a villainous aggressor may do, but rather they are responsible for 
their own contributions (Ibid: 114). On this view, rescuers are pro tanto 
blameworthy for the negative effects of their own actions. This has two 
potential readings. Firstly, that the rescuers are responsible for the negative 
effects of their actions insofar as these actions contribute to the 
                                                          
106 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to outline and defend a particular view of moral 
responsibility against competing views.  
107 T. M. Scanlon provides an alternative view of blame which states that to blame a person 
for an action, “is to take that action to indicate something about the person that impairs 
one’s relationship in a way that reflects this impairment” (Scanlon, 2008: 122-3). For the 
purposes of this chapter, however, I shall assume that to be blameworthy is to be liable to 
moral sanctions, such as indignation or resentment.   
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circumstances which lead to the villainous aggressor harming others. Or, 
secondly, that the rescuers bear moral responsibility for a proportionate 
share of the negative effects from the villainous aggressor’s actions.108 The 
account I offer critiques the claim that rescuers are blameworthy in any 
degree for the negative foreseen effects of their morally-motivated, 
permissible aiding. I argue that although rescuers may be causally 
responsible for foreseeable harms, this does not entail that they are 
blameworthy for these harms.  
It is worth considering the possibility that on Rubenstein’s account, one can 
act permissibly and yet also be blameworthy for performing the action. 
Suppose that I perform an action, X, and foresee that Y is a direct 
consequence of this action. I will be blameworthy for Y if it turns out that Y 
is appropriately related to X; that is, that it was foreseeable that Y was a 
direct consequence of my performing X. For example, if I provide aid to a 
group of individuals then I am blameworthy or praiseworthy for that act, 
but if an individual then uses this act as a means for carrying out his own 
evil plan, then this is, I submit, something that I cannot be blameworthy for. 
If Y is a consequence of X that is foreseeably caused by a separate agent, then 
I cannot be blameworthy for Y.109 If the above is correct, then serious doubt 
is cast on the interpretation of Rubenstein that rescuers are morally 
                                                          
108 A third potential reading is that cases such as Aid Case are tragic ones, such that a rescuer 
is blameworthy whatever she does. If she fails to act then she is blameworthy for the deaths 
of the 100 and if she does act, she is blameworthy for the deaths of the 20. But, as I will 
argue in the remainder of the chapter, rescuers are not blameworthy for consequences 
which they are not the direct cause of. I argue that a rescuer would not be blameworthy if 
they decided to save the 20.  
109 Risk can be introduced if it is assumed that although the harmful actions of another are 
foreseeable, they may not be certain. The aggressor could decide not to cause harm, even 
though the rescuers predicted that they would. This could increase the permissibility of 
providing aid in Aid Case since there is the possibility that no harmful effects foreseeably 
arise from the provision of aid.    
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responsible in the sense of being answerable for their actions foreseen 
consequences. This is because rescuers cannot be answerable for the evil 
actions that originate from a separate agency, since they are not the rescuers 
actions. I defend this view in the next section. 
Before outlining the Moral Purity Account I shall first outline some desiderata 
– in light of the examination of Rubenstein’s approach – for an account to 
adequately explain the permissibility of acting in Aid Case. The desiderata 
are as follows: 
1. The separate agency of both the rescuer and the villainous aggressor. 
2. The fact that the rescuers have good intentions and merely foresee 
that harms will occur as a result of the actions of others.  
3. The “felt experience” of the rescuers. 
The Moral Purity Account, I submit, adequately meets the three desiderata 
and is superior to the “spattered hands” approach. 
5.4 The Moral Purity Account 
The Moral Purity Account has two parts. The first part outlines when it is 
morally permissible for rescuers to intervene in Aid Case, and the second 
part outlines when rescuers in such cases are blameworthy for the harms 
caused by the agency of another. In the course of building the account, I 
shall consider four different permutations of Aid Case.  
Consider the first: 
Infected Rescuer: One hundred individuals are stranded on 
a large island, and are about to die from a serious illness 
unless a rescuer provides a treatment to each. Behind the 
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large island is a small island with twenty healthy 
individuals. The rescuer has a choice of going on to the 
large island to provide medicines to each of the hundred, 
or to refrain. The rescuer carries a virus that is harmless to 
him and those on the large island, but lethal to those on 
the small island. As a foreseen but unintended 
consequence of the rescuer saving the one hundred, the 
virus will spread to the small island, killing all twenty 
inhabitants.110  
Would it be morally permissible for the rescuer to save the one hundred 
individuals? I claim that it would be. The intention of the rescuer is to save 
the one hundred individuals from their fatal illness. The deaths of the 
twenty individuals are a foreseen side-effect of his aiding the one 
hundred.111 There are competing interests in this case. The twenty do not 
want to be killed, and will be made worse off than they would have been 
                                                          
110 This case is inspired by UN peacekeepers in Haiti who inadvertently spread Cholera. 
This case is different in the respect that the peacekeepers’ harmful effects were both 
unforeseen and arose from alleged negligence (through an improperly managed human 
waste disposal site). The case I am considering assumes that there is no negligence on the 
part of the rescuers.  
111 I argue that although the number of people saved has to be greater than the number of 
people who are foreseeably killed, the number saved ought to be sufficiently greater. For 
instance, it would not be permissible to foreseeably kill 24 individuals in order to save 25, 
but it would be permissible (I assert) to foreseeably kill 20 in order to save 40. It is difficult 
to say precisely where the boundary lies between a permissible ratio of saved individuals to 
foreseeably killed individuals and an impermissible ratio. An explanation for this thought is 
that there are stronger moral constraints against harming people than there are against not 
aiding people, so more good action is required in order to outweigh the harm that is caused 
by the evildoer. However, a consequentialist would argue that there is no intrinsic 
difference between harming and not-aiding, so we could provide aid in cases where 100 
people are saved and 99 people are harmed, since more good is done overall. Whereas, I 
maintain that the bar for justifying harming is higher than the bar for justifying not-aiding. 
If the rescuers provide aid when the benefits do not sufficiently outweigh the harms caused 
by the evildoer, then the rescuers act impermissibly, but they are not blameworthy for the 
deaths that are caused by the evildoer. 
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otherwise, were it not for the rescuer’s intervention. The one hundred 
individuals will be made better off than they would have been before the 
intervention. The DDE can provide a principled explanation of why saving 
the one hundred and foreseeing that the twenty will die is permissible, 
where intentionally killing the twenty in order to save the one hundred 
would not be. The rescuer does not intend the deaths on the small island; 
they are a foreseen but unintended consequence of his intention to save the 
one hundred. Of course, one must also take into account the asymmetry 
between killing and letting die. It would be impermissible, for example, to 
save the hundred if one thereby foreseeably spread a virus that killed ninety 
others. But I submit that, in Infected Rescuer, the number of lives saved 
sufficiently outweighs the number of foreseen but unintended killings. For 
these reasons the rescuer acts permissibly.  
Is the rescuer blameworthy for the deaths of the twenty? Although the 
rescuer’s actions have caused the deaths of the twenty, I submit that he is not 
blameworthy for the deaths. I shall adopt Scanlon’s account of 
blameworthiness to provide an explanation as to why the rescuer in Infected 
Rescuer is not blameworthy for the deaths of the twenty.112 According to 
Scanlon, a person is blameworthy for an action when “his action indicates 
something about the agent’s attitudes toward others that impairs his 
relations with them” (2008: 145). An individual is blameworthy when their 
conduct reveals something about them which indicates an impairment of 
                                                          
112 If one were to use an account of blameworthiness that held that one is blameworthy if 
and only if one acted impermissibly, then one will get the same result in Infected Rescuer as 
well as the further cases under discussion in this paper. To demonstrate: (1) for someone to 
be blameworthy they must have acted wrongly. (2) The rescuer in Infected Rescuer did not 
act wrongly because their action was permissible. (C) Therefore, the rescuer is not 
blameworthy. The view I am defending here is consistent with this account of 
blameworthiness.  
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their relations with others. This impairment makes it appropriate for others 
to blame them, to hold attitudes toward them that are different from those 
that constitute the default moral relationship (Scanlon, 2008: 141). To 
illustrate, suppose that Ann drives recklessly, but through sheer good luck, 
she injures no one. Those around her who were endangered by her lack of 
concern for their safety can revise their attitudes toward Ann, given her 
reckless attitude towards their well-being.  
The rescuer does not act in such a way that his attitudes towards those 
whom his action affects are impaired by failing to show a concern for the 
welfare of others. His attitude towards the welfare of others is a positive one: 
concerned with saving people from disease. One may argue that because 
twenty people foreseeably died as a result of the rescuer’s action, his 
relationship to the victims is impaired. It was his actions that lead to the 
foreseeable deaths. He may have to offer compensation and an expression of 
regret to those affected. If an individual’s action is the cause of harm to 
another, then this individual may have a duty to provide compensation to 
the victim (Schroeder, 1997: 349). For example, if I accidently knock over 
someone’s vase, it is appropriate for me to apologise to the owner and offer 
to pay compensation. Being the cause of a death may also warrant an 
apology, even though one is not blameworthy for the death (Scanlon, 2008: 
150). Such an apology would not constitute a “genuine apology”, but will 
rather reflect the fact that the agent’s action has turned out badly.113 
However, there was nothing about the rescuer’s attitudes towards others 
which showed a failure to have concern for the welfare of others, and 
                                                          
113 According to Luc Bovens, “for a genuine apology, it is not sufficient that the offender 
admit that her action turned out badly – she must also recognise her culpability” (2008: 221). 
To the extent that the rescuer in Infected Rescuer is not culpable for the deaths he is not liable 
for a genuine apology.  
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consequently it is not appropriate to hold the rescuer as blameworthy for the 
deaths of the twenty.  
Consider now the following case, which is structurally equivalent to Aid 
Case: 
Villain-enabling Rescue: In order to rescue one hundred 
people deserted on an island with rising water that will 
soon engulf them, rescuers can build a bridge with the 
sole intention of allowing them to leave. If the bridge were 
built, all one hundred people would escape, but as a 
foreseen consequence, the bridge would give a villainous 
aggressor access to a smaller island nearby that is 
connected to it by a small further walkway. The small 
island is protected from the rising water (but it is too small 
to support the hundred on the larger island, which is why 
they need to escape via the bridge). The villainous 
aggressor would use the bridge to kill the twenty people 
that are on the smaller island.  
In this case I think that it would be permissible for the rescuers to build the 
bridge. The intention of the rescuers is merely to save the one hundred. As a 
foreseen and unintended side-effect of their aiding, a villainous aggressor 
harms twenty people. What is important about this case is that there is now 
the agency of two separate individuals. Because of this, it is not immediately 
clear that the DDE can explain why it is permissible to provide aid in this 
case. The reason is that the set-up of Villain-enabling Rescue is structurally 
different from most standard applications of the DDE, where the good effect 
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and the foreseen negative effect arise from the actions of a single agent.114 
One way of applying the DDE to Villain-enabling Rescue is to examine what 
answer it gives for each agent separately. For the rescuers, they intend to 
save one hundred, and they foresee that twenty will be killed by someone 
else. Rescuing would be permissible according to the DDE. But for the 
villainous aggressor, his actions are clearly impermissible – intending the 
deaths of twenty individuals for the goal of his own sadistic satisfaction. 
There are no foreseen but unintended consequences of the villainous 
aggressor’s action, since he is only able to perform his action if the rescuers 
perform theirs. According to the DDE, it is impermissible to intend harm to 
a person. The aggressor’s actions would also be impermissible because no 
good would be done to outweigh the harm.  
The following question then arises. Is it permissible for rescuers to provide 
aid if it follows that as a foreseen but unintended consequence another agent 
intentionally carries out a harm to others? One answer would be that it 
would be impermissible to provide aid, because although the rescuer does 
not intend harm, their actions provide the circumstances through which it is 
possible for another to intentionally cause harm.  
Another answer is to argue that it would in fact be permissible to intervene 
in Villain-enabling Rescue because the DDE should only apply to the actions 
of the rescuers. I think that this is the correct application since the action of 
                                                          
114 For example, in Quinn’s (1989) Terror Bomber case, a pilot in a just war intentionally kills 
twenty civilians in order to bring forward the end of the war, thereby saving many more 
lives. In Strategic Bomber a pilot in a just war aims to destroy a munitions factory in order to 
bring forward the end of the war, but as a foreseen and unintended consequence, the bombs 
also lead to the deaths of twenty civilians. Even though the same number of deaths arise in 
both cases for the same good purpose, the Terror Bomber acts impermissibly, whereas the 
Strategic Bomber acts permissibly. In Strategic Bomber, the intended target and the foreseen 
but unintended harms both arise through the actions of the pilot alone.   
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the villainous aggressor would not occur at all if it were not for the actions of 
the rescuers.  I think that this second approach is superior and that the harm 
being inflicted through the villainous agency of another or through one’s 
introducing an unintended threat does not alter the permissibility of 
rescuers providing aid.  
To further illustrate, consider the following case from Jeff McMahan (2002: 
239-40). Suppose that one is not a police officer or other agent of the state, 
but merely a morally-motivated stranger and can either prevent a terrorist 
attack that will kill fifty innocent people, or prevent the accidental explosion 
of a gas main that will kill fifty people and cause minor injuries to a few 
others. Suppose that any further ill effects of these disasters would be 
equivalent. McMahan claims that “it would not be unreasonable to suppose 
that one ought to prevent the explosion of the gas main” (Ibid.) [because it 
prevents more harm]. This is because the prevention of wrongdoing doesn’t 
matter much independently of the prevention of its consequences. One 
might argue in response that there is something uniquely bad about harmful 
consequences that are caused by wrongdoing, and as such it is preferable to 
prevent the terrorist attack. I assert, however, that from the perspective of an 
agent who performs an action that has a foreseen consequence not directly 
caused by their agency it does not make a difference whether the foreseen 
harm was caused by wrongdoing or by nature. There is a distinction to be 
drawn between bringing evil into the world that wasn’t there previously, 
and bringing about a set of consequences from evil intentions. It is better not 
to bring evil into the world. But in the scenarios under discussion in Aid 
Case, no new evildoers are brought into existence. The harms are caused by 
evildoers, but this is not important for assessing the badness of the 
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consequences themselves. Compare, for example, a person’s death as a 
result of a natural landslide versus the same death caused by a landslide that 
was exactly similar but was in fact caused by a villainous aggressor. In each 
case the consequences are equally bad.115 
 One question that may arise is whether it is more readily justifiable to 
intervene in Villain-enabling Rescue than Infected Rescuer, since in the former 
case the rescuer does not owe an apology and compensation for the harms 
that foreseeably arose from the agency of the villainous aggressor, whereas 
the rescuer ought to apologise in the latter case because of his special causal 
role in the deaths of innocents. These can be grounds for making an 
intervention in Villain-enabling Rescue more justifiable since the rescuers lack 
the burden of paying compensation or making an apology. Instead it is the 
villainous aggressor who bears the burden of moral sanctions through his 
culpability for deaths of the innocents. From the point of view of the 
rescuers there is greater reason to intervene in Villain-enabling Rescue than 
Infected Rescuer. I do not think that this is a troubling implication of the view. 
If two actions have the same consequences, but one action has greater moral 
sanctions on the individual than the other, then it is reasonable for the 
individual to prefer the latter action.  
One may question whether an intervention is more readily justifiable when 
it does not lead to the burden of compensation or apology than it will be in 
an alternative when it does, if both interventions are permissible and 
blameless. Although saving the 100 in both cases, where doing so is 
permissible and blameless, is equally justified all-things considered, there 
                                                          
115 Quinn (1989: 347) makes a similar point regarding the symmetry of the badness of 
consequences arising from direct harmful agency and indirect harmful agency. 
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may exist an agent-relative reason to prefer acting in one scenario rather 
than the other. Having the option of two equally permissible and blameless 
interventions that each saves the same number of individuals, an individual 
may reasonably choose one over the other if there are fewer moral sanctions.  
One may argue that in a case like Villain-enabling Rescue, the villain has a 
primary duty to compensate, but that this duty passes on to the rescuers if he 
were to die. I submit that in such a case the rescuers would have a duty to 
fulfil the compensatory duties, given their unique causal role in allowing the 
villain to carry out his deeds, along with other agents who had a 
contributory role in enabling the villain to cause harm. It might then be 
argued that an intervention will become less justifiable if it were to be 
known that the villain will die from a heart attack after his villainous deeds. 
In response, both interventions would be equally justified all-things 
considered because each would be equally permissible and blameless, but 
the rescuers would have more reason to intervene in the case where the 
villain aggressor does not have a heart attack.   
In order to now consider how the role of the separateness of the agency of 
the rescuers and the villainous aggressor plays a role in identifying 
blameworthiness for the deaths of innocents, I shall consider an example 
from Kamm. The example performs two functions for my argument. Firstly, 
it highlights how the separateness of agency can make a difference to 
blameworthiness. Secondly, Kamm’s example provides a case where one is 
not blameworthy for a harm that one has personally committed since one 
acted at the request of a villainous aggressor. I argue that if it is plausible to 
think that one is not blameworthy in this case, then this provides support for 
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the weaker claim I defend that one is not blameworthy for purely good acts 
that one performs which foreseeably lead another person to cause harm.   
Kamm argues that in some cases there are positive reasons to collaborate 
with evil (2007: 309). Kamm examines two types of cases; one where it is 
possible to harm others at the request of a villain, and another where there is 
the opportunity to harm others not at the request of an evil villain.116 Kamm 
argues that we are “often more willing to recommend an agent harming 
others in the first case than in the second” (Ibid). To illustrate this point, 
Kamm presents the following two cases:117 
Offer: The Captain is about to execute twenty randomly 
selected villagers. The Captain offers Jim to shoot one of 
the villagers. If Jim accepts the offer, then the Captain will 
let the other nineteen villagers go. If he refuses, all twenty 
will be shot by the Captain.  
Scan: The same scenario as Offer, but now Jim is hiding in 
the bushes and is in possession of an infallible brain-
scanning device that tells him that the Captain will kill all 
twenty unless Jim kills one. If Jim does kill the one, then 
the Captain will release the nineteen others, and if Jim 
does not kill the one, then the Captain will kill all 
twenty.118  
                                                          
116 It is possible for Jim to refuse the offer, but this would lead to all the villagers being killed 
by the Captain. 
117 These cases are adapted from Bernard Williams (1973). 
118 A less abstract example can also be constructed. For example, a judge in a town has the 
option of scapegoating one person in order to stop an angry mob from killing a greater 
number. The scapegoat would have been killed by the mob anyway. The mob calls for the 
one to be scapegoated, and if he is not, then they will kill the greater number. This is 
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Kamm introduces the notion of differential responsibility to explain why it 
would be more permissible for Jim to shoot in Offer than in Scan. If Jim 
shoots in Offer then the Captain will be solely blameworthy for the death of 
the villager.119 If Jim shoots in Scan then, she claims, he will be partly 
blameworthy for the death of the villager.120 What makes the Captain solely 
blameworthy for the negative consequences of Jim’s action in Offer is that 
the Captain created the evil scheme whereby the contingency of the better 
outcome (one villager dying rather than all twenty) is reliant on Jim’s killing. 
If the Captain did not make the offer, or create the unjust state of affairs, 
then no villagers would have died. The Captain’s act in Offer is “the 
initiation of a lethal plot” (Kamm, 2007: 312), and “we lay the negative 
consequences of the act at the Captain’s doorstep and not just negatively, 
that is, because he allowed Jim to kill, but positively, as something he 
brought about because he made the offer” (Ibid: 311). Although the structure of 
these cases differs somewhat from the Aid Case, by virtue of the fact that 
rescuers do not directly kill in order to save more from harm and because 
the person Jim kills would have been killed by the Captain anyway, there is 
a valuable insight for the distribution of blameworthiness in Aid Case. 
Returning to Villain-enabling Rescue, it is important in these cases that the 
aims of the rescuers and the villainous aggressor are separate. There is no 
explicit collaboration, and the rescuers do not intend harm (unlike Jim in 
                                                                                                                                                                   
sufficiently similar to Offer. An approximation of Scan can be made if one now assumes that 
the judge knows that this is what the mob are planning to do, so he can choose to scapegoat 
the one because he knows that they plan to kill a greater number if he doesn’t.   
119 Kamm argues that this would be true “even though Jim kills someone and the Captain 
winds up killing no one” (2007: 311). 
120 Kamm specifically has in the mind the idea of moral responsibility and moral 
blameworthiness. Although there is a sense in which Jim would be causally responsible for the 
death of the one if he chooses to shoot with respect to the fact that the negative 
consequences are attributable to his agency (Rosen, 2010: 684). 
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Offer). The evil plan of the villainous aggressor exists separately from the 
agency of the rescuers plan to save the one hundred people. The villainous 
aggressor uses the efforts of the rescuers as a means to carry out his evil 
project. Why should the rescuers be blameworthy for the actions that result 
from the evil plan from the agency of another? One might think that the 
rescuers bear some moral responsibility for the bad effects of their action of 
building a bridge because the villainous aggressor would not have killed the 
twenty people had they not built it. In response, I think that the fact that an 
intention to aid others is used by another to carry out a distinct and evil plan 
to harm others does not make those who aid others morally responsible for 
the harms resulting from this evil plan. 
This can be developed further by seeing how the separateness of the aims of 
the rescuers and the villainous aggressor can have implications for liability 
to blame. According to Elinor Mason (forthcoming) one can only be morally 
responsible for those actions that one has a “right relationship” with. For 
example, if one performs an action whilst being coerced their action is “not 
[their] own in the right way for him to be responsible for it” (Ibid.). Mason 
illustrates this with Offer. The captain dominates Jim’s will, and as such Jim 
is not responsible for his action. He doesn’t identify it as his action. 
Something similar can be said in Aid Case. The rescuers cannot identify with 
the action of the villainous aggressor as their action. This might seem 
obvious, since the actions of the villainous aggressor are his actions. But 
what is crucial is that, furthermore, the rescuers do not share the aims and 
desires of the aggressor. If the rescuers did share the aims and desires of the 
aggressor, and wished for him to carry out the harms as an indirect 
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consequence of their rescuer, then this would be grounds for thinking that 
they identify with the actions of the aggressor in the right way.  
One might argue that if one foresees particular consequences from one’s 
action then one relates in the right way, to some degree, to the consequences. 
This might be the case when there are direct foreseeable consequences that 
flow from one’s actions. But when there are foreseeable indirect 
consequences, it is difficult to see how mere foreseeability can entail that one 
is partly responsible for the act if one both did not share the aims of the act 
nor carry out the act. The foreseen harm that occurs in Villain-enabling Rescue 
is not only causally distant from the action of the rescuers, but if no other 
agent had intervened there would be no harmful side effect. This is in 
contrast to Infected Rescuer where the rescuer’s action of saving was also the 
direct cause of the foreseen harm to the islanders. This lack of a direct causal 
connection between the rescuers aiding and the harm caused by the 
villainous aggressor is what absolves the rescuers from blame in Villain-
enabling Rescue. After all, even in Infected Rescuer, the rescuer’s causal 
connection to the foreseen harm of the twenty was enough to make the 
rescuer liable for an apology or for compensation, but not enough to make 
him blameworthy for the deaths.  
To summarise, I have argued that in Infected Rescuer the rescuer is not 
blameworthy for the deaths of the twenty because he acted permissibly. He 
owes an apology and/or compensation to the victim in virtue of being the 
cause of the harm. Due to the differences between Villain-enabling Rescue and 
Infected Rescuer – that the rescuers were not the cause of the deaths in Villain-
enabling Rescue, and that it was another agent who was responsible for the 
negative effects – the rescuers are no more blameworthy in Villain-enabling 
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Rescue than they are in Infected Rescuer. Therefore, rescuers are not 
blameworthy in Villain-enabling Rescue. To connect this conclusion to the 
dialectic of the paper, it is important to note that Villain-enabling Rescue is 
structurally equivalent to Aid Case. Given that this is the case, I have 
demonstrated that (other things being equal) rescuers in Aid Case are not 
blameworthy for the harms that arise through the agency of another. The 
first part of the Moral Purity Account utilises the applied version of the DDE 
to state when it would be permissible for rescuers to intervene in Aid Case. 
The second part of the account is comprised of the account of 
blameworthiness previously discussed. The account of permissibility utilises 
the DDE. This is also implicitly used by the “spattered hands” account to 
determine when it is permissible to intervene in Aid Case (Rubenstein, 2015: 
108).121  
To further illustrate the view of permissibility outlined in the Moral Purity 
Account, consider the following case:  
Tsunami Terror: There are one hundred individuals on the 
larger island. A tsunami will shortly crash into the island 
and kill all one hundred. They could leave and save 
themselves, but due to a reasonable distrust of outsiders, 
the one hundred do not believe the warnings about the 
tsunami and refuse to evacuate the island. As a means of 
getting the hundred to leave, the rescuers could kill the 
twenty on the smaller island (who would be safe from the 
                                                          
121 Further evidence for this can be found when Rubenstein says that “the spattered hands 
framework suggests, first, that in addressing this question, INGOs should focus primarily 
on the likely consequences of their actions. Rather than simply “doing no harm,” they 
should, as the DDE suggests, seek to implement a principle of “proportionality.” (2015: 105). 
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tsunami) as a means of terrorising the one hundred into 
evacuating the larger island.  
The account claims that it would be impermissible for the rescuers to save 
the hundred by killing the twenty in this case. It is impermissible to 
intentionally kill the twenty as a means of saving the one hundred. A further 
explanation for the impermissibility of killing the twenty is that if one does 
so, one is thereby employing opportunistic agency. This is the use of others to 
further our own ends, and is something that the DDE “strongly 
discriminates against” (Quinn, 1989: 344). Further, on the Moral Purity 
Account the rescuers would be blameworthy for the deaths of the twenty. 
They intentionally cause harm to individuals, and the harmful effects flow 
from their agency. This is in contrast to Villain-enabling Rescue, where the 
intentional harm flowed from the agency of the villainous aggressor. This 
makes a difference to the blameworthiness that can be ascribed to rescuers in 
each case.  
Consider now the following variation: 
Tsunami Terror-enabling Case: This case has a similar 
structure to Tsunami Terror. The rescuers can either refrain 
from saving the one hundred, or they can intend to build a 
bridge so as to facilitate the evacuation of the island. The 
rescuers are unable to persuade the islanders to leave. 
Knowing this, the bridge is built by the rescuers because 
they foresee that a villainous aggressor will use the bridge 
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to kill twenty on the small island, which then spreads 
terror in the large island, and persuades them to leave.122  
Here the bridge is built knowing that the villainous aggressor will use it, and 
only because he will use it. Building the bridge because it will lead to the 
twenty being killed by the villainous aggressor does not imply that one 
intends the death of the twenty (Kamm, 2007: 95). To illustrate, the bridge 
isn’t built in order for the villainous aggressor to kill the twenty. The bridge 
is built because it is known that the villainous aggressor will kill the twenty, 
thereby facilitating the evacuation of the one hundred. The rescuers would 
not build the bridge unless it was expected that the villainous aggressor 
would kill the twenty and facilitate the escape of the one hundred. For it is 
consistent with building it only because they foresee that the aggressor will 
come that the rescuers wouldn’t, if the rescuer would not otherwise come 
without encouragement, encourage or induce the villainous aggressor over 
to the smaller island, knowing that he will kill twenty.  
I believe that because the deaths of the twenty are not intended by the 
rescuers, it is permissible for them to save the one hundred. This is true, 
even though the bridge is built only because the villainous aggressor kills 
the twenty. On the Moral Purity Account, the rescuers would not be 
blameworthy for the deaths. The deaths are intended and caused by the 
agency of another, not by the rescuers.123  
                                                          
122 This example shares a similar structure to Kamm’s “Party Case” (2007: 95). 
123 The Moral Purity Account is therefore also consistent with what is called the Doctrine of 
Triple Effect (DTE): “The DTE states: ‘A greater good that we cause and whose expected 
existence is a condition of our action, but which we do not necessarily intend, may justify a 
lesser evil that we must not intend but may have as a condition of action” (Kamm, 2007: 
118). 
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It is worth considering how different types of behaviour may be 
collaboration with evil and therefore impermissible. In Somalia Famine 
rescuers had to pay militants in order to access those who required aid. 
When one pays-off evil-doers, one is giving a direct financial contribution to 
those who are likely to use the resources to continue carrying out harm. To 
see where the Moral Purity Account stands on such cases, consider the 
following modification to Aid Case:  
Ransom Payment Rescue: There are one hundred 
individuals held hostage on an island who will soon die if 
they are not given life-saving medicines. The island is 
guarded by a villainous aggressor, who will grant access 
to the island for a ransom payment. If the aggressor 
receives the ransom payment he will then be enabled to 
kill twenty separate individuals. Rescuers can decide 
whether to pay the ransom or to refrain. 
If the rescuers refrain from paying the ransom the one hundred will die, and 
the twenty others will live. If the rescuers pay the ransom, then they will 
save the one hundred, but will also be providing the villainous aggressor 
with the means to kill the twenty. Would it be permissible to pay the 
ransom? One answer is that it would be impermissible because the ransom 
payment takes the form of bribery, and bribery is a mala in se – a wrong in 
itself. Another answer is to suggest that the payment is permissible because 
the rescuers do not intend the deaths of the twenty since their intention is to 
pay-off the aggressor in order to access the one hundred. If the payment is 
interpreted as a bribe, then I argue it would be impermissible for the 
rescuers to save the one hundred. This is because the act itself would be 
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wrong. But if instead the payment is viewed as a mere enabling of the saving 
of the one hundred then it would be permissible to pay the ransom. This is 
because Ransom Payment Rescue will have the same structure as Villain-
Enabling Rescue, in virtue of the payment both functioning as a means to save 
the one hundred, and as an enabler of the villainous aggressor’s plan to kill 
the twenty.      
5.5 Rubenstein and Responsibility    
The Moral Purity Account differs from Rubenstein’s “spattered hands” 
account because it claims that rescuers are not blameworthy for the negative 
effects of aiding others if their intentions are solely to save others, and that 
any negative effects come from the evil projects of another. The “spattered 
hands” account claims that rescuers would have some blameworthiness 
because they foresaw that their actions would indirectly lead to some 
causing harm to others. A virtue of the “spattered hands” account is that it 
takes the felt experience of the rescuers into consideration. To recall, the 
account states that the hands of rescuers become: 
“Dirty through more indirect means; they are spattered by 
dirt created primarily by others. Nonetheless dirt still 
clings to them: INGO’s good intentions do not shield them 
from moral responsibility for the predictable effects of 
their actions, even if those effects are indirect” 
(Rubenstein, 2015: 105). 
I have claimed that rescuers are not blameworthy for the side effects of their 
actions caused by a villainous aggressor. Further, because the harms 
occurring as a side effect arise from the agency of another, the rescuers do 
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not compromise their integrity as individuals. According to Bernard 
Williams (1973), for an individual to act with integrity is for the individual’s 
actions and decisions to flow from his projects and attitudes which he is 
most closely identified (116-7). The integrity of an individual is 
compromised when obliged to act in a particular way, as determined by the 
projects and plans of another, or of an impartial viewpoint. For example, in 
the Offer case, above, Jim’s integrity is compromised if he shoots villager 
without previously wanting to. A utilitarian would suggest that the correct 
thing to do would be to shoot the villager, for this increases the sum total of 
utility. However, doing so will compromise the integrity of Jim. Nothing of 
this sort occurs in Aid Case.124  
My preferred view is that rescuers may suffer from “agent regret” in Aid 
Case. Agent regret is a variety of regret whereby an agent themselves is 
causally responsible for an unintended harm that flows from their agency.  
For example, a conscientious lorry driver who runs over a small child who 
skips in front of the lorry before the driver has the opportunity to stop or 
swerve feels a distinct type of regret, because it was he who made the death 
happen, even though it was not intentional. This is not true of a spectator to 
the incident, who may legitimately feel regret about what has happened, but 
not agent regret.125  
Agent regret captures the felt experience of individuals whose good actions 
lead to another exploiting those actions in order to cause harm. Rescuers 
                                                          
124 It is not clear that the integrity of the rescuers is compromised when they carry out their 
benevolent projects and attitudes. If it were the case that the rescuers had to intentionally 
cause harm to some in order to save others, this may be a cause for compromised integrity.  
125 I shall leave aside the question of whether individuals ought to feel agent regret in such 
cases. Instead, I present this account as a possibility that is consistent with the Moral Purity 
Account. 
174 
 
may regret that their actions have been part of a causal chain that led to harm 
being caused.126 But this does not mean that moral dirt clings to them in the 
sense that they have a share of the blameworthiness for the harms that are 
caused, but instead that the rescuers wish that it was not them that made the 
conditions appropriate for a villainous aggressor to carry out their evil 
projects. Further, feeling agent regret does not entail that the agent is in 
anyway blameworthy for the harm that may inadvertently flow from their 
agency. This is consistent with the Moral Purity account. This is a more 
plausible account of the felt experience of the rescuers in Aid Case.  
The view I am developing can allow for the alteration of the moral 
relationship between the victim and the “perpetrator” even when blame is 
inappropriate. To illustrate, recall the lorry driver case. It may be 
appropriate for the child’s parents to not want to say hello to the lorry driver 
in the morning, let him look after their other children, or rely on him to fulfil 
a particular duty (Scanlon, 2008: 148). These forms of stigma or negative 
attitudes towards those who are causally responsible for a state of affairs 
may be appropriate, even though these individuals are not blameworthy for 
the harms that they caused. In Aid Case it may be appropriate for those who 
bear the harms of the villainous aggressor to modify their moral relationship 
with the rescuers whose actions indirectly caused harms through the agency 
of another. For example, individuals may become less trustworthy of 
rescuers if it is known that their aiding led to the circumstances in which a 
villainous aggressor killed innocents.  
                                                          
126 Bernard Williams argues that “the sentiment of agent regret is by no means restricted to 
voluntary agency. It can extend far beyond what one intentionally did to almost anything for 
which one was causally responsible in virtue of something one intentionally did” (1993: 43). 
To this extent, it is possible for an agent to feel regret about a harm caused by a villainous 
aggressor, if it was the case that this agent’s act was causally responsible for the circumstances 
that allowed for the villainous aggressor to cause harm.   
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To this extent, the Moral Purity Account provides a plausible account of the 
three criteria listed in Section 5.3.3 It adequately captures the fact that the 
rescuers only intend for the one hundred to be saved, and foresee that the 
agency of another will kill the twenty. It is also sensitive to the separateness 
of the agency of the rescuers and the villainous aggressor; that the rescuers 
only intend to carry out a plan that saves individuals, whereas the villainous 
aggressor intends only to kill innocent people. The Moral Purity account is 
also sensitive to the “felt experience” of the rescuers in Aid Case.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the Moral Purity Account provides a more 
plausible conceptualisation of Aid Case than the “spattered hands” approach. 
The “spattered hands” approach argues that sometimes rescuers share a 
degree of blameworthiness for the harms caused by another. I have argued 
that this is not the case. The Moral Purity Account also provides an 
independently plausible explanation for both the separateness of the agency 
of the rescuers and the villainous aggressor, along with the “felt experience” 
of rescuers acting in Aid Case.  
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